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LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES
INTRODUCTION
In Stephenson v. Woodward, the Supreme Court of Kentucky functionally
affirmed a quo warranto against a sitting member of the senate. Although
a respectable argument can be made that the person in question was in
fact not qualified to serve,' the senate itself had deliberated on the issue
6and had reached its own respectable conclusion that she was qualified.
More importantly, the Constitution of Kentucky, like the Constitution of
the United States and that of virtually every other state,' authorizes each
3 Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2oo5).
4 Black's Law Dictionary defines quo warranto as "[a] common-law writ used to inquire
into the authority by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1285 (8th ed. 2oo4). Because Stephenson proceeded indirectly from a statute, KRS
118.176, it was not literally a quo warranto, but it had much the same effect. The court below
(the Franklin Circuit Court) declared that Dana Scum Stephenson could not serve in the
Senate and enjoined her from doing so, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the
declaratory portion of this judgment. See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 173 ("[W]e affirm that
portion of the [judgment below] declaring that Stephenson is not constitutionally qualified for
the office of State Senator and may not be seated."). Stephenson subsequently resigned. See
Ky. SEN. JOUR. 1-2 (Jan. 3, 2oo6). As we explain further below, quo warranto has not historically
been available against a member of the legislature. See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Tomlinson,
2o Kan. 692, 703 (1878) ("We are not cited to a single case in the federal or state courts, where
any member of congress, or any member of a state legislature, from the foundation of the
government to the present time, has been ousted by quo warranto."). See infra notes 740-59
and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. The list of legislators who have not met
the qualifications for membership is quite long, and indeed quite distinguished. It includes
Henry Clay, who served in the Senate of the United States despite being underage, see infra
note 438, and Ed Baker, who represented Oregon in the same place despite actively serving
as a colonel in the Army, see infra notes 310-12 and accompanying text. In an oblique sense,
it also includes the great Edward Coke, who was elected to Commons in 1625 and who
remained a member thereof despite having been made a sheriff by Charles I. See Harold
Hulme, The Sheriff as a Member of the House of Commons From Elizabeth to Cromwell, I J. MOD.
HIST. 361, 367-70 (1929). Clay and Baker were never subject to a challenge, but Coke was,
although Commons took no action. See id. at 368-69. Coke stayed away from Parliament,
however, thereby serving the King's goal of keeping a leader of the opposition out of action.
See id. at 369.
6 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
7 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. s; ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 5 i; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12; ARiz.
CONsT. art. IV, pt. 2, § 8; ARK. CONsT. art. 5, § II; CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 5; COLO. CONsT. art. V, §
10; CONN. CONsT. art. III, § 7; DEL. CONsT. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 2; GA. CONsT. art.
III, § 7, para. 7; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 9; ILL. CONsT. art. 4, § 6; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 10; IOWA
CONsT. art. III, § 7; KAN. CONsT. art. 2, § 8; Ky. CONST. § 38; LA. CONsT. art. 3, § 7; ME. CONST. art.
IV, Pt. 3, § 3; MD. CONST. art. III, § 19; MAsS. CONST. Pt. 2, Ch. I, § II, art. IV, X; MICH. CONST.
art. IV, § 16; MINN. CONsT. art. IV, § 6; Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 38; Mo. CoNsT. art. III, § I8; MONT.
CONsT. art. V, § io; NEB. CONST. art. III, § to; NEv. CONsT. art. 4, § 6; N.H. CONST. Pt. II, arts.
22, 35; N.J. CONsT. art. IV, § 4, para. 2; N.M. CONsT. art. IV, § 7; N.Y. CONsT. art. 3, § 9; N.C.
CONsT. art. II, § 20; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 6; OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 30; OR. CONsT. art. IV, § I I;
PA. CONsT. art. 2, § I I; R.I. CONsT. art. VI, § 6; S.C. CONsT. art. III, § I I; S.D. CONsT. art. III,
§ 9; TENN. CONsT. art. II, § I I; Thx. CONST. art. III, § 8; UTAH CONsT. art. VI, § 10; VT. CONST.
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house of the legislature to be the "judge of" its members' "qualifications,
elections and returns. 8 According to the Court, the senate's authority did
not apply because a lower court had found the person unqualified in a sepa-
rate action litigated before the senate convened. What the Court never
really explained was how this earlier ruling could supersede the senate's
authority without contradicting the language of the constitution.'° This ex-
traordinary reasoning, which defies longstanding tradition and precedent,'I
is inconsistent with legislative independence, which the Court itself has12
recognized as a critical facet of separation of powers. The decision is also
a blow to textualism, which the Court has frequently identified as an impor-
tant ground for interpreting the constitution. Because of these apparent
ch. II, § 14; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 24; WIs.
CONST. art. IV, § 7; WYo. CONsT. art. 3, § 10. See generally Note, The Legislature's Power to Judge
the Qualifications ofIts Members, 19 VANo. L. REv. 1410, 1410(1966) [hereinafter Vanderbilt Note];
Jack Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresentation in PoliticalAdvertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36
EMORY L.J. 853, 877 & n. 12 (1987).
8 Ky. CONST. § 38. This section provides in full that "[e]ach House of the General
Assembly shall judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, but a
contested election shall be determined in such manner as shall be directed by law." Id. For
specific consideration of the last clause of section 38 as it might apply to Stephenson, see infra
notes 88o-88 and accompanying text.
9 See Stephenson, 182 S.W3d at 167-68.
1o The Court's analysis on this point is cryptic. After holding that the Jefferson Circuit
Court "had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter and grant relief" before the Senate convened,
it went on to state that, "for substantively different reasons, we affirm that portion of the
Franklin Circuit Court judgment declaring that Stephenson is not constitutionally qualified
for the office of State Senator and may not be seated." Id. at 173. It never fully explained
what those "substantively different reasons" were, however.
ii The House of Commons asserted a prerogative to determine its prospective
members' eligibility for service over against the Crown as early as 1586, in correspondence
with Elizabeth I. See infra notes 71-225 and accompanying text for a general discussion of
history underlying development of the privilege; see also 79 CONG. REC. 9770 (June 20, 1935)
(Sen. Connally) ("Under the Constitution we have the right to pass upon the qualifications of
Senators; and if a i5-year-old boy came up here with a certificate of election, and we seated
him, he would be a United States Senator, and there is no power on earth which could take
him out except the people at the next election."); 68 CONG. REC. 987 (Dec. 22, 1926) (article
by Sen. Norris) ("[W]hen our forefathers framed the Constitution, they provided ... that the
Senate should be the sole judge of the qualifications and elections of its members .... From
its decree there is no appeal, and no other court or other body of men can withhold its arm
by injunction or other process."); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 294 (Jan. 13, 1862) (Sen.
Sumner) ("This, at least, I do know: the Senate is the judge, without appeal, with regard to
the seats of its members ...."); lO REG. DEB. 3 (Dec. 2, 1833) (Sen. Clay) ("It was the right,
and the imperative duty of the Senate, to say who were to be the Senators, and who were the
individuals to be associated in the performance of the important duties which devolved upon
them."). For examples of legislative exercise of this privilege, see infra notes 227-679.
12 See generally Taylor v. Beckham, 56 SW. 177, 179 (Ky. 19oo) (discussing the importance
of protecting the legislature from the executive). See infra notes 760-89 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the contest that gave rise to this case.
13 See Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 358 (Ky. 2006) (noting the importance of
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defects, and because the opinion will quite likely produce uncertainty in
the areas of elections and separation of powers, the Court should consider
limiting or overruling it as precedent at the first opportunity.
14
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we set forth the factual
background for the case. In Part II, we discuss the various historical and
legal principles that underlie the legislative privilege at issue in Stephen-
son. In Part III, we examine the case in light of these principles, noting
that the Court appears to have reached its holding in error. Our criticism of
the Court's analysis takes two specific forms. First, we criticize the Court's
implication that the general assembly could delegate to the judiciary ir-
revocable authority to resolve disputes over the qualifications of legisla-
tors-elect.17 Second, we criticize the Court's indication that the legislative
privilege to judge the qualifications, elections, and returns of members ap-
plies only to individuals who have already been admitted to service.
18
interpreting the Constitution according to its "clear and unambiguous" meaning); Williams
v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 26o, 268 (Ky. 1998) (citing Ky. State Bd. for Elementary and Secondary
Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.zd 877 (Ky. 1979)) ("This Court's [precedent] provides a proper
methodology for constitutional analysis. It requires that text be the beginning point .... ); see
also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ThE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 119 (1993) ("Any system of interpretation
that disregards the constitutional text cannot deserve support."); Akhil Reed Amar, Fidelity in
Constitutional Theory: Fidelity Through History: A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism,
and Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1658 (997) ("I don't want to affirm the idea of
sola scriptura, that it's text only, but it seems to me that text does matter in this culture.");
Michael W. McConnell, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Fidelity as Intergriy: The Importance of
Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin 's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278-79 0997) ("If the Framers' words have authority for us today,
this is because, in Chief Justice Marshall's words, 'the people have an original right to establish,
for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their
own happiness."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803))); Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 429-30(1985) ("To the extent that society wishes
to influence the direction of law in a conscious fashion, it will do so with language."); Douglas
Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEx. L. REV 343, 346
(1981) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: ATEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(198o)) ("Certainly the justifications for judicial review given by The Federalist and Marbury
v. Madison permit invalidation only for inconsistency with the Constitution itself, and not for
inconsistency with judicial notions of fundamental fairness.").
14 See infra notes 89i-95 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 19-7 o and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 71-797 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 823-3o and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 831-45 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings in Jefferson Circuit Court
In the general election of November 2, 2004, Dana Seum Stephenson and
Virginia L. Woodward were opposing candidates for the office of Kentucky
State Senator from the 37th district, which occupies a fairly narrow strip
of land that meanders east from the Ohio River more than halfway across
Jefferson County. On November 1, the day before the election, Woodward
brought a motion against Stephenson in Jefferson Circuit Court under Ken-
tucky Revised Statute (KRS) 118.176, Kentucky's statute for challenging• , 19
a candidate's bonafides. Specifically, Woodward argued that Stephenson
had not "resided in" Kentucky for six years "next preceding" her election,
as required by section 32 of the constitution. An array of facts gave cred-
ibility to Woodward's contention, with particular reference to the period
from 1997 to 2001, when Stephenson displayed substantial indicia of hav-
21
ing resided in Indiana. In her motion, Woodward also named the Jef-
ferson County Board of Elections, the Kentucky State Board of Elections,
and the secretary of state as respondents." The next day, the voters of the
district chose Stephenson over Woodward by a substantial margin to repre-23
sent them in the senate.
At a hearing on November 3, Woodward presented evidence in support
of her argument that Stephenson had not "resided in" Kentucky during
19 KRS 118.176(2) provides in part as follows:
The bona fides of any candidate seeking nomination or election
in a primary or general election may be questioned by any qualified
voter entitled to vote for such candidate or by an opposing candidate
by summary proceedings consisting of a motion before the Circuit
Court of the judicial circuit in which the candidate whose bona fides is
questioned resides. An action regarding the bona fides of any candidate
seeking nomination or election in a primary or general election may be
commenced at any time prior to the general election.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.176(2) (West zoo6).
20 Section 32 provides in pertinent part as follows:
No person shall be a Senator who, at the time of his election, is not a
citizen of Kentucky, has not attained the age of thirty years, and has not
resided in this State six years next preceding his election, and the last
year thereof in the district for which he may be chosen.
Ky. CONST. § 32.
21 See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
22 See Motion Pursuant to KRS § 118.176 to Disqualify Candidate at 1-2, Woodward v.
Stephenson, No. 04-CI-09261 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Ky. Nov. 1, 2004).
23 See Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-C-o1676, slip op. at I (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. June
1, 2005) ("Woodward received 21,750 votes and Stephenson received 22,772 votes.").
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the disputed period. 4 This included testimony from Stephenson herself.2 5
Stephenson's response took two basic forms. First, she provided testimony
to the effect that she had "resided in" both Kentucky and Indiana during
the period in question.16 Second, she presented various legal objections
to the proceeding, including in particular the argument that the senate's
authority to judge its members' qualifications precluded the court from
exercising jurisdiction after the election." This argument was also made
by David L. Williams, president of the senate, who had intervened as a
respondent in the proceedings.28
On November 22, the court held largely, if not entirely, in Woodward's
favor, rejecting respondents' jurisdictional arguments and finding Stephen-
son ineligible to serve. 9 In reaching the latter conclusion, the court relied
upon various evidence adduced at trial. First, by her own testimony Ste-
phenson and her husband had purchased a house in Jeffersonville, Indiana,
and had "lived" there from 1997 until 2001, during most of which time
she had been attending graduate school in that state.30 Second, Stephen-
son had obtained a driver's license from Indiana in 1997, giving Jefferson-
ville as her place of residence, and had kept this license until after she had
moved back to Kentucky.' Third, Stephenson had registered to vote in
Indiana shortly after moving to Jeffersonville and had voted in that state.32
Fourth, Stephenson had insured her car in Indiana while residing in Jef-
fersonville.33 Fifth, Stephenson had averred in a complaint that she was a
resident of Indiana during this period.3 Proceeding then to the question of
remedy, the court began by noting the lack of clear direction from the stat-
ute as to how it should proceed in the present circumstances." This is not
24 See Woodward, No. o4-CI-o9261, slip op. at 2.
25 Id.
26 See Dana Seum Stephenson's Memorandum in Opposition to Movant's Motion for
Relief Under KRS § 118.176 at 15-26, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o926i (Jefferson
Cir. Ct., Ky. Nov. 22, 2004).
27 See id. at 9-o.
28 See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at i, Woodward v. Stephenson, No.
04-CI-09261 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Ky. Nov. 8, 2004). Senator Williams appeared specially. See id.
at i n. i (reserving rights).
29 See Woodward, No. o4-CI-o9261, slip op. at 6 ("Clearly, this Court has jurisdiction to
hear this case pursuant to this delegation and the plain language from KRS 118.176."); id. at
13 ("[This Court finds that Ms. Stephenson is not a bona fide candidate for the office of State
Senate from the 37"' District because she has not met the six-year residency requirement
found in Ky. Const. § 32 for the office of State Senate.").
30 See id. at 2.
31 See id. at 3.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 Seid. at 13. KRS 118.176(4) provides in part as follows:
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surprising, given the historical role of a statute like KRS 118.176 as a means
of regulating elections and access to the ballot. Given that the election had
already occurred, the statute could not operate in its customary manner:
The Court must now fashion an appropriate remedy. Ms. Woodward
requests that votes cast for Ms. Stephenson not be counted, making her the
de facto winner of the election. To do so would be to disregard the votes of
over 22,000 people who cast a ballot for Ms. Stephenson in this race, which
this Court does not take lightly. Ideally, this Court would like to call a spe-
cial election to enable each voter in this district an opportunity to cast a bal-
lot again for the candidate of his or her choice-as long as both candidates
satisfy the requirements of Ky. Const. § 32. However the legislature did not
provide this as a potential remedy for this situation.
The court went on to hold that the Jefferson County Board of Elections
should not count the votes cast for Stephenson.37 The board complied with
this order the following day.
B. Proceedings in the Senate, Franklin Circuit Court,
and the Supreme Court of Kentucky
Although no party to the proceeding in Jefferson Circuit Court sought re-
view of that court's order, the matter was far from resolved. On December
7, Stephenson gave notice of a contest in the senate in accordance with
chapter 120 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the chapter governingS 38
contested elections. Six days later, on December 13, the state board of
elections met to consider the status of the 37th district and unanimously
chose not to act on a motion to issue a certificate of election to Woodward.
39
If the court finds the candidate is not a bona fide candidate it must
so order, and certify the fact to the board of elections, and the candidate's
name shall be stricken from the written designation of election officers
filed with the board of elections or the court may refuse recognition or
relief in a mandatory or injunctive way.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.176(4) (West 2006).
36 Woodward, No. o4-CI-o926i, slip op. at 13.
37 See id. at 14 ("IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Jefferson County Board of
Elections not count any votes cast for Dana Seum Stephenson for the office of State Senate
for the 371 District.").
38 See Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Ky. 2oo5). KRS Chapter 120
sets forth the rules for contesting elections in a variety of contexts. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. ch.
120 (West 2oo6). KRS 120.195, 120.205, and 120.215 set forth rules specifically applying to
contested elections for seats in the General Assembly. Id. at §§ 120.195, 120.205, 120.215.
(Although KRS 120.205 speaks solely in terms of contested elections for the office of Governor
and Lieutenant Governor, KRS 120.215 adopts the procedures and rules set forth in KRS
120.205.)
39 See Al Cross, Panel Won't Certify RaceforSenate; Members Expect Justices to Decide Residency
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Then, on December 15, Woodward brought an original action in Franklin
Circuit Court against the state board of elections and the secretary of state,
as well as Stephenson and Williams. Among other things, she asked the
court to put an end to the contest, prevent Stephenson from taking a seat
in the senate, and require Williams, and through him the full senate, to
admit Woodward to membership. 40 She also asked the court to require the
state board of elections and the secretary of state to meet and issue her a
certificate of election.41
On December 21, Woodward was heard on two motions for temporary
injunctive relief before Special Judge William T Jennings. First, she asked
the court to require the state board of elections and the secretary of state
to meet and issue a certificate of election to her.4' The court granted this
motion. Second, she asked the court to prevent Stephenson from pursuing
the contest.43 The court denied this motion, reasoning that resolution of
the contest lay solely with the senate. 44
On December 30, Woodward gave notice of two additional motions for
temporary injunctive relief, one against Stephenson and the other against
Williams. 45 The motion for relief against Stephenson was identical to the
motion Judge Jennings had denied on December 21.46 In her motion
Dispute, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Dec, 14, 2004, at Ai.
40 Verified Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15-17, Woodward v.
Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o1676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 15, 2004).
41 Seeid. at 16.
42 See Amended Notice for Hearing for Motion for Temporary Injunction Directed at
Respondents, Trey Grayson and the State Board of Elections at i, Woodward v. Stephenson,
No. o4-CI-o1676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 17, 2004).
43 See Amended Notice for Hearing for Motion for Temporary Injunction Directed
at Respondent, Dana Seum Stephenson at i, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o1676
(Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 17, 2004).
44 See Transcript of Hearing at 6:24-7:1, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-oi676
(Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 21, 2004); see also id. at 1:19-2:2 ("[Tjhe General Assembly has
delegated certain pre-election challenges to the courts. The courts only get their power
through that type of delegation. And while they have delegated the authority for the courts
to determine the bonafides of potential candidates, they have kept unto themselves all post-
election contests for General Assembly members. And those are vested solely in the General
Assembly.")
45 See Motion for Temporary Injunction Directed at Respondent, Dana Seum Stephenson
Woodward v. Stephenson, No. 04-CI-O1676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 30, 2004); Motion for
Temporary Injunction Directed at Respondent, David Williams, In his Official Capacity as
President of the Kentucky State Senate and Official Representative of all Members of the
Kentucky State Senate, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-oi676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky.
Dec. 30, 2004).
46 Compare Amended Notice for Hearing for Motion for Temporary Injunction Directed
at Respondent, Dana Seum Stephenson at i, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o1676
(Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 17, 2004) ("Please take notice that ... Petitioner, Virginia L.
Woodward, will make a Motion for Temporary Injunction prohibiting Respondent, Dana
Seum Stephenson, from pursuing a purported election contest because such contest seeks to
2006- 2007]
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against Williams, Woodward sought to require Williams, and through him
the full Senate, to admit her to membership.
47
Less than a week later, on Januar% 4, 2005, Stephenson and Williams
brought separate motions to dismiss. The court took Woodward's two
motions for temporary injunctive relief under advisement pending resolu-
tion of the motions to dismiss. That same day, the senate met to organize
for its new session. Shortly after it came to order, a motion was made to
establish the membership of the body, specifically excluding Woodward on
the ground that the voters of the district had not chosen her. This carried
49
by a voice vote.
Later that day, the senate established a board to hear and report on the
contest. In accordance with KRS 120.205 and 120.215, the statute gov-
erning contests for seats in the legislature, the senate randomly selected
nine members to serve on the board, and the board began its hearings and
deliberations.'s On January 6, the members of the board issued three re-
ports-one by a majority of five, a second by a minority of three, and a
third by a minority of one. The majority concluded that Stephenson was
not qualified to serve and that the senate should admit Woodward.5' The
minority of three concluded that Stephenson was qualified to serve and
that the senate should admit her." The minority of one concluded that the
overturn a final court order in violation of the separation of powers doctrine...."), with Motion
for Temporary Injunction Directed at Respondent, Dana Scum Stephenson, Woodward v.
Stephenson, No. 04-CI-0 1676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 30, 2004) ("Petitioner, Vrginia L.
Woodward. ... moves this Court to enter a temporary injunction prohibiting [Stephenson]
from pursuing a purported election contest because such contest seeks to overturn a final
court order in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.").
47 See Motion for Temporary Injunction Directed at Respondent, David Williams, in his
Official Capacities as President of the Kentucky State Senate and Official Representative of
All Members of the Kentucky State Senate at 1-2, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o 1676
(Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Dec. 30, 2004) ("Petitioner, Virginia L. Woodward, moves this Court to
enter a temporary injunction ordering [Senator Williams], in his official capacities as President
of the Kentucky State Senate and official representative of all members of the Kentucky State
Senate, to immediately seat Virginia L. Woodward and permit her to fully participate as the
duly-elected Senator from the 37th district in the business and affairs of the [Senate] ... ").
48 See Respondent Dana Scum Stephenson's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. 04-CI-o i676
(Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Jan. 4, 2005); Motion to Dismiss [of David L. Williams], Woodward v.
Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o 676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Jan. 4, 2005).
49 See Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 165-66 (Ky. 2005).
50 See id. at 166. Although Republicans outnumbered Democrats in the Senate, the
Board as chosen actually had five Democratic and four Republican members.
51 See Report of Determination of the Kentucky State Senate Election Contest Board
at 9 (Jan. 6, 2005).
52 See Report No. 2 of the Election Contest Board 4 (Jan. 6, zoo5) (hereinafter Report
No. 2].
[Vol. 95
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES
senate should declare the seat vacant and that a special election should be
called. 3
On January 7, the senate rejected the first report and adopted the sec-
ond. It then adopted Senate Resolution 35, which reaffirmed the second55
report's conclusion that Stephenson was qualified to serve. This rested
on a finding that she had resided in Kentucky for six years before her elec-
tion, including the period before May 2001 when she had substantial in-
dicia of residing in Indiana as well as Kentucky. The specific grounds for
this finding were several in number, but they reduced to a conclusion that
Stephenson had maintained sufficient contact with Kentucky during the
disputed period to establish valid dual residence. First, since 1995 she had
continuously owned a home in Louisville. Second, on a typical day during
this period she had taught children in one form or another from early in the
morning until early evening at Pleasure Ridge Park High School ("PRP")
in Louisville. Third, after performing these duties she would often go to
her home in Louisville. Fourth, she would often then return to PRP to
serve as a coach. Fifth, she would often spend the night in Louisville if
she stayed late at PRP. Sixth, she would take part in various educational
activities at PRP on Saturdays. Seventh, she worshiped in Louisville on
Sundays. Finally, her stepchildren, her husband, and she would often stay
at her home in Louisville during days off because it had a pool. 56 Shortly
after the ssenate adopted this resolution, Stephenson took the oath of of-
fice.
That did not quell the controversy, though. On January 14, the Frank-
lin Circuit Court denied Stephenson's and Williams' motions to dismiss
and entered an order temporarily enjoining Stephenson from serving in the
senate.57 The court justified its denial of the motions to dismiss, notwith-
standing the language of section 38, on the ground that the final clause of
that section-"but a contested election shall be determined in such man-
ner as shall be directed by law"-presented a substantial question as to
whether courts could sit in judgment in this context pursuant to such a
53 See Election Contest Board Report No. 3 at i (Jan. 6, 2005) Ihereinafter Report No.
31.
54 See Minutes, Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 36-37 (Jan. 7, 2005) (motion
to adopt Determination of Election Contest Board defeated, 15 voting yea, 22 voting nay); id.
at 37-38 (motion to adopt Report No. 2 passed, 20 voting yea, 16 voting nay). After the Senate
adopted Report No. 2, Senator Bob Leeper moved for the adoption of Report No. 3. Senator
Williams, in the chair, ruled that this motion was out of order because the Senate had already
adopted Report No. 2. Id. at 38.
55 See id. at 40 (motion to adopt SR 35 passed).
56 See Report No. 2, supra note 52, at 3.
57 See Order Overruling Motion to Dismiss and Granting Temporary Injunction Directed
at Respondent, Dana Scum Stephenson [hereinafter Order of Jan. 14, 2005], Woodward v.
Stephenson, No. 04-CI-oi676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Jan. 14, 2005).
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statute as KRS 118.176.'8 Approximately two weeks later, at a hearing on
January 26, the court inquired into the status of Woodward's motion of Jan-
uary 4 for a temporary injunction requiring Williams, and through him the
full senate, to admit her to membership. Woodward proceeded with this
motion and the court heard argument thereon. On January 28, the court
denied this motion.5 9
In early February, Stephenson and Williams sought interlocutory relief
in the Kentucky Court of Appeals from the Franklin Circuit Court's order
of January 14, which temporarily enjoined Stephenson from serving in the
senate. On February 5, the Supreme Court of Kentucky transferred these
motions to its own docket. On March 17, the Court affirmed the temporarl
injunction on the ground that it did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Justices Keller and Scott dissented, reasoning that the judiciary lacks juris-
diction to supervise the senate in the exercise of its authority under section
38.61
The parties then brought cross-motions for summary judgment. On
June 1, 2005, the Franklin Circuit Court entered an order declaring Ste-
phenson ineligible to serve in the senate and incapable of admission to that
body. 6' The court then went on to enjoin Stephenson permanently from
serving in the Senate and to deny any relief, equitable or declaratory, that
would enable Woodward to lay claim to a seat therein.63 Whereas the court
had previously justified its decision against Stephenson and Williams in
terms of the final clause of section 38,
64 in this order it justified its decision
to exclude Stephenson from the Senate to a large extent, if not completely,65
on section 2 of the constitution, which provides that "[a]bsolute and arbi-
trary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere
58 See id. at 3-4.
59 See Order Denying Temporary Injunctive Relief Directed at Respondent, David
Williams in his Capacity as President of the Kentucky State Senate and as a Representative
of That Body at 4, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o1676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. Jan. 28,
2005). According to the court, mandatory relief could not lie because, in the court's view, the
Senate had more than one course of action available to it. See id. at 3-4.
60 See Stephenson v. Woodward, Nos. 2005-SC-oo96-TG, 2005-SC-0097-TG, slip op. at
i (Ky. Mar. 17, 2005).
61 See Stephenson, Nos. 2005-SC-oo96-TG, zoo5-SC-oo97-TG, slip op. (Keller, J.,
dissenting).
62 See Order at 15, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. 04-CI-ot676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky.
June I, 2005).
63 See id.
64 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
65 See Order at 6, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. 04-CI-ot676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. June
1, 2005) ("In Justice Keller's dissent, he admits that courts normally have jurisdiction to review
actions of the Legislative Branch. But, he argues, the Kentucky Constitution has removed the
power to determine post-election contests from the courts under Section 38 and given it to the
Legislative Branch. The dissent does not address the issue of whether the General Assembly
is allowed to act arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of Section 2 of the constitution.")
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in a republic, not even in the largest majority." On July 5, the court de-. , .67
nied Woodward's motion to alter or amend.
Cross-appeals followed, as well as motions for transfer to the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, which were granted. On December 22, 2005, the Court
affirmed in part and reversed in part.68 Although the exact nature of the
Court's analysis is not clear, it upheld the lower court's declaration that
Stephenson was unqualified and therefore could not serve in the senate.
In principal part, the Court justified its decision on the ground that the
legislature had delegated authority to judge the qualifications of would-
be members to the courts pursuant to KRS 118.176, and that such del-
egation did not interfere with section 38 because the senate's authority
thereunder did not extend to an individual, like Stephenson, who was not
a "member" when the Jefferson Circuit Court had found her unqualified to69
serve. This interpretation of section 38, we submit, is inconsistent with
accepted sources of authority in constitutional interpretation. In partic-
ular, this interpretation would render the legislature's authority to judge
"elections" and "returns" meaningless, given that "election" and "return"
always precede an individual's appearance in the chamber for admission.
Second, legislatures in the Anglo-American tradition have been adjudicat-
ing the "qualifications, elections and returns" of prospective members for
centuries. Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly
recognized that the word "member" in this context includes prospective
members.
70
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The basis for a provision like section 38 is not immediately apparent. The
Constitution of Kentucky, like the Constitution of the United States and
that of every other state, sets forth reasonably precise requirements for
membership in the legislature. Along with being elected and returned, 7' a
66 KY. CONST. § 2.
67 Order at i, Woodward v. Stephenson, No. o4-CI-o 676 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. July 5,
2005).
68 See Stephenson v. Woodward, i8z S.W.3 d 162, 164 (Ky. 2005).
69 See id. at 167--68 (Ky. 2005). Justices Scott and Roach dissented. See id. at 211 (Scott,
J., dissenting) ("[Tihe acts of the majority of this Court, in this decision, are unconstitutional,
as outside the powers granted us. And in doing so, they are as wrong as was the Senate."
(citation omitted)); id. at 192 (Roach, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority's approach is built on
the fundamentally mistaken belief that any entity-including the circuit court, this Court, or
the state board of elections-can bind the Senate as to questions related to the qualifications,
elections, and returns of its members.").
70 See Barry v. United States ex re/. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 615 (1929). Please see
infra notes 797-893 for further discussion of Stephenson.
71 "Election" pertains literally to the votes cast. A "return," by contrast, pertains to the
indicia of election that administrative and executive officials provide to the apparent winner
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would-be member must possess certain qualifications, principally relating
to age, citizenship, and residency7 2 All of these concepts are familiar to the
judiciary and are well within the scope of judicial competence. Indeed,
the application of a major premise,-such as the requirement that a person
be "elected," to a disputed minor premise, such as the question of whether
one candidate received more votes than another, is the judiciary's stock in
trade. As a consequence, numerous courts, including the highest Court of
Kentucky, have recognized the authority conferred by a provision like sec-
tion 38 as judicial in nature."
But why authorize the legislature to resolve these kinds of disputes at
all? Why not allow the judiciary to resolve disputes that appear justiciable
in nature? Why not adopt the current approach of Hawaii and North Da-
kota, where judges do resolve these kinds of cases?74 The short answer to
these questions, of course, is that the constitutions of the other forty-eight
states, including Kentucky, and of the United States provide unequivo-
in an election.
72 In order to serve in the Senate of Kentucky, a would-be member must be a citizen
of the Commonwealth, must be thirty years of age, and must have "resided in this State six
years next preceding his election, and the last year thereof in the district for which he may
be chosen." Ky. CONST. § 32. There are other provisions, however. For example, a would-be
member must not have accepted, and must not accept, an incompatible municipal office. See
id. § 165.
73 See Pratt v. Breckinridge, 65 S.W. 136, 137 (Ky. I9O1) ("Each house may perform the
executive act of electing its own officers (sections 34 and 249), and the judicial acts of judging
of the qualifications, elections, and returns of its members (section 38) [and) punishing
disorderly behavior and expelling members (section 39)."); see also Barry, 279 U.S. at 613
("Generally, the Senate is a legislative body, exercising in connection with the House only
the power to make laws. But it has had conferred upon it by the Constitution certain powers
which are not legislative but judicial in character. Among these is the power to judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its own members"); Kansas ex n'l. Attorney Gen. v.
Tomlinson, 2o Kan. 692, 702-03 (1878).
See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A T"IEATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 159 (Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1883) ("In determining questions concerning contested seats, the house
will exercise judicial power, but generally in accordance with a course of practice which has
sprung from precedents in similar cases, and no other authority is at liberty to interfere.").
74 See HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1o ("Contested elections shall be determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction in such manner as shall be provided by law."); N.D. CONST. art. IV, §
12 ("Each house is the judge of the qualifications of its members, but election contests are
subject to judicial review as provided by law."). Hawaii's implementing statute vests final
jurisdiction to resolve contests in the Supreme Court of Hawaii. See HAW. REV. STAT. § I I-
174.5 (1993 & Supp. 2005). North Dakota's implementing statute provides that a legislator's
qualifications may be challenged at any time, see N.D. CENT. Code § 16.1-16-o4 (1997), and
that "llegislative election contests must be determined in court as provided in this chapter for
other contests. No legislative election may be contested before either house of the legislative
assembly." Id. § 16.1-1-16-1o.
[Vol. 95
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES
cally to the contrary." But the more substantive answer lies in three dis-
tinct propositions. First, legislative independence and legislative privilege,
including the privilege to judge members' eligibility, are conceptually re-
76
lated, and in fact come to us from the same period in English history.
"The history of Parliament ... " Wallace Notestein wrote, "is an English
heritage, with a remainder to Americans. Legislative practice to-day in Ne-
braska and Minnesota can be traced back to early seventeenth-century or
late Tudor usages at Westminster. 7 7 Second, as a matter of political theory,
the power of appointment and removal is intimately related to the power
of control, and a branch of government is less than independent if ultimate18
control over its membership lies in another branch. Finally, legislative
determination of members' eligibility has often marched to the beat of a79
very different drummer than analogous judicial determinations. In other
words, legislative bodies have often decided to exalt substance over form,
admitting or allowing as members people who most likely did not meet the
stated qualifications for service. Often, if not invariably, this had the effect
of allowing the individual chosen by the voters to serve, notwithstanding
apparent defects in his or her claim to the seat in question. Subjecting this
unique process to judicial supervision would eliminate a vital and distinct
tradition in our governmental system.
In this part we will consider the historical antecedents for the privilege
set forth in section 38 of Kentucky's constitution. We will also consider
some of the most notable precedent, both legislative and judicial, that ex-
emplifies this privilege in operation. We begin with the privilege's origin
in the English experience of the early modern era. We then continue with
the experience of this side of the Atlantic.
A. The English Experience
The historical record indicates that the House of Commons first exercised
the prerogative underlying section 38 in 1553, during the reign of Mary
I, when it excluded a prebendary (minister) on the ground that he was
already represented through a separate body-the "Convocation."8 0 Thir-
75 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 8o-i6i and accompanying text.
77 WALLACE NOTESTEIN, 'ME WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 3
(1924).
78 See infra notes 79o-96 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 664-7o and accompanying text.
8o See LINDSAY KEIR,THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN, 1485-1951 151
(5th ed. 1957) ("In 1553 [Commons] decided that Dr. Nowell, prebendary of Westminster,
was incapable, being a member of Convocation, of sitting for the Borough of Looe which
had elected him to the House."); ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES: THEIR FRAMEWORK,
MAKE-UP, CHARACTER, CHARACTERISTIcS, HABITS, AND MANNERS 192 (1924); I EDWARD PORRITT,
THE UNREFORMED HOUSE OF COMMONS: PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION BEFORE 1832, at
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ty-three years later, in 1586, it first asserted this prerogative in adversarial
circumstances, in a dispute involving the election of two knights from the
county of Norfolk."
Before these developments, various agents of the Crown, principally
the Court of Chancery, had typically resolved disputes over seats in Com-
mons, most likely on the theory that writs of election, having proceeded
from the royal offices, should return there." Indeed, Parliament's basic
origin as an extension of the monarch's retinue would readily account for
83royal scrutiny of returns. Before modern times, membership in Parlia-
ment had been largely a matter of royal grace. 84 As one scholar has noted,
when Edward I died in 1307, "Parliament was a good way from being a real
or defined institution. Even its membership remained entirely variable, at
the pleasure of the Crown .... "8 For that matter, even after the develop-
125-26 (I909); J.R. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, A.D. 1485-1603, WITH AN
HISTORICAL COMMENTARY 596 (1930); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,522-23 (1969)
(discussing In re Nowell). Commons resolved a comparable issue in favor of a member in
1559. On February 24 of that year, a certain Mr. Marshe argued that John Smith, returned as
a burgess from Camelford, "had come to this House being outlawed, and also had deceived
divers merchants in London...." SELECT STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REIGNS OF ELIZABETH AND JAMES 1 131 (G.W. Prothero ed., 1894) (quoting
I H.C. JOUR. 55) [hereinafter PROTHERO]. Although the House determined the allegation
to be true, "the question was asked by Mr. Speaker, if [Smith] should have privilege of this
House or not [and it was] ordered, That he shall continue a member of this House." Id.
(quoting I H.C. JOUR. 55). Somewhat similarly, in 1576 Commons determined that the heir
apparent to the Earl of Bedford could sit in the House despite the fact that peers were not
eligible for membership. Ste id. (quoting I H.C. JOUR. 104).
81 See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
82 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 142 (noting that, in the sixteenth century, the royal Council
might occasionally "intervene over a disputed election return"); id. at I51 ("The practice had
long been to make returns into Chancery and have them scrutinised by Lords or judges.");
PORRITT, supra note 8o, at 7 ("In the early days of the House of Commons, when controverted
elections were exceedingly few, because as yet men were not desirous of being of the House,
these cases were tried in Chancery."); TANNER, supra note 8o, at 595 (discussing the practices
that existed before Commons claimed the privilege to determine questions connected with
its membership).
83 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 39 ("In its origin, Parliament had been essentially an
extension of the royal Council."); G.O. SAYLES, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL PARLIAMENT
OF ENGLAND 12 (1988) (discussing the thirteenth century origins of Parliament) ("It is also
during these years that 'parliament' . . . enters into the scheme of government to supervise
the departments of state and the courts of law, to settle problems that arose within them and
between them, and to consider all complaints that the machinery of government was not
working satisfactorily.").
84 See 2 G. R. ELTON, STUDIES IN TUDOR AND STUART POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: PAPERS
AND REVIEWS 1946-1972, at 21 (1974).
85 Id.; see also id. ("Of Edward I's fifty-two Parliaments-'afforced' (enlarged) sessions of
his Council, summoned by special writs-only thirteen included representatives of shires and
boroughs. In session, a full Parliament was unicameral, and it existed even after the better
part of those summoned had gone home."). See generally Conrad Russell, A Parliament in Early
Stuart England, in BEFORE THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: ESSAYS ON EARLY STUART POLITICS AND
[Vol. 95
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES
ment of more formal criteria for membership, as well as differentiation of
Lords and Commons, the monarch's role in supervising entry into Parlia-
ment persisted.86 In fact, the Crown continued to assert an authority to re-
solve disputed elections even after 1586, when, as noted above, Commons
first articulated its privilege in adversarial circumstances." Not until the
third decade of the seventeenth century was Commons able to look back
and describe this privilege as "antient."
The development of the privilege corresponded to the gradual emer-
gence of Parliament, and particularly Commons, as an element of the
English political system both conceptually and formally distinct from the
Crown. To understand these developments, a brief review of the history of
this period may prove helpful.
1. Political Struggles.-During the sixteenth century, England saw a sub-
stantial modernization of both its economy and its government, the latter
in particular becoming more centralized, powerful, and professional. Two
distinct theories seemed to inform this emerging national authority: one
of absolute monarchy, and another of power distributed among the two
primary organs of government, the Crown and Parliament.9° For much of
GOVERNMENT 123, 127 (Howard Tomlinson ed., 1983) ("Kings called Parliament for their own
advantage or not at all.").
86 See KEIR, supra note 80, at 42 (noting that, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth
century, "disputed elections were dealt with by the King with the Lords or judges"); id. at
113 (noting that, in the early sixteenth century, the Privy Council "managed Parliament, by
influencing elections, scrutinizing their results, and directing parliamentary business").
87 See id. at 175 (discussing the Bucks Election Case of 1604); LUCE, supra note 8o, at
192-93 (same); see also MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 9 (1943) ("[Als late as 1604 when the Goodwyn-Fortescue case arose, there was still
enough uncertainty that the king could make an enormous amount of trouble.").
88 LUCE, supra note 80, at 193 ("By 1624 [Commons] had come to look on it as their
'antient and natural undoubted privilege and power' to examine the validity of elections and
returns."); see also J.E. NEALE, THE ELIZABETHAN HOUSE OF COMMONS 79 (London, Jonathan
Cape 189o) ("The proper remedy [to a claim of fraudulent election] did not come until James
I's House of Commons, lacking all historical or constitutional warrant, and yet with sound
sense behind its action, usurped jurisdiction over election questions.").
89 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 5 ("The position asserted for the Crown during this period
came naturally to be expressed in terms which emphasised its monopoly of power, the
essentially derivative nature of all other lawful magistracies, the lack of legal restraints on
royal action, and the divine sanctions by which it was upheld."); see also CHRISTOPHER HILL,
T IE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603-1714, at 3 (I98O) ("James I preached that kings ruled
by Divine Right, and many political writers argued that subjects' property was at the king's
disposal.").
90 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 161 ("Neither [royal nor parliamentary supremacy] could
prove permanent, since each excluded elements without which the constitution could not
subsist. It was as hopeless for the King to attempt to govern solely by virtue of Prerogative
as it was for his opponents to cast out completely the discretionary element from English
government."); Louise Halper, Measurefor Measure.- Law, Prerogative, Subversion, 13 CARDOZO
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the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, the monarch had the stron-
ger side of this debate, but several developments in the late sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries enhanced Parliament's position. In particular, the
Crown needed money and it needed far more money than it could raise
from its usual sources.
As a matter of tradition and practice, the English had generally left the
Crown to its own devices, believing the King should "live of his own." 92
For the monarch, "public" and "private" were not distinct concepts. Cer-
tain sources of revenue, such as proceeds from agricultural holdings, du-
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 221, 229 (2001) ("On the one hand, the king's powers were divine and
thus unlimited .... On the other was the view that royal power came from an earthly source
... [; hence,] a monarch could not act without some agreement of those who represented
the people or their law."). A third theory, one of parliamentary sovereignty, was slow to take
root, and most likely had few if any devotees in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. See id.
at 227 ("[The Stuarts'] claims of royal absolutism were challenged by those who did not yet
have a competing theory of sovereignty, but who knew that their own interests, which they
saw as both economic and spiritual, demanded something other than submission to the rather
uncertain vagaries of royal power."). The idea of parliamentary sovereignty did emerge as a
powerful force, of course, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160-61 (2d American ed. 1799); A.W.
Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament-in Perpetuity?, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 25,
30 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2d ed. i989) ("[Slince 1700 the weight of judicial
authority has given support to the doctrine of legislative omnipotence.").
The student of separation of powers will naturally ask how the courts fit into this struggle.
The idea of a power in the judiciary not derived from the Crown or Parliament was slow to
take root in Great Britain, and even now lacks a widely shared theoretical basis. See generally
Lori Ringhand, Fig Leaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional Foundations: Debating Judicial Review
in Great Britain, 43 COLUM. J. ThANSNAT'L L. 865 (2005).
9I See Halper, supra note 90, at 228 (discussing "King and Parliament") ("The ur-issue
was money, as it so often is."). Religion as well played a major role in these struggles. See
generally HILL, supra note 89, at 63 ("[Qluestions of religion and Church government loomed
large for contemporaries [of the English Civil War], even in spheres which today we should
not regard as religious at all.").
92 HILL, supra note 89, at I; KEIR, supra note 8o, at 158-59, i8o; see also Douglass C. North
& Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIsT. 803 (1989) (noting that, when the reign
of James I began, "the king was expected to 'live on his own,' that is, to fund the government
in the manner of an extended household").
93 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 1o-I I (noting that the monarch's "ordinary" revenue was
derived in part from "lands belonging to the Crown in its own right, or to the King as Prince of
Wales, Duke of Lancaster and of Cornwall, Earl of Chester and of Richmond.
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ties from trade, 94 levies for defense,
9 and sales of exclusive franchises,
96
had historically been available, but these proved insufficient for reasons
owing both to receipts and expenditures. With respect to receipts, for ex-
ample, income from agricultural holdings was limited by practical consider-
ations.97 Similarly, the universe of trade potentially subject to royal duties
was a matter of debate, 98 as was the scope of the Crown's ability to impose
levies for defense.99 Finally, Parliament came to resent and oppose extrava-
94 See id. at 12 (noting these duties). See generally id. at 117 ("It was an indisputable part
of the Crown's prerogative that it could regulate external trade in what it deemed to be the
national interest.").
95 By the early modern era, the Crown's historical prerogative to call its vassals to defend
the realm had become a pecuniary duty. See id. at 19 ("The obligation to assume knighthood
(the military obligations of which had long been translated into terms of money with other
feudal incidents) could be extended by distraint of knighthood.") In addition, the Crown
could require seaports to contribute money to build warships. See id.
96 See id. at 117-18 (noting that, as an incident to its authority to regulate external trade,
the Crown could restrict various activities to an "incorporated group of traders" and forbid
"'interlopers' from engaging therein") (footnote omitted); id. at i18 ("Conversely, trade might
be stimulated by the grant of exclusive privileges to inventors and entrepreneurs engaged in
new manufactures at home. By these methods of levying impositions and granting patents and
monopolies, financial profit accrued to the Crown.") (footnote omitted); North & Weingast,
supra note 92, at 81o-ii (noting the royal practice of selling monopolies and its economic
impact).
97 See HILL, supra note 89, at 39 ("Like all conservative landowners the King had
difficulty in reorganising estate-management to meet the rise in prices. Nor was it necessarily
to his advantage to do so. For crown lands were not only a source of revenue: they were also
a source of patronage and influence. Leases on favourable terms were a means of rewarding
courtiers and royal servants without cost to the Exchequer."); see also North & Weingast, supra
note 92, at 8o9-io (noting vast sales of royal land during the reigns of Elizabeth, James I and
Charles I) ("Sale of a major portion of a revenue-producing asset for annual expenses indicates
that the revenue problem was endemic.").
98 See HILL, supra note 89, at 40 (noting that "control of the customs was in dispute").
Although the Crown had historically set customs, merchants had become acutely conscious
of international economics, and Parliament was understandably anxious that the Crown
not acquire a way to support itself without resort to the legislature. See id. In addition, the
Crown's authority to exact "duties of tunnage and poundage" on exports and imports was at
least technically subject to parliamentary grant. Parliament had historically made this grant
effective for a monarch's entire reign, but it discontinued this practice under Charles I. See
Harold Hulme, Charles I and the Constitution, in CONFLICT IN STUART ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF WALLACE NOTESTEIN ioi (William Appleton Aiken & Basil Duke Henning eds.,
196o); KEIR,supra note 8o, at 12; HILL, supra note 89, at 41.
99 Attempts by the Crown to raise additional money from these quasi-feudal sources
led to tension with Parliament. The Five Knights Case arose from an attempt by Charles I
to compel various people to lend money to the Crown in a context where repayment was
unlikely. See HILL, supra note 89, at 8, 44; Hulme, supra note 98, at 99; see also North &
Weingast, supra note 92, at 81o (describing the economic reality of these forced loans) ("The
Stuarts secured most of their loans under threat .... Repayment was highly unpredictable
and never on the terms of the original agreement."). This case, which the courts resolved in
the King's favor, provided much of the impetus for the Petition of Right of 1628. See HILL,
supra note 89, at 44. In the Ship Money Case, which arose from an attempt by the Crown to
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gant sales of monopolies. With respect to expenditures, foreign and par-
ticularly military policy had become extraordinarily expensive. To raise
money outside its traditional "private" sources, the Crown needed taxes,
and tradition had definitively established that a grant of taxes was within
the prerogative of Parliament. 0 '
Under the prevailing political theory of the time, taxes were seen as a
voluntary gift from the population to the Crown.10 3 They could only be
assented to by the realm as a whole, which entailed the coming together of
England's various estates-Crown, church, aristocracy, and bourgeosie.
1 04
These four elements were deemed to coalesce in the concept of "King-
in-Parliament": monarch, lords spiritual, lords temporal, and commoners.1 5
But by the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Parliament as a whole,
and Commons in particular, was quite definitely feeling new power.10 6 It
saw in the concept of King-in-Parliament an opportunity to make assent to
taxes dependent upon a distribution of actual governing authority between
the Crown and the legislature.0 7 To the best of its ability, the Crown both
raise money for the navy from non-maritime areas of the country, the courts also held in the
King's favor. See id. at 45-46.
IOO See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 193-94.
1OI See HILL, supra note 89, at 39 (discussing James I's difficult financial situation) ("The
cost of warfare was increasing: ships were getting larger, cannon heavier, fire-arms were
becoming essential for the rank and file of an army.").
102 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 37-38 ("It was in Parliament that the [powers of the Crown]
attained their zenith. Only in this capacity could the King impose extraordinary taxation on
his subjects, or make changes in the law affecting their rights.").
103 See id. at 117 ("There could be no paltering with the fundamental rule, based on
Common Law and frequently reinforced by statute, that no tax could be laid on the subject
without his consent, and that Parliament was the only place where such consent could be asked
or given."); EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: ThE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 239-40 (1988) (describing the theory according to which the Crown
would ask Parliament to levy taxes against the populace).
104 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 39-40 ("In its origin, Parliament had been essentially
an extension of the royal Council .... The conjunction of the estates of the realm with
the Council in an assembly possessing plenary authority to legislate, tax, and judge was the
essence of a Parliament in the later Middle Ages."); see a/so RUSSELL, supra note 85, at 128 ("If
a parliament voted a tax, no one could say 'I never agreed to this': every potential protester
was legally bound by the act of his representative.").
io5 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 39-40.
Io6 Seeid. at 136 ("[Tlhe experience [Parliament] gained by being used as the supreme
instrument of royal power gradually trained its members in the business of the State, and,
combined with their experience in local affairs, converted them into a body capable of
asserting a necessary, and ultimately a dominant, place in the constitution.")
107 See HILL, supra note 89, at 42 ("[Clontrol of finance ultimately raised the question of
control of the executive ...."); KEIR, supra note 8o, at 182-83 (describing broad negotiations
about money and power between the Crown and Commons) ("Royal prerogatives seemed to
become a saleable commodity. The Commons at once improved their opportunity."); id. at 187
(noting that the Parliament of 1621 offered funds to James I provided he "seek a Protestant
marriage for his son, break with Spain and declare war on her"); cf. North & Weingast, supra
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worked with and resisted this effort, but certain trends are evident. In
particular, Elizabeth I tended to enjoy more success with Commons than
her successors James I and Charles I. In any case, over the course of the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Parliament and particularly
Commons emerged as the dominant force in Englishoin large
measure because of its power to grant 
or deny taxes.
By the third decade of the seventeenth century, tension between the
Crown and Parliament had become deadly serious, eventually ripening
into a casus belli for both sides in the civil wars of the 1640s and 1650s. .9
Indeed, Charles I himself was executed in 1649 after wrangling with a leg-III
islature increasingly bereft of royal supporters. Less famously, Parlia-
ment impeached several of Charles's senior ministers in the 1620s, l"' and
both James I and Charles I had members of the parliamentary opposition
committed to prison.1  As the two sides fought for rhetorical advantage in
note 92, at 812 ("Parliamentary interests regularly demanded that in exchange for revenue the
Crown respect traditional property rights and institutions: for example, that it cease declaring
new monopolies.").
Io8 See NOTESTEIN, supra note 77, at 13 ("If Elizabeth has her troubles with the Commons
and has to cope ... with a very persistent opposition, she has in most sessions only to put her
foot down and measures and policies upon which the Commons have set their hearts are
given up."); id. at 32 ("James's personal relations with Parliament did not a little to put the
Commons on the offensive. His want of dignity in carriage was no greater handicap to him
than his want of dignity in political conduct."); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS 34 (1965) ("[A] Queen kept in
office by the love of her subjects is a majoritarian ruler. Elizabeth's successors, less loved, had
a difficult time; Parliamentary dominance, obscured by affectionate relations with Elizabeth,
became evident as soon as the country had trouble with James and Charles.").
1O9 See Richard D. Rosen, Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring
Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. I, z8-44 (1998) (summarizing the
development of Parliament's power of the purse); see also HILL, supra note 89, at 60 ("The
reigns of the first two Stuarts... taught a number of lessons to those Englishmen who counted
in politics. The first was that administration could be carried on, and the royal budget (just)
balanced, without Parliamentary taxation, if the government abstained from foreign war...
• A corollary was that no expansionist foreign policy, such as many of the propertied classes
conceived to be in the best interests of the country, could be embarked upon without regular
sessions of Parliament.")
I 10 See CLARKE, supra note 87, at 1o.
I II See HILL, supra note 89, at 96-97; SUTHERLAND, supra note Io8, at 74.
1I Z See HILL, supra note 89, at 50 (noting the impeachments of the Lord Chancellor,
Francis Bacon, the Lord Treasurer, Lionel Cranfield, and the Lord Admiral and Duke of
Buckingham, George Villiers); KEIR, supra note 8o, at 193-94 (same). Buckingham was later
assassinated. See HILL, supra note 89, at 59.
113 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 187 (noting the imprisonment of Southampton of Lords
and Sandys of Commons by James I); id. at 189-9o (noting the imprisonment of the Earl of
Arundel of Lords); SUTHERLAND, supra note io8, at 73 (noting the imprisonment by Charles
I of nine members of Commons who organized a protest against royal policy on taxation and
religion in 1629); id. at 74 ("For what they had done in the House, three prominent members,
Sir John Eliot and his friends Valentine and Strode, were kept in prison; Eliot, an unselfish
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this struggle, each sought to articulate and defend its perceived privileges114
or prerogatives in the constitutional system. One fruit of this effort was
vindication of many, if not all, of the privileges with which legislatures are
now familiar, including the privilege to determine members' eligibility.II
2. Emergence of the Privilege.-The student of history naturally takes notice
of such dramatic events as the execution of a monarch,'16 but focus on the
punctuated events of a civil war should not give rise to the false impression
that Commons' grivileges emerged fully born in the middle of the seven-
teenth century. In fact, Commons first asserted many of its privileges in
the 1500s, during the relatively peaceable reigns of Mary I and Elizabeth
1.118 For example, the historical record indicates that Commons first under-
and public-spirited man, died in the Tower, refusing to obtain release by acknowledging
submission; his two friends remained in prison eleven years.").
114 In technical parlance, the Crown asserted "prerogatives" and Parliament tended to
refer to its analogous claims as "privileges." This appears to reflect a status quo ante bellum
of absolute monarchy, inasmuch as a "privilege" is an exemption to an otherwise applicable
power. See generally Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5,
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VANU. L. REV. 1539, 1547 (1995) (citing Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 28 (1913)); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917) (discussing the conceptual relationship
between the existence of a "privilege" and the non-existence of a "right")).
1 15 These privileges were actually several in number. Along with the privilege to judge
eligibility for service, they included a privilege from civil arrest, see KEIR, supra note 80, at
147-48 (noting various assertions of this privilege during Elizabeth's reign) ("The privilege
of both Lords and Commons of immunity from arrest on civil process rested, like that of
immunity from jury service and from being called as witnesses, on the principle .. .that
attendance in the High Court of Parliament took priority of any obligation owed to any other
jurisdiction."), immunity for legislative acts, see Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the
Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 229 (2003) ("Parliament
first began to articulate a privilege of free speech in the sixteenth century, in response to
repeated skirmishing with Queen Elizabeth over issues of royal succession and religious
reform."), and a privilege to choose officers, see HILL, supra note 89, at 51 ("The invention
of 'the committee of the whole House' enabled the Commons to replace the Speaker by a
chairman of their own choosing.").
116 See, e.g., C.V. WEDGWOOD, A COFFIN FOR KING CHARLES: THE "IMIAL AND EXECUTION
OF CHARLES 1 (1964).
117 See NOTESTEIN, supra note 77, at 4 ("It is, of course, a mistake to suppose that
constitutional history proceeds from remonstrance to remonstrance, from charter to bill of
rights alone. It is quite as much concerned with changes, often inconspicuous, in the ways of
doing business from day to day.").
118 See ELTON, supra note 84, at 51 ("[Tihe history of the House in [the sixteenth]
century may be summed up by saying that it had finally achieved its ambition to be a court, a
self-governing institution. It is in this period that the main precedents were set for the various
privileges-freedom from arrest at private suit, the right to determine disputed elections, the
power to control members and deal with outsiders-upon which the House rested its self-
sufficiency and with which it protected its influence."); see also KEIR, supra note 8o, at 149-50
(making similar observations about the House's ascension to a self-governing state).
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took to exclude a prospective member for lack of qualification in 1553,119
and that it first asserted the privilege to judge the eligibility of its members
in an adversarial context in 1586, in a case involving two seats from the
county of Norfolk.
a. The Knights for the County ofNorfolk.-According to evidence present-
ed to a committee of Commons, a writ of election for the two "Knights for
the County of Norfolk" had issued on September 15, 1586. 12 For some
reason, however, it was not received by the sheriff until Sunday, Septem-
ber 25. 12 By law, this official was obliged to execute the writ the next day,
"County day,"' 3 and he did his best to announce it. Despite poor notice,124
the election attracted many voters, and Farmer and Gresham prevailed.
This writ was returned to the royal offices on October 15.125 On October 11,
however, a second writ had issued from Chancery for the same two seats,
2 6
provoking a second election, at which Heydon and the same Gresham pre-
vailed."7 When the matter came before Commons, Chancery had already
decided that the first writ was valid as returned, that the second was there-
fore void, and that both Farmer and Gresham should take their seats.128
Nevertheless, Commons appointed a committee to examine the matter.1 9
The Queen was not pleased, however, taking the position that Commons
should leave the matter to the judges:
On Thursday the third day of November... Mr. Speaker shewed unto the
House, that he received Commandment from my Lord Chancellor from her
Majesty to signifie unto them, that her Highness was sorry this House was
troubled the last sitting thereof with the matter touching the chusing and
returning of the Knights for the County of Norfolk: a thing in truth imper-
tinent for this House to deal withal, and only belonging to the Charge and
I 19 See supra note 8o and accompanying text.
120 SIMONDS D'EWEs, A COMPLEAT JOURNAL OF THE VOTES, SPEECHES AND DEBATES BOTH
OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE REIGN OF QUEEN
ELIZABE-rH, OF GLORIOUS MEMORY 393 (London, Paul Bowes 1693). At that time, counties
ordinarily sent both knights and burgesses to Commons, knights representing the county and
burgesses representing the boroughs.
121 Id. at 396.
122 See id.
123 Id.
124 Seeid. (summarizing the Under-Sheriff's testimony to the committee) ("The Election
was so expected in the Country, that by his Estimation there were three thousand Persons at
the same....").
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 396-97
129 See id. at 395-97.
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Office of the Lord Chancellor, from whence Writs for the same Elections
issued out, and are thither returnable again.]30
After reviewing the matter, the committee came to the same conclusion
as Chancery, that the first writ had been valid, and that both Farmer and
Gresham should serve.' 3' But the issue remained of which body had fi-
nal authority to resolve the dispute. On behalf of the committee, Thom-
as Cromwell (whose father had suffered execution at the hand of Henry
VIII 32) reported that the privilege in question lay with Commons. 133 Al-
though one member of the committee had proposed discussing the matter
with the chancellor, the committee as a whole had rejected this idea, first
because they felt satisfied with their own conclusion, and second because,
in Cromwell's words, "they thought it prejudicial to the priviledge of the
House to have the [matter] determined by others than such as were Mem-
bers thereof." "4 In short, "though they thought very reverently of the said
Lord Chancellor and Judges, and thought them competent Judges in their
places; yet in this case they took them not for Judges in Parliament in this
House."' 3 5
In retrospect, Commons' assertion of its privilege in this context was as
clever as Chief Justice John Marshall's defense of judicial review in Mar-
bury v. Madison. 36 Here, Commons asserted its privilege with a result in-
distinguishable from what would have obtained in the absence of such an
assertion. There was little, if anything, about which the Queen or chancel-
lor could complain because Commons admitted exactly the two individuals
Chancery had deemed admissible. In Marbury, quite similarly, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall had used judicial review to deny his Court jurisdiction, thus
leaving a case against his political enemies undecided.'37
But as with Marbury, so with Commons in 1586. The ultimate vindica-
tion of the privilege depended on consistent and persuasive assertion in a
130 Id. at 392-93.
131 Id. at396-97.
132 SeeANNE HOFFMANN, LIVES OF THE TIJDOR AGE I 18 (1977) (noting the elder Cromwell's
execution on charges of high treason).
133 See D'EwEs, supra note 120, at 396-97.
134 Id. at 396.
135 Id. Commons went on to adopt the committee's recommendation:
[Ihf it were so thought good to the House, [the Committee proposed
that] Mr. Farmerand Mr. Gresham might take their Oaths and be allowed
of by the force of the first Writ, as allowed by the censure of this House,
and not as allowed of by the said Lord Chancellor and Judges. Which was
agreed to by the whole House, and ordered to be entered accordingly.
Id. at 396-97.
136 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
137 See generally id.
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. 138variety of circumstances and against a succession of monarchs. The next
situation, which involved James I, was somewhat less harmonious and yet
is regarded as a critical event in the development of the privilege.
b. The Knight for the County of Buckingham.-When James I called his
first Parliament in 1604, he stipulated that the voters should not send any
outlaws to Westminster. 39 He also stipulated that returns from writs of
election should be made to Chancery, meaning that Chancery would pass141
on their sufficiency. J.H. Hexter has argued that the chancellor, Lord
Ellesmere, had written this language into the proclamation as a "pre-emp-
tive strike" in the ongoing struggle between his office and Commons about
the scope of their respective jurisdictions. 11 "For Parliament to accept
this," the scholar Robert Luce observed, "would be the undoing of what
had been achieved in the preceding reign. So it took the first chance to
assert its privilege by seating, for the county of Buckingham, an outlaw, Sir
Francis Goodwin . . . ." Goodwin had prevailed in the election, being
elected "first knight" for the shire, but the royal clerk had refused the writ144
owing to his apparent status as an outlaw. (Apparently the sheriff had
138 See CLARKE, supra note 87, at IO ("Probably not one of [Commons'] powers was so
well established when James I came to the throne that no one could question it. In fact in
the reign of Queen Elizabeth the degree of privilege actually possessed by parliament at any
given time was by no means a matter of settled constitutional right but rather an unknown
quantity to be determined by a clash of personalities.")
139 See PROTHERO, supra note 8o, at 281; I STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS: ROYAL
PROCLAMATIONS OF KING JAMES I, 1603-1625, at 68 (James E Larkin & Paul L. Hughes eds.,
1973) [hereinafter STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS] ("Further wee doe command, that an
expresse care bee had, that there bee not chosen any persons Banquerupts or Outlawed ..
140 See STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS, supra note 139, at 69 ("Furthermore We notifie by
these Presents, that all Retournes and Certificats of Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, ought
and are to be brought to the Chancery, and there to be filed of Record.") (footnote omitted).
141 See LUCE, supra note 8o, at 192-93.
142 J.H. Hexter, Parliament, Liberty, and Freedom of Elections, in PARLIAMENT AND LIBERTY:
FROM THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH TO THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 21, 23 -2 4 (J.H. Hexter ed. 1992).
143 LUCE,supra note 8o, at 193. See generally Hexter, supra note 13 1, at 23 ("The contested
Bucks election .. .afforded the king's lord chancellor, Lord Ellesmere, the opportunity to
bring to a head decades of feuding between his office and the House of Commons about
jurisdiction over the issue of election writs and the examination of returns."). Luce's point
perhaps should have been that Commons provoked a confrontation by admitting an apparent
outlaw, because more than one historian has explained that Goodwin was in fact not an outlaw
at the time of his election, having resolved the underlying legal actions well before. See id. at
30 ("The House of Commons discovered that [years before] two plaintiffs had initiated.., the
process of outlawry required as a legal first move against Goodwyn for recovery of a debt ....
It also learned from written releases of two creditors that when, long since, Goodwyn had paid
his debt, they had dropped their suit."); see also WALLACE NOTESTEIN, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
1604-1610, at 67 (1971) ("Two outlawries there had been against him, [but both) had been
paid by Goodwin and a discharge received from the creditors.").
144 See I H.C. JOUR. 149 (Mar. 22, 16o4).
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described Goodwin as an outlaw on the return.)14 ' A second writ had then
issued, with John Fortescue prevailing in the second election. A contest
was thus begun between the two claimants, 4 1 which Commons proceeded
to resolve in Goodwin's favor.'48
This did not sit well with the King, however, who maintained that "[b]y
the Law, this House ought not to meddle with Returns, being all made into
the Chancery; and are to be corrected or reformed by that Court only, into
which 'they are returned."' 49 But Commons was resolved and undertook150
to reduce its conclusions to writing. With reference to the constitutional
issues presented, Commons took the position that its privilege had arisen
long before 1586, and was now a matter of well-settled law. Once again,
145 See Hexter, supra note 142, at 26 ("The sheriff's return of the writ had alleged no
illegality in the [election itself], and so the Commons also decided that: 'the return of the
sheriff was void as to the outlawry.' The whole duty of the sheriff was to hold the election
and report who had been chosen, and not to make lawyer-like noises about outlawry in an
endorsement on an election writ.").
146 Fortescue almost certainly would have been seen as the King's man. As Hexter has
noted, "[bly 16o4 he had been in the English Privy Council for fifteen years and high in the
service of the English Crown for thrice that long." Id. at 22.
147 See i H.C. JoUR. 149 (Mar. 22, 16o4) (noting the motion of Sir William Fleetwood,
also of Buckingham, that Fortescue's "Return might be examined, and Sir Francis Goodwyne
received as a Member of the House").
148 See id. at 151-52 (Mar. 23, 16o4):
[Alfter much Dispute, the Question was agreed upon and made:
Quest. Whether Sir F Goodwyn were lawfully elected and returned
One of the Knights for Buck', and ought to be admitted, and received as
a Member of this House.
Upon this Question, it was resolved in the Affirmative, That he was
lawfully elected and returned; and, de jure, ought to be received.
Hereupon the Clerk of the Crown was commanded to file the
first Indenture of Return: And Order was given that Sir Francis should
presently take the Oath of Supremacy usual, and his Place in the House;
which he did accordingly.
Id.
149 Id. at I58 (Mar. 29, 1604); see also id. ("His Majesty answered, he was loth he should
be forced to alter his Tune; and that he should now change it into Matter of Grief, by way of
Contestation.").
150 See id. at i6o (Mar. 30, 16o4); see also Hexter, supra note 142, at 28 ("In 16o4 the
Commons did not rattle.").
151 Seeid. at 163 (Apr. 3, 1604):
Our humble Answer is, That until the Seventh Year of King Henry
IV. all Parliament Writs were returnable into the Parliament ... [, when]
a Statute was made, that thenceforth every Parliament Writ [should
include a clause making it returnable to Chancery].
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the King was not entirely satisfied, and he invoked the strongest language
in support of further discussion on the matter:
His Majesty protested ... [that] he had as great a Desire to maintain [Com-
mons'] Privileges as ever any Prince had, or as they themselves. He had seen
and considered of the.Manner, and the Matter; he had heard his Judges and
Council; and that he was now distracted in Judgment: Therefore, for his
further Satisfaction, he desired, and commanded, as an absolute King, that
there might be a Conference between the House and the Judges; and that,
for that Purpose, there might be a select Committee of grave and learned
Persons out of the House; that his Council might be present, not as Umpires
to determine, but to report indifferently on both Sides.'s'
Commons took the King's message quite seriously and sent the delega-
tion. The conference spurred the King to propose a compromise. As
one scholar has noted, "the question of law began to appear, in [the King's]
eyes, a little more doubtful than he had hitherto imagined it; and in order
to extricate himself with some honour, he proposed, that both Goodwin
and Fortescue should be set aside, and a writ be issued, by warrant of the
house, for a new election."'I54 Commons acceded to this arrangement by
resolving to issue a writ for a new election and to exclude both Fortescue
and Goodwin.'
By this, although the Form of the Writ be somewhat altered, yet the
Power of Parliament, to examine and determine of Elections, remaineth;
for so the Statute hath been always expounded ... to this Day ....
Id.
152 Id. at 166 (Apr. 5, 1604). According to Representative John B. Alley of Massachusetts,
Abraham Lincoln made a similar argument on the basis of magisterial authority in 1865 when
his managers for the Thirteenth Amendment told him they were two votes short in the
House. "I am president of the United States, clothed with great power," he reportedly said.
"The abolition of slavery by constitutional provision settles the fate, for all coming time, not
only of the millions now in bondage, but of unborn millions to come-a measure of such
importance that those two votes must be procured." REMINISCENCES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN BY
DISTINGUISHED MEN OF His 'TME 585-86 (New York, N. Am. Rev., Allen Thorndike Rice ed.,
1888). Although the historian Michael Vorenberg doubts the "specifics" of Alley's report, he
nevertheless agrees that, "by directly confronting specific congressman," among other things,
"Lincoln sent a clear signal that he would look kindly on those opposition members who
switched their vote." MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION
OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 198--99 (2oo4).
153 See 2 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR
TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 140 (Philadelphia, M. Polock 1856) (cross-references omitted)
("This conference, he said, he commanded as an 'absolute' king; an epithet, we are apt to
imagine, not very grateful to English ears, but one to which they had already been somewhat
accustomed from the mouth of Elizabeth.").
154 Id. (discussing the conference).
155 See I H.C. JOUR. 171 (Apr. 13, 1604); see also CARL WITrKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 59 (1921) (arguing that James I, rather than Commons, was forced
to compromise).
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Thus, the matter was resolved. Although Goodwin did not become a
member, Goodwin v. Fortescue is widely regarded in retrospect as a major
victory for Commons. Luce, for example, wrote that "[allthough the Com-
mons did not get what they set out to get, they are credited with having
won. By 1624 they had come to look on it as their 'antient and natural
undoubted privilege and power' to examine the validity of elections and
, 156
returns.' Similarly, David Lindsay Keir noted that "[alnother [royal] in-
strument for controlling the Commons was finally lost when in 1604 the
House in the Bucks Election Case asserted its sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion over disputed election returns, which by the proclamation summoning
the Parliament that year had been conferred upon Chancery." '  Although
"[tihe King got [from resolution of the contest] the empty satisfaction of
a statute disabling outlaws from being elected in future," Keir continued,
"he at once surrendered to the Commons jurisdiction over two other dis-. ,158
puted returns, at Shrewsbury and Cardigan." In sum, he noted, "[an
authority which would have enabled the Crown to control with effect the
composition of the Commons was abandoned. '
The mechanical explanation for this appears to lie in the fact that the
warrant for the new election came from Commons itself, thus confirming160
Commons' view of itself as a court in these circumstances. As Hexter has
noted, "[wihatever ambiguity" may have arisen from the dialogue between
Commons and James I, "there was no ambiguity at all in the warrant of the
House. Coming freshly from its love feast with James I, the House entered
the warrant in the Journal, which it alleged to be, and which thereafter it
treated as, the record which sustained its claim to be a court."1 6'
156 LucE, supra note 8o, at 193.
157 KEI, supra note 8o, at 175.
158 Id. at 175 (footnote omitted).
159 Id.; see also CLARKE, supra note 87, at 133 ("[T]he concessions wrung from the king [in
this contest] were sufficiently great that this has usually been looked upon, and rightly so, as a
victory for the house."); HILL, supra note 89, at 5 1 ("In 1604 the House successfully opposed
James's attempt to refer to the Court of Chancery a disputed election in Buckinghamshire,
and so won the right henceforth to decide election disputes, though James's action had
had good Elizabethan precedent."); NOTESTEIN, supra note 143, at 78 ("In the long run the
compromise forced upon [Commons] turned out to be a complete victory. It did not appear
so, at the time, but it proved to be the first of many defeats for the Stuarts."); WirrKE, supra
note 155, at 60 ("In spite of the form of a compromise, the struggle ended in a clear victory for
the Commons."). See generally HILL, supra note 78, at 6 (discussing James's first Parliament)
("A clash over the right to determine disputed elections led the House of Commons to declare
that their privileges were inherited of right, and were not due to the King's grace.").
i6O See I H.C. JouR. 171 (Apr. 13, 1604); see also I H.C. JOUR. (Apr. 11, 16o4) (2d scribe),
available at, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=749 ("We lose more at a
Parliament, than we gain at a Battle.").
161 Hexter, supra note 142, at 33; see also id. at 34 ("Since 1604 no officer of the Crown
has effectively by virtue of his office exercised jurisdiction over elections to the House of
Commons.").
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This, then, was the legacy of the English experience for purposes of
this article: a privilege in Commons to resolve questions about eligibility to
serve in that body, justified as "antient" and forged in a sequence of con-
frontations with the Crown and the Court of Chancery.
B. The American Experience
Although the basic scope of the privilege was well established before any
government of substance took form in what became the United States, it
seemed to acquire an enhanced vitality once transplanted to North Ameri-
ca. The reasons for this are perhaps difficult to discern, but one can begin
by noting that the early colonists were both aware of and dependent on
such precedents as Goodwin v. Fortescue for their political fortitude. "The
significance of this victory for American history," wrote Mary Patterson
Clarke with reference to the case, "lies in its nearness in time to the begin-
ning of colonization and in the great publicity that was given to this and
other disputes with the crown in the early seventeenth century." ' "Many
of the migrating settlers who came to America," she went on to note, "must
have been well acquainted with this contest and keenly alive to its implica-
tions."163 Indeed, not only were they aware of such precedents as Goodwin
v. Fortescue, but they kept them in mind as they began to assert preroga-
tives for themselves in the new world.
The colonial legislatures along the eastern seaboard (at least the lower
houses) understandably sought to emulate Commons 164 and in fact saw
much of the tension of the seventeenth century between Commons and165
the Crown re-enacted in their relationships with royal governors. Thus,
162 CLARKE, supra note 87, at 133.
163 Id.
164 See WILLIAM PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 230
(1980) ("As early as 1640, eight colonies had assemblies that represented the interests of the
settlers in their dealing with the companies, the king's governors, or the proprietors [who
stood for the Crown in their respective territories] .... From the 169os on, the assemblies
regarded themselves more and more as comparable to the House of Commons and followed
the rituals of Parliament as closely as they could."); see also CLARKE, SUpra note 87, at 13 ("The
early leaders of America were in touch with affairs in England, and aware of the powers of
parliament and the importance of precedent."); NOTESTEIN, supra note 77, at 3 ("When Sir
Walter Raleigh looked westward he could hardly have foreseen that the House of Commons,
of which he was an active member, would be transported to the new world."); William C.
Morey, The First State Constitutions, 4 ANNALS OF THE AM. AcAo. OF POL. & Soc. SCI. 201 (1893);
William C. Webster, Comparative Study of the State Consitutions of the American Revolution, 9
ANNALS OF THE AM. AcAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 380 (1897).
165 See CHARLES LEE RAPER, NORTH CAROLINA: A STUDY IN ENGLISH COLONIAL
GOVERNMENT 93 (1904) (discussing the legislature of colonial North Carolina) ("By virtue of
the fact that the lower house had control of the supplies [i.e. money], it compelled the governor
not infrequently to assent to its demands, and in so doing it exercised a very considerable
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the two departments found themselves in constant dispute over taxes, ap-
propriations, the line between individual rights and executive discretion,
and the very issue of which organ of government should dominate.
In fact, the colonials' experience of fortifying their legislatures was a
substantial proving ground for the coming Revolution.1 67  Writing about
colonial New York, for example, Alan Tully notes that governors would ar-
rive from England "puffed up with their extravagant prerogative claims,
symbolic proximity to royalty, and unbridled greed." 6 According to Tully,
the most vigorous response to such developments lay in the legislature,
which would seek to "puncture" the "pretensions" of arriving governors by
"neutralizing some of their prerogative privileges":
With its ability to draw strength from the House of Commons analogy, and,
when that failed or was inappropriate, from the argument that local legisla-.
tive innovation was justifiable in defense of English rights, the assembly
was well equipped to claim a sizable area of political competence for pro-
vincials to control. 69
influence over him and his administration."); SUTHERLAND, supra note io8, at 72 ("[Tlhe first
comers [to New England] were Puritans whose sympathies had been on the side of Parliament
in its struggles with Charles I."); id. at 114 ("The colonial assemblies (by whatever name
known) are the ancestors of present American legislatures .... Much constitutional history
in the Colonies can be told in annals of controversy between Assemblies and Governors.");
ALAN TULLY, FORMING AMERICAN POLITICS: IDEALS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA 226 (1994) (discussing New York in the eighteenth century)
("Unlike the situation in Britain, where a system of ministerial power and corruption had
replaced the prerogative as the main threat to liberty, the royal colonies were confronted with
representatives of the Crown whose prerogative claims were reminiscent of seventeenth-
century English monarchial powers.").
166 See generally JACK P. GREENE, TUE QUEST FOR POWER: T-IE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY
IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689-1776, at 71 (1963) (discussing colonial struggles
between governors and legislatures) ("No political unit can exist without money, and as
long as the lower houses' consent was required to raise money, they were certain to occupy a
prominent place in the framework of government. Indeed, it was by an ingenious use of their
control over finance that the lower houses were enabled to enlarge their powers so greatly in
the years before 1763."); id. at 87 ("Power to determine how public taxes should be spent was
a natural corollary to the authority to tax, and it became an important element in the lower
houses' control over finance.").
167 See GREENE, supra note 166, at vii ("Through their lower houses of assembly the
colonists achieved a considerable degree of home rule in the eighteenth century; and it was
the lower houses that took the lead in defending American rights and liberties when they
were challenged by Crown and Parliament after 1763 .... ); TLLY, supra note 165, at 91 ("[If
the proving of popular power through the assemblies [of New York and Pennsylvania] was
only one expression of the processes of political self-definition that both colonies undertook
in the eighteenth century, it was clearly of fundamental importance."); id. at 92 ("[Tlhe most
vocal proponent of colonial rights in the various British North American provinces was the
assembly.").
168 TULLY, supra note 165, at 55.
169 Id.
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Similarly, when colonial Pennsylvania learned that Charles II might "re-
possess" the proprietary powers the Crown had granted to William Penn,
it drafted a new document, the Charter of Privileges of 1701. By enhanc-
ing the elected nature of the colonial government and the authority of a
unicameral legislature, writes Tully, this document gave "unprecedented
structural recognition" to Pennsylvanians' claims for autonomy.170
Given Commons' success in asserting itself against Elizabeth I and the
early Stuarts, and given the replication of Commons' political struggles
with the Crown on this side of the Atlantic, colonial legislatures were apt
to seek and obtain privileges comparable to those enjoyed by Commons.
For them, these privileges were part of their inheritance as English sub-
jects. Among these privileges, of course, was the privilege to adjudicate the
eligibility of prospective members.'
A particularly fascinating episode in this regard was In re Gadsden, which
Jack P. Greene discusses at length in his monograph on lower houses in the
colonial South."' In 1762, the voters of the parish of St. Paul in South Caro-
lina elected Christopher Gadsden to represent them in that colony's house
of commons, notwithstanding the fact (presumably unknown to them) that
the person who conducted the election (the warden of a church) had not
been properly sworn as per a statute of 1721. The defect was real but tech-
170 Id. at 69.
171 See RAPER, supra note 165, at 87 (discussing the legislature in colonial North Carolina)
("The lower house during the whole of the royal period claimed that it had some rights,
inherent in its own nature and derived from the proprietors, which the crown must allow.").
172 See CLARKE, supra note 87, at 134 ("[A] set of resolutions, passed in Virginia in April,
1692, declared not only that the house of burgesses was the only judge of its members'
qualifications, but also that any other person who should usurp such authority would be
guilty of breach of privilege."); id. at 135 (discussing colonial Pennsylvania) ("When William
Penn, after regaining his province, issued a new frame of government in 1696, he specifically
reserved to each of his houses the right to be sole judge of its own elections."); GREENE, Supra
note 166, at 189 ("A third ingredient of control over membership was the power to determine
disputed elections. The English House of Commons had won that power in 16o4 in the cases
of Goodwin and Fortescue, and most American lower houses claimed it early in their history.");
A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 56 (1968) (noting a dispute between the two houses of Maryland's colonial assembly
over "the right of the Speaker to issue warrants for elections to vacant seats") ("[The
Proprietor argued that 'the King had power to dispose of his conquests as he pleased.' The
lower house, irate over this suggestion, insisted on the rights of its members as being those
of Englishmen, 'their birthright by the words of the Charter."'); RAPER, supra note 165, at 89
(discussing the colonial legislature in North Carolina) ("The lower house also claimed the
privilege of making inquiries into the election returns of its own members."); TULLY, Supra
note 165, at 69 (discussing Pennsylvania's Charter of Privileges of 1701, by which the people
of this colony conferred on their legislature customary parliamentary privileges, including
"the right to 'be Judges of the Qualifications and Elections of their own members' . . .").
Clarke provides a general discussion of exercise of the privilege by colonial legislatures. See
CLARKE, supra note 87, at 132-72.
173 See GREENE, supra note i66, at 191-97.
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nical. 174 "Although the letter of the law had been violated," Greene wrote,
"the spirit obviously had not, for the election had been carried on without
any other irregularity, and Gadsden was the overwhelming choice of the
St. Paul electors."' 75 The house proceeded to declare Gadsden elected,
but the governor, Thomas Boone, refused to give him the oath, standing
on the statute. 7 6 This provoked a sharp dispute with the house, which
propounded a lengthy remonstrance, resolving that the right to determine
the validity of elections for seats in the legislature "belonged 'SOLELY'
and 'ABSOLUTELY' to the representatives of the people .... " The gov-
ernor did not modify his position, however, and matters grew even more
acrimonious. On December 16, 1762, the house resolved not to transact
further business with him until he apologized for violating its rights and
privileges.1 78 It also undertook to express its grievance to its agent in Lon-
don. By then the controversy had expanded to the papers, with Gadsden
himself taking a prominent role. 80 As he put the matter, the legislative
privilege to resolve electoral disputes "'is so unalienable and inherent in
the people, that they can be no longer denominated a free people when it
is parted with; because all their freedom as British subjects most essentially
depends on it. '"81
The house stuck to its word and refused to work with the governor.
In September 1763, after Boone again refused to administer the oath to
individuals whose election he had not personally verified, the house asked
the Crown to remove him.'82 The board of trade, an instrumentality of the
Crown to some extent responsible for the colonies, soon heard the matter
and resolved it largely against the governor. "The Board's decision was
clearly unsympathetic to Boone's position," ' 3 noted Greene. "Because it
did not uphold him in his attempts to usurp the power to determine the va-
lidity of elections," Greene continued, "this decision represented a victory
for the Commons."'" "Thereafter," he concluded, "no one questioned its
exclusive power to determine the validity of the elections of its own mem-
bers, and future governors hesitated to revive a dispute which had broken
one of their predecessors."8 5
174 See id. at 192.
175 Id.
176 See id.
177 Id. at 193.
178 See id. at 195.
179 See id.
i8o See id.
181 Id. (quoting Gadsden).
182 Seeid. at 196.
183 Id. at 197.
184 Id.
185 Id.
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As In re Gadsden illustrates, the lower houses did not invariably exercise
the privilege in the manner established by the English House of Com-
mons in the early seventeenth century, but that was certainly the goal and
the ideal, and movement was inexorable in that direction. "[A]II attempts
to interfere with the assembly's determination of its own membership, no
matter from what source those efforts came," noted Clarke, "were trifling
in the face of one all-important fact that the house did, over a wide area
and throughout a long period, make such decisions. Election contests were
heard and determined by the house itself, usually without protest from the
governor or council." 186
But the American experience added at least one important and interest-
ing wrinkle to the development of this privilege. In particular, the Ameri-
can penchant for written constitutions enabled this privilege to grow in a
substantial new direction.
187
The idea of a written constitution was not literally unique to Americans188
of the founding generation, but it was substantially so. As the legal schol-
ar Philip Bobbitt has noted, this idea gained currency on this side of the At-
lantic because of a distinct development in American political theory about
the nature of sovereignty. Unlike their English predecessors, Americans
of the founding era did not recognize sovereignty and government as fun-
gible concepts. That is, they saw the people, and not any department or
level of government, as the true sovereign, and they saw the government190
itself as a mere agent. Because of this, Americans of this era were almost
universally inclined to reduce their constitutional preferences to writing,
much as any principal is inclined to reduce a relationship with an agent to
writing.
This inclination, together with a profound solicitousness for the legisla-
ture that typified the colonial and revolutionary period, 19' produced wide-
186 CLARKE, supra note 87, at 170-7 1.
187 See id. at 171 ("This 'ancient and undoubted right' did not end with the American
Revolution but, with many other governmental provisions, passed out of the realm of unwritten
law into that of a written or 'rigid' constitution.").
188 See PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3-4 (991).
189 See id. at3-5.
I9o See GORDON S. WOOD, ThE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 383
(1969) ("[D]evelopments in America since 1776 had infused an extraordinary meaning into
the idea of the sovereignty of the people. The Americans were not simply making the people
a nebulous and unsubstantial source of all political authority.").
i91 See BOBBI1T, supra note 88, at 4 ("The American innovation was not the writing
per se, but rather the political theory whereby the state was objectified and made a mere
instrument of the sovereign will that lay in the People."); see also HOWARD, supra note 172,
at 204 ("In reducing the basis of government to a written instrument, the Americans were
simply following [the example] of the colonial charters, to which as colonists the Americans
had so often ... pointed as security for their rights and under which they had lived for six
generations.").
192 See Webster, supra note 164, at 398 ("Under most of the revolutionary constitutions
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spread textual recognition of the privilege to determine members' eligibil-
ity. Although Pennsylvania adopted such text as early as 1701 in its charter
of privileges,' 93 this process truly took off during the revolutionary era when
new constitutions abounded." In fact, by the time Kentucky became a
state in 1792, twelve of the fourteen existing states-all but Connecticut
and Rhode Island-had adopted at least one constitution since the battles,
of Lexington and Concord, and of these twelve, all but Virginia had adopt-
ed a constitution explicitly recognizing the privilege. In the "first wave"
of such documents, six states-Delaware,'97 Maryland,'9 New Jersey,19
the legislature was truly omnipotent and the executive correspondingly weak."). In time,
of course, the people of many states modified their constitutions to reduce the authority of
the legislature. Indeed, this was evident after the "first wave" of revolutionary constitutions
adopted in 1776 and 1777. Much later, one of the principal modifications to Kentucky's
Constitution was to limit or eliminate the ability of the legislature to enact so-called "special
legislation." See generally ROBERT M. IRELAND, 'ME KENTUCKY STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE I 1 (1999). Even so, the privilege to which this article pertains has remained
a part of almost every state's constitution, including that of Kentucky.
193 See supra note 172.
194 See Robert F. Williams, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide": The State Constitutional
Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 403, 405 (1988)
("By the time the Constitutional Convention met in the summer of 1787, the thirteen
independent states had debated, framed, adopted, rejected, and modified at least twenty state
constitutions.").
195 Virginia's Constitution did not contain an express recognition of the privilege until
1830. See VA. CONST. art. III, § 9 (1830), mprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 6z (William F. Swindler ed., 1979) [hereinafter Swindler] ("Each house
shall judge of the election, qualification, and returns of its members...."). But the legislature
of that state nevertheless exercised such a power in 1780, in the matter of John Breckinridge,
"a youth of 19," whom the House of Delegates excluded on account of his age. 69 CONG. REC.
114 (Dec. 6, 1927) (quoting report of Price Wickersham). Although the House of Delegates'
exact estimation of its privilege at the time is unknown, the author of the report citing In e
Breckinridge concluded that "the house of delegates assumed that it had the inherent power
to judge of the qualifications of its members, regardless of the absence of a constitutional
provision giving it such power." Id. (same).
196 See Williams, supra note 194, at 413-14 ("The first wave of state constitutions is
generally seen to include those adopted during the first year after Independence.").
197 See DEL. CONsT. art. V (1776), reprinted in 2 Swindler, supra note 195, at 200 ("[Ejach
house shall . .. judge of the qualifications and elections of its own members.
198 See MD. CONsT. art. IX (1776), reprinted in 4 Swindler, supra note 195, at 377 ("[Tlhe
House of Delegates shall judge of the elections and qualifications of Delegates."); id. art.
XVII, reprinted in 4 Swindler, supra, at 378 ("[Tlhe electors of Senators shall judge of the
qualifications and elections of members of their body; and, on a contested election, shall admit
to a seat, as an elector, such qualified person as shall appear to them to have the greatest
number of legal votes in his favour.").
199 See N.J. CONST. art. V (1776), reprintedin 6 Swindler, supra note 195, at 450-51 ("[Tlhe
Assembly, when met, shall have power... to be judges of the qualifications and elections of
their own members .... ).
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New York, z°° North Carolina,' °  and Pennsylvania, plus Vermont -ad-
opted such provisions. Within short order, four more-Georgia,2 0 4 Massa-205 2 06 2 07
chusetts, 2'New Hampshire, and South Carolina -followed suit. Con-
necticut and Rhode Island adopted provisions setting forth the privilege
somewhat later, when they finally adopted their first post-revolutionary
constitutions. 20  Similarly, when the framers met in Philadelphia in 1787,
200 See N.Y. CONST. art. IX (1777), reprintedin 7 Swindlersupra note 195, at 174 ("[Tlhe
assembly, thus constituted, shall ... be judges of their own members, and enjoy the same
privileges, and proceed in doing business in like manner as the assemblies of the colony of
New York of right formerly did.
2o See N.C. CONST. art. X (776), rprintedin 7 Swindler, supra note 195, at 405 ("[Tlhe
Senate and House of Commons, when met, shall each have power to ... be judges of the
qualifications and elections of their members .... ).
202 See PA. CONST. § 9 (1776), reprinted in 8 Swindler, supra note 195, at 280 (The
members of the house of representatives ... shall have power to... judge of the elections and
qualifications of their own members ....").
203 Although not a state until 1791, Vermont adopted a constitution in 1777 that explicitly
recognized the privilege. See VT. CONST. Ch. II, § 8 (1777), reprinted in 9 Swindler, supra note
195, at 491 ("The members of the House of Representatives, shall ... judge of the elections
and qualifications of their own members ...."). Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New
York, all of which laid claim to what is now Vermont, refused to recognize this document. See
9 Swindler, supra note 195, at 485.
2o4 Georgia's Constitution of 1777 did not contain an express recognition of the privilege,
but in 1789 it adopted a new organic document intended to reflect the federal Constitution
of 1787 that did contain such a provision. See GA. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (1789), reprinted in 2
Swindler, supra note 195, at 452 ("Each house shall be judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its own members ....").
205 After adopting a relatively short constitution during the revolution, Massachusetts
adopted an elaborate document in 178o-still in force today-that includes two express
recognitions of the privilege. See MAss. CONST. Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. IV 078o), reprinted in 5
Swindler, supra note 195, at 98 ("The senate shall be the final judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of their own members, as pointed out in the constitution; and shall, on the
said last Wednesday in May, annually, determine and declare who are elected by each district
to be senators by a majority of votes...."); id. pt. 2, ch. i, § 3, art. X, reprintedin 5 Swindler, supra
note 195, at ioo ("The house of representatives shall be the judge of the returns, elections,
and qualifications of its own members, as pointed out in the constitution ....").
2o6 New Hampshire adopted a short document in 1776 that was superseded in 1784. As
amended in 1793, this document, which is still in force today, includes two express recognitions
of the privilege. See N.H. CONST. art. 22 (amended 1793) ("The house of representatives ...
shall be judge of the returns, elections, and qualifications, of its members, as pointed out in
this constitution."); id. art. 35 ("The senate shall be final judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications, of their own members.").
207 See S.C. CONsT. art. I, § I (1790), reprinted in 8 Swindler, supra note 195, at 477 ("Each
house shall judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.
2o8 See CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6 (1818), reprinted in 2 Swindler, supra note 195, at 146
("[E]ach house shall be the final judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of its own
members."); R.I. CONST. art. 4, § 6 (1842), reprintedin 8 Swindler, supra note 195, at 390 ("[E]ach
house shall be the judge of the elections and qualifications of its members ...."). These two
states operated under their colonial charters until well after independence.
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the Constitution they proposed-and that the states shortly thereafter rati-
fied-contained such a provision.2 0 Indeed, this aspect of legislative inde-
pendence was so widely accepted at the time that no one appears to have
opposed this clause at the Convention, and criticism in the state ratifying
conventions was limited to its exclusion of state legislatures, not the judi-210
ciary, from the adjudicative process. Thus, by the end of the founding
era the legislative privilege to adjudicate the qualifications, elections, and
returns of members was firmly established, having found its way not only
into settled custom and practice, but also into virtually every constitution
of the period.
Ironically, just as Americans were fortifying the privilege on this side
of the Atlantic, giving it an authority it had never enjoyed before, Com-
mons was taking steps in the opposite direction. In 1770, at the instance of
George Grenville, it began delegating the resolution of contested electionsS 211
irrevocably to a select committee of its members. Under this system, ri-
vals for a seat would alternately strike members until they had established
a committee of thirteen, to which each would then add a nominee, bringing
the total to fifteen. The committee would then resolve the contest without
appeal to the full membership."' A century later, Commons took this idea
a step further and allocated much of the responsibility for resolving con-213
tests to the courts.
Various scholars have attributed these developments to distaste for what
had become a highly politicized process. In 1770, for example, Commons'
was wrestling with the recurrent matter of In re Wilkes, having expelled
John Wilkes from its ranks more than once despite his constituents' ardent
209 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. i ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.
21o Then-Circuit Judge Scalia attributed this to the provision's non-controversial nature.
See Morgan v. United States, 8oI F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (opinion by Scalia, J.) ("As far
as we are aware, in none of the discussions of the clause did there appear a trace of suggestion
that the power it conferred was not exclusive and final. The fragments of recorded discussion
imply that many took for granted the legislative 'right of judging of the return of their
members,' and viewed it as necessarily and naturally exclusive." (quoting 2 MAx FARRA'D,
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 241 (rev. ed. 1966) (statement of Rufus
King in Federal Convention))).
211 See ERSKINE MAY'S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE
OF PARLIAMENT 32 (Sir David Lidderdale ed., 19th ed. 1976) [hereinafter ERSKINE MAY];
FRANK O'GORMAN, VOTERS, PATRONS, AND PARTIES: THE UNREFORMED ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF
HANOVERIAN ENGLAND 1734-1832, at 165 (1989);.
212 See LUCE, supra note 8o, at 194 ("]Grenville's] plan was to have thirteen members
elected by the sitting members and petitioners from a list of forty-nine who had been chosen
by ballot, to whom each party should add a nominee. This tribunal was to decide without
appeal.").
213 See ERSKINE MAY, supra note 211, at 32-35; LUCE, supra note 8o, at 195; O'GORMAN,
supra note 21 1, at 165.
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desire that he represent them in that body. 1 4 Before Grenville's act, notes
Frank O'Gorman, "election petitions were rarely decided on the merits
and even more rarely with reference to the interests of the electors."
2 15
The authors of May's treatise on parliamentary practice similarly observe
that, before 1770, "controverted elections were tried and determined by
the whole House of Commons, as mere party questions, upon which the
strength of contending factions might be tested."
But for some reason these adaptations never gained much traction in the
United States. Perhaps one explanation for this dramatic divergence lies in
Parliament's near pre-eminence in the British political structure, such that
delegation of particular responsibilities cannot materially threaten its au-
tonomy. On the other hand, the distinction might simply be a matter of
political culture. In any case, not only has every state other than North Da-
kota"1 8 and Hawaii2 19 preserved the adjudication of members' eligibility as
an exclusively legislative privilege, but the states that gave Grenville's pro-
cedure a try eventually rejected it in favor of a decision by the full chamber.
Although Pennsylvania adopted this approach in its constitution of 1790,
as did Kentucky in its first constitution of 1792, 22 it did not last in either
state, and in fact had a particularly short tenure in Kentucky, surviving only
seven years.21 It survived much longer in Pennsylvania, remaining in force... . .222
until that state adopted its present constitution in 1873. In Kentucky's
case, the removal appears to have been attributable to an intensely populist
approach to government. In fact, the same document that saw rejection of
Grenville's procedure also saw rejection of an indirectly elected governor
214 See 0. A. SHERRARD, A LIFE OF JOHN WILKES 200-11 (1930); PETER D.G. "hOMAS, JOHN
WILKES: FRIEND TO LIBERTY 106 (1996). See infra notes 578-618 and accompanying text for a
discussion of In re Wilkes.
215 O'GORMAN, supra note 2 11, at 164.
216 ERSKINE MAY, supra note 21I, at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
217 See supra note 90.
218 See supra note 74.
219 See id.
220 See Ky. CONST. § I8 (1792) ("Each House shall judge of the qualifications of its
members; contested elections shall be determined by a committee to be selected, formed,
and regulated in such manner as shall be directed by law."); PENN. CONST. art.I, § l2 (1790),
reprintedin 8 Swindler, supra note 195, at 287 ("Each House shall judge of the qualifications of
its members. Contested elections shall be determined by a committee, to be selected, formed
and regulated in such manner as shall be directed by law."); see also LUCE, supra note 80, at
198 (noting Pennsylvania and Kentucky's adoption of Grenville's procedure). See generally
IRELAND, supra note 192, at 2 (noting the influence of Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1790 on
Kentucky's first Constitution).
221 See KY. CONsT. art. II, § 19 (1799).
222 See PA. CONsT. art. II, § 9 ("Each House shall choose its other officers, and shall judge
of the election and qualifications of its members.").
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and senate. The language of Kentucky's recognition of the privilege has
not seen a material change since 
1799. 2 4
In the next Subpart, we will discuss some of the more famous exer-
cises of the privilege by legislatures in the United States. After discussing
legislative practice, we will then discuss judicial precedent pertaining to
the privilege, noting that the overwhelming weight of this authority simply
225
confirms the legislative nature of the prerogative.
C. Legislative Precedent
Legislatures in the United States, particularly the two houses of Congress,
have resolved questions about their members' eligibility so many times
and in so many contexts that an Article of this size can no more than note
the basic contours of the practice. For the most part, they have adjudicated
the regularity of elections-that is, questions about who received the most
votes, who has the proper credentials for admission, and whether so-called
"corrupt practices" occurred at the polls or thereabouts. More to the point
of this Article, they have also addressed the question of whether people
have met the various qualifications for service. In this Subpart, we hope to
provide some examples of legislative practices in this area. Many of these
examples are from the United States Senate, whose Historical Office has
produced an excellent monograph on the subject.6
1. In re Gallatin (Senate, United States, 1793-1794).-The federal Senate
first exercised its privilege in controversial circumstances in the winter
223 Compare Ky. CONsT. art. I, § 9 (1792) (describing the procedure for determining
"electors of the senate"); id. art. II, § 2 ("The governor shall be chosen by the electors of
the senate, at the same time, at the same place, and in the same manner that they are herein
directed to elect senators ...."), with Ky. CONsT. art. II, § 14 (799) (One senator for each
district shall be elected by those qualified to vote for representatives therein ...."); id. art.
III, § 2 ("The governor shall be elected for the term of four years by the citizens entitled to
suffrage at the time and places where they shall respectively vote for representatives.").
224 Compare Ky. CONsT. art. II, § 19 (1799) ("Each House of the General Assembly shall
judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns of its members; but a contested election
shall be determined in such manner as shall be directed by law.") with Ky. CONsT. art. II, § 20
(1850) ("Each House of the General Assembly shall judge of the qualifications, elections, and
returns of its members; but a contested election shall be determined in such manner as shall
be directed by law."), and Ky. CONST. § 38 (1891) ("Each House of the General Assembly shall
judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, but a contested election shall
be determined in such manner as shall be directed by law.").
225 See infra notes 680-796 and accompanying text.
226 See ANNE M. BUTLER & WENDY WOLFF, UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION: EXPULSION
AND CENSURE CASES, 1793-1990 (1995). Seegenerally id. at xiii (noting that, over its long history,
the Senate has "jealously guarded" its prerogative to determine the eligibility of its members
and to punish its members for misconduct).
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of 1793-1794, in the case of Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania,1 7 who later
served as Thomas Jefferson's secretary of the treasury. At that time, sena-t . , 229
tors were elected by the state legislatures, but the exact means by which
such elections occurred were often subject to confusion or manipulation.3
Although typically the two houses of a bicameral legislature would vote131
as one on the question, from 1791 to 1793 a handful of Federalists in
Pennsylvania's senate insisted on separate votes, thus preventing the state
from agreeing on a second senator.' 3z Gallatin, a Jeffersonian (Republican)
and a member of Pennsylvania's house, 3 3 was an outspoken critic of this
bloc, "decrying the fact that just six men.. . were depriving Pennsylvania
2,,34
of half of its representation in the United States Senate. Ultimately, the235
Federalists capitulated and agreed to a joint vote. Although he discour-
136aged his own election, and even speculated out loud about whether he
had been a citizen long enough to serve,2 3 7 Gallatin nevertheless prevailed
in the vote of February 28, 1793.2
3
8
227 See id. at 4-5.
228 See id.; RAYMOND WALTERS, JR., ALBERT GALLATIN: JEFFERSONIAN FINANCIER AND
DIPLOMAT 143 (1957).
229 Until the Seventeenth Amendment, the Constitution provided that "[t]he Senate of
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, chosen by the legislature
thereof•. ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. I (amended 1913). The Seventeenth Amendment
provides that "[lt]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
state, elected by the people thereof ." Id. at amend. XVII (1913).
230 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at xiv.
231 See WALTERS, supra note 228, at 50.
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 Id.
235 See id.
236 See HENRY ADAMS, THE LIFE OF ALBERT GALLATIN 95-96 (1879) ("You will see by
the papers that I am elected one of the Senators to represent this State in the Senate of the
United States, an appointment.., which, notwithstanding its importance, I sincerely wish had
not taken place .... It will be enough to say that none of my friends wished it, and that they
at last consented to take me up because it was nearly impossible to carry any other person of
truly Republican principles." (quoting Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Clare (Mar. 9,
1793))).
237 See id. at 98 ("[W]hen his name was proposed, [Gallatin] made a short speech to the
effect that there were many other persons more proper to fill the office, and indeed that it
was a question whether he was eligible, owing to the doubt whether he had been nine years
a citizen."); see also 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 58 (1794) (affidavit of John Breakbill) ("[Llast Winter,
being a member of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, ... I heard Mr. Gallatin say his citizenship
would not admit his being a Senator...."). Gallatin may well have said this while under the
false impression that the Constitution required him to have been a citizen of Pennsylvania for
nine years. See id. at 58-59 (affidavit of Henry Kammerer) (noting that, according to Gallatin,
he had expressed doubts about the duration of his citizenship "under a mistaken idea that it
was necessary for him to have been nine years a citizen of Pennsylvania...").
238 SeeWALTERS, supra note 228, at 5i. In addition to the obstacles set forth in the text,
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Apparently the duration of his citizenship was more than a matter of
idle speculation. The federal Constitution requires nine years of prior citi-
zenship for service in the Senate.23 9 A native of Switzerland,' 4° Gallatin had
left Europe in 1780,41 and presumably had established citizenship on this
side of the Atlantic at some point thereafter. Although the Senate admitted
him to membership and allowed him to take the oath of office when it con-
vened on December 2 141793, 24 that same day it noted a petition regarding
his eligibility to serve.
Thus began the notable, and notably short, career of Albert Galla-
tin in the Senate. Although he remained in the chamber less than three
months,244 in that short time he succeeded in establishing himself as the
chief burr under the saddle of Alexander Hamilton, George Washington's
secretary of the treasury.245 As Raymond Walters, one of Gallatin's biogra-
phers, has suggested, with his "Genevan heritage" and fiscal experience
from serving in Pennsylvania's legislature,2 " Gallatin was uniquely fit to
subject Hamilton's work to scrutiny.
And so he did. Although the provenance of the Senate's resolutions
during Gallatin's brief tenure is not entirely clear, Walters is confident in as-
cribing them to Gallatin's influence. 4 ' Thus, on January 8, 1794, a motion
Gallatin's party was also in the minority in the legislature as a whole. In his autobiography, he
attributed his success to hard work in that branch of government:
In the session of 1791-92 ... I was put on 35 Committees, prepared
all the reports and drew all their bills .... It was my constant assiduity
to business and the assistance derived from it by many members, which
enabled the republican party in the Legislature, then a minority on the
joint ballot, to elect me and no other but me of that party, Senator of the
United States.
EDWIN G. BURROWS, ALBERT GALLATIN AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REPUBLICANISM, 1761-
I8oo, at 293 (1974) (citation omitted).
239 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States and who
shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen.").
240 See WALTERS, supra note 228, at I.
241 See id. at II.
242 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. I (793) ("This being the day fixed by the Constitution for
the annual meeting of Congress, the following members of the Senate appeared, produced
their credentials, and took their seats: ... ALBERT GALLATIN, from Pennsylvania .... "); id.
("The VICE PRESIDENT administered the oath required by law to Mr. BUTLER, Mr. GALLATIN,
and Mr. MARTIN, respectively, and they took their seats.").
243 See id. ("The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the petition of Conrad Laub and
others, relative to the appointment of Mr. GALLATIN, a Senator of the United States; which was
read, and ordered to lie on the table.").
244 See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
245 See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
246 WALTERS, supra note 228, at 60.
247 See id.
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was made in the Senate to require Hamilton to lay before that body vari-
ous accounts, including "the Domestic Debt of the United States, ... the
Domestic Debt redeemed since the commencement of the present Gov-
ernment, ... the Foreign Debt of the United States .... the application of
the moneys obtained upon Foreign Loans contracted since the commence-
ment of the present Government, ... [and the] actual receipts and expendi-
tures ... of the present Government [for various periods of time]." With
a few changes, this motion carried just a few days later on January 20.' 49
Needless to say, Hamilton was not well disposed to these requests." ° As
the historian Edwin Burrows has noted, Gallatin "ultimately emerged as
the Republicans' first line of defense against Hamiltonian finance."
Given this forensic assault, one should not be astonished that the Fed-
eralists, who dominated the Senate, were less than solicitous of Gallatin's
252fate as the subject of a petition. On December 11, 1793, the Senate
referred the petition to a committee of five Federalists, 53 who somewhat
predictably reported on the last day of the year that he was not qualified
to serve. The committee justified its conclusion in terms of his foreign255
birth and extensive ties to people overseas. On January 13, 1794, the
Senate referred the petition to another committee, this time a "Commit-
tee on Elections" comprising seven members, four of whom were Federal-256
ists. On February 10, this committee made a report favorable to the pe-
titioners, although it articulated its conclusions in terms of Gallatin's need
257to make his case.
248 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 26-27 (1794).
249 See id. at 34-36.
250 See WALTERS, supra note 228, at 60.
251 BURROWS, supra note 238, at 420.
252 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 4 ("Faced with some confusion over a
technical point of citizenship, Federalists saw no reason to rescue a dangerous foe.").
253 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 19 (Dec. II, 1793) ("Ordered, That Messrs. RUTHERFURD,
CABOT, ELLSWORTH, LIVERMORE, and MITCHELL, be a committee to take into consideration the
petition of Conrad Laub and others, stating that the Hon. Albert Gallatin, at the time he was
elected a Senator of the United States, had not been nine years a citizen of the said United
States, as is required by the Constitution, and report thereon to the Senate.").
254 See id. at 24 (Dec. 31, 1793) ("Mr. RUTHERFURD reported, from the committee to
whom was referred the petition of Conrad Laub and others, stating that the Hon. ALBERT
GALLATIN, at the time he was elected a Senator of the United States, had not been nine years
a citizen of the said United States, as is required by the Constitution ... 
255 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 3.
256 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (Jan. 13, 1794); BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 4
(noting the composition of the committee).
257 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 61 (Feb. 10, 1794) ("[l~n the opinion of the Committee, it is
now incumbent upon Mr. Gallatin to show that he has become a citizen of the United States,
and when."); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 4 (noting that the report "again
supported the Pennsylvania petitioners").
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Gallatin's chief difficulty lay in his inability to establish to the satisfac-
tion of the Senate that he had become a citizen of one state or another
early enough to qualify for membership in that body. As David Currie has
observed, questions of citizenship were difficult to resolve at that time,5 8
owing to technicalities arising from the transfer of sovereignty from the
British Crown to entities on this side of the ocean. Quite understandably,
Gallatin emphasized his various ties to the Union since he had arrived in
1780, noting that he had contributed money and services to the Revolution,
that he had bought land in what is now Maine, and that he had taken oaths• .• 259
of loyalty to both Massachusetts and Virginia. He also took the abstract
position that the common experience of immigration and Revolution had. 260"E
swept away technical notions of citizenship in one state or another. "Ev-
ery man who took an active part in the American Revolution," he argued
"was a citizen according to the great laws of reason and nature ....
But he was ultimately unable to establish persuasively that he had actu-.... 262
ally assumed citizenship in any one state. As William Lewis, counsel for
the petitioners, summarized the case against him, "the difficulties which
stood between Mr. GALLATIN and his seat, were insurmountable and could
not be removed without showing a law of Massachusetts, Virginia, &c., re-
pealing those laws in regard to the qualification of citizens, which he had
mentioned, but which repeal he was certain did not exist. '2 63 Ironically,
Gallatin's case might have been stronger had he immigrated before the
Declaration of Independence, for in that case he might first have become
a British subject and thus somewhat automatically a citizen of his state of• 264
residence upon independence.
On February 28, the full Senate determined that Gallatin was not eli-
gible to serve. The et tu Brute perhaps came from Gallatin's fellow Penn-
258 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: TIhE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-18Oi, at 197 n.185 (997) ("Like the case of William Smith .... Gallatin's exclusion
raised difficult questions of defining citizenship before the new Constitution took effect.").
259 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 47-48 (Feb. 20, 1794) (describing the "written statement" of
"Mr. G.").
260 See id. at 49 (noting that Gallatin "conceived himself a citizen in common with the
other citizens of the United States, from the time of his first qualifying after his arrival and
attachment to the country").
261 Id. at52 (Feb. 21, 1794).
262 See WALTERS, supra note 228, at 61 (describing the argument of William Lewis, who
presented the case against Gallatin in the Senate) ("His chief tactic was to place the burden
of proof squarely on Gallatin, insisting that he show he had been a citizen of Massachusetts or
Virginia or some state at least nine years before his election as a senator.").
263 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 50 (Feb. 20, 1794).
264 Cf. id. at 49 (remarks of William Lewis, counsel for petitioners) ("[S]urely the
gentleman was not one of the mass of citizens at the accomplishment of Independence.").
265 See id. at 57 (Feb. z8, 1794) ("Resolved, That the election of ALBERT GALLATIN to be a
Senator of the United States was void, he not having been a citizen of the United States the
term of years required as a qualification to be a Senator of the United States."); see also CURRIE,
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sylvanian in the Senate, Robert Morris. Although a Federalist, Morris had
initially told Gallatin that he would remain neutral." 6 In the end, however,
he voted against him.1
67
In re Gallatin displayed many of the characteristics of contests, protests,
and petitions to come. Although argued in substantially legalistic terms,
those terms included a significant admixture of hortatory claims, and poli-
tics quite likely exerted some influence on the process. In addition, and
as with virtually every exercise of the privilege to follow, In re Gallatin per-
tained to an alleged infirmity that existed at the time the would-be mem-
ber presented himself for membership. That is, the basis for the petition
against Gallatin-the possibility that he had not been a citizen for a suf-
ficient number of years-preceded his appearance in the Senate for admis-
sion on December 2, 1793.
2. Stanton v. Lane (Senate, United States, 1861-1862).---Civil War and Re-
construction naturally subjected the American political system to severe
strains, and the two houses of Congress were no strangers to this phenom-
enon. One of the most fascinating parties to a contest during this period
was James H. Lane of Kansas, a fiery orator with a powerful personality.'69
Although a Democrat and (at least ostensibly) a supporter of slavery when
he entered the territory of Kansas, 70 Lane eventually transferred his alle-
supra note 258, at 197 n. I85.
266 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 4; WALTERS, supra note 228, at 59
267 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 4; WALTERS, supra note 228, at 63.
268 See CURRIE, supra note 258, at 197 n.185 (noting that "Gallatin lost by an unexplained
vote of 14 to 12 that appeared to be on what we would now call party lines"). In hindsight,
we can see that the issue left somewhat unresolved in In re Gallatin was whether the Senate
thought Gallatin had to have been a citizen nine years at the time of his election or when
the term for which he had been elected began. In the later case of In re Shields, the Senate
excluded James Shields on the express ground that he had not been nine years a citizen
when his putative term began. See infra notes 461-63 and accompanying text. Even later,
the Senate looked back at In re Gallatin through the lens of In re Shields and noted the lack
of clarity in the earlier case. See 79 CONG. REC. 9838 (June 21, 1935) (Sen. Bulkley) (debates
on the contest of Hatfield v. Holt) ("The resolution adopted in the Gallatin case in its fair
meaning holds that the election was void because the claimant did not possess the necessary
qualifications as of the time of election. Whether it meant that or not, those who discussed
and debated the Shields case ... thought it meant that .... ").
269 See ALLAN G. BOGUE, THE EARNEST MEN: REPUBLICANS OF THE CIVIL WAR SENATE 42
(1981) ("Jim Lane was a volatile man, and capable of violence in both word and deed."); id.
at 42-43 ("[Although Lane] called for draconian war, [he] was capable of surprising flashes of
sentiment and was extolled by many as a real 'live' one."). He committed suicide in 1866. See
KENDALL E. BAILES, RIDER ON THE WIND: JIM LANE AND KANSAS 208-09 (1962); BOGUE, supra,
at 340.
270 See BAILES, supra note 269, at 45 (noting Lane's election as President of the "National
Democratic party in Kansas" on June 27, 1855); id. at 44 ("Arriving in the border town of
Westport, Lane made a speech in which he said he would as soon buy a slave as a mule.").
There is some evidence that this ignoble remark was a ruse. See id. at 40 (describing a
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giance to the Republican Party and succeeded in being elected one of that
state's first senators when it joined the Union in early 1861."'
Soon after his election, Lane made his way to Washington to attend a
special session President Lincoln had called for July 4. Upon arrival, he
found matters somewhat in disarray. In particular, what troops the North
could muster were at some distance from the capital,27 2 and Maryland had.... 273
made deployment of additional troops to the city difficult. Indeed, there
was some concern that the president himself was in danger.14 Upon learn-
ing this, Lane organized a "Frontier Guard" that actually took stations in
275
the East Room of the White House. After this crisis abated, Lane went
back to Kansas, despite the imminent special session, to organize an army
of volunteers in support of the Union. On June 20, after he returned to
Washington, Lincoln made Lane a brigadier general in this unit"--or at
least extended to him an appointment in this regard.2
78
suspected bargain between Lane and Senator Stephen A. Douglas) ("Now it will be necessary
for you to mislead the South with regard to your plans on the slavery question. This you can
do on your way to [Kansas] and trying to buy some slaves.").
271 See id. at 54 (noting Lane's political affiliations); id. at 148 (noting Lane's election
to the Senate on April 4, 1861); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 92 (noting Lane's
switch to the Republican party and his election to the Senate).
272 See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 298 (1995) ("After the firing on Fort Sumter
the capital seemed almost deserted because of a steady exodus of pro-Confederate officials,
including high-ranking army and navy officers."). Lincoln had called for 75,000 militia, see
id. at 296 (noting the President's proclamation of April 15, 1861), but they did not arrive for
several days. See id. at 299 (noting the arrival of New York's Seventh Regiment on April 25).
273 See DONALD, supra note 272, at 298 ("For nearly a week Washington was virtually
under siege. Marylanders destroyed the railroad bridges linking Baltimore with the North
and cut the telegraph lines.").
274 See BAILES, supra note 269, at 151.
275 See BAILES, supra note 269, at 151-52; BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 92; DONALD,
supra note 272, at 298 ("To preserve some semblance of order in the national capital, Cassius
M. Clay, wearing three pistols and an 'Arkansas toothpick' (a sharp dagger), organized the Clay
Guards, and Senator-elect James H. Lane of Kansas recruited the Frontier Guards from fellow
Kansans who were in Washington looking for jobs. Lane's group was quartered in the East
Room of the White House.").
276 In his biography of Lane, Kendall E. Bailes suggested that Lane sought to organize
this force so that he, and not his chief political rival Governor Charles Robinson, could control
patronage in Kansas. See BAILES, supra note 269, at 154 ("Unless Lane could recruit several
[regiments] of his own, his downfall would be assured. In Lane's mind, there was only one
solution. He had to be both a Senator and a general.");c. id. at 171 ("[Lane's] power was such
that Kansas was the only state in the Union where a Senator controlled military patronage
instead of the Governor.").
277 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 92.
278 Lane and his supporters later took the position that the President lacked authority
to make the appointment, or that Lane had not accepted it. See infra notes 300--o and
accompanying text.
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On July 4, Senator James W. Grimes of Iowa presented Lane's creden-
tials for the special session. 79 The Senate promptly admitted him as a
member, and he took the oath, s but trouble soon arose. On July 12, Fred-
erick P. Stanton arrived at the Senate with credentials signed by the gov-
ernor of Kansas."" Although the legislature had elected Lane, Governor
Charles Robinson, who was also one of Lane's political opponents, took
the position that Lane had forfeited his seat by accepting the incompatible
office of brigadier general, and had appointed Stanton in his stead. 8 Lane
promptly described Stanton's credentials and a supporting memorial as "an
attempt to bury a man before he is dead," adding that he did not intend to
"surrender [his] certificate" to serve in the Senate until after the brigade
had filled and had chosen him as its commanding 
officer.213
As had become its practice, the Senate referred the matter to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.2 84 On August 2, the committee reported against
Lane, finding that he had been "appointed a brigadier general in the volun-
teer forces of the United States," that he had "accepted said appointment,"
and that, in its opinion, "the office of brigadier general under the United
States is incompatible with that of member of either house of Congress.""8 5
In connection with this report, the committee also offered the following
two resolutions:
1. Resolved, That JAMEs H. LANE is not entitled to a seat in this body.
2. Resolved, That Frederick P. Stanton is entitled to a seat in this
286
body.
The evidence against Lane was quite strong, although not perfect.
Among other things, he had referred to himself as a "duly appointed ...
brigadier general in the volunteer force of the United States" in a letter to
the editor of the Daily Times of Leavenworth, and he had gone on to solicit
recruits for the new brigades in the same correspondence. He also ap-
279 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., ist Sess. I(July 4, 186i).
28o See id.
281 See id. at 82 (July 12, 1861).
282 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note zz6, at 93. See generally BAILES, supra note 269, at
154 (describing the confusion in Kansas arising from Lane's actions) ("When [Lane] returned
to Kansas in August [18611, people there had no idea what his real status was."). The federal
Constitution provides that "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be
a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
283 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., ist Sess. 8z (July 12, 1861).
284 Id.
285 S. REP. No. 37-1, at I (1861); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 93.
286 CONG. GLOBE, 3 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (Dec. 18, 1861).
287 S. REP. No. 37-I, at 4-5 (i86i). The solicitation-described in the debates as a
"proclamation"-bore the words "Brigadier Generaf" under James H. Lane's name. Lane,
however, took the position that someone else had added the title. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th
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peared to have taken an oath in support of his apparent appointment the
day that the president had made it. "28 Lane remained adamant in his de-
fense, however, arguing that he had never formally accepted the appoint-
ment, that he would not consider doing so until the regiments in question
had fully formed, and that the evidence against him suffered from various
infirmities.2 89
On August 6, the president pro tempore of the senate laid before the
body a letter from President Lincoln to the effect that Lane's appoint-
ment had been anticipatory to the formation of a regiment of volunteers29o
from Kansas. "It was my intention, as shown by my letter of June 20,
1861," the President wrote, "to appoint the Hon. JAMEs H. LANE, of Kansas,
a brigadier general of United States volunteers, in anticipation of the act of• . . )291
Congress, since passed, for raising such volunteers. .. . Although this
letter was obviously helpful to Lane's position, it was certainly not an elixir,
at least not yet. The matter was then passed over to the next session, with
292further information requested from the president.
Between the Senate's two sessions in 1861, Lane returned to Kansas
and kept up his military or quasi-military activities. 93 On December 2,
the Thirty-seventh Congress's second session began.' 94 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the Senate resumed its consideration of the contest, sending it back to
committee to take into account additional information that the Senate had
295received 9. But Lane fared no better the second time around, the commit-
tee again reporting against him on January 6, 1862.296 Although it was able
to produce further evidence that he had acted in a manner consistent with
291acceptance of a military appointment, perhaps the most telling argument
Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (Jan. 8, 1862).
288 See S. REP. No. 37-1, at 4 (86).
289 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1stSess.44o-41 (Aug. 5, 1861).
290 See id. at 450 (Aug. 6, 1861).
291 Id.
292 See id. at 452.
293 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 93 ("From September to November 1861,
Lane skirmished around the Kansas countryside with an army that became infamous for its
depredations."). In later debates on the contest, Lane conceded that he led forces during this
period, but took the position that Kansas had been under threat and that his leadership had
been informal. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 341 (Jan. 15, 1862) ("I put the case to
any Senator upon this floor. Kansas was about being invaded by the army of Price, over ten
thousand strong."); id. ("Look at the orders and proclamations issued from that army. How
are they signed? 'J.H. Lane, commanding Kansas brigade."'); see also BAILES, supra note 269,
at 156 ("Lane's Brigade was the only protection Kansas had against a possible attack from
Missouri, and to the misfortune of everyone it turned out to be little more than a band of
thieves....").
294 SeeCONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. I (Dec. 2, 186I).
295 See id. at 130 (Dec. 18, 1861).
296 See id. at 185 (Jan. 6, 1862); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 93.
297 Apparently Lane had put in a request for uniforms for his troops. See CONG. GLOBE,
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against him was one that proceeded from the spirit of the constitutional
provision forbidding dual office. "To ascertain, then, what the construction
of this clause in the Constitution should be," asked Senator Lafayette S.
Foster of Connecticut, "we should ask, of course, what mischief the makers
of the Constitution had in view when they [adopted the clause] .... Mani-
festly this-this and nothing more-executive influence," he answered. z98
According to this view, the evil lay in the president's defacto influence on a
member of the Senate, without regard to the regularity of Lane's appoint-
ment.
Ten days later, however, the Senate resolved the contest in Lane's favor,
deciding for unclear reasons to uphold his tenure. 99 It may have acceded
to arguments that Lane had not actually joined the military-for example
that the president had lacked authority to appoint Lane when he purported
to do so, or that Lane had never accepted the appointment.' Or it may
have determined that Lane had accepted but resigned the position before
serving in the Senate. 30 ' The Senate's historians, however, argue that the
body held for Lane in a spirit of patriotism. 3 0 Although they conclude that
his activities "clearly violated" the Constitution,3°4 they go on to suggest
3 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (Jan. 8, I862).; see also id. at 296 (Jan. 13, 1862) (Sen. Davis) ("That
[Lane] did attempt to do various acts which nobody but a brigadier general could have done;
and that he performed those acts under this appointment by the President of the United
States to this identical brigadier generalship, I think admits of no reasonable doubt.").
298 Id. at 226 (Jan. 8, i862);see also id. at 296 (Jan. 13, 1862) (Sen. Davis). The contestant
himself, who had been permitted to speak, made an interesting point in this regard:
Why, sir, here is a member of the Senate of the United States with
an appointment in the Army held over his head for six months for his
acceptance, and he voting upon his own pay, voting upon every measure
connected with the organization of the Army into which he may at any
time step and occupy a high and honorable command.
Id. at 339 (Jan. i5, 1862) (Frederick P. Stanton). In making this point, Stanton appears to have
assumed, at least arguendo, that Lane had not accepted his appointment.
299 See id. at 363 (Jan. I6, 1862).
300 See, e.g., id. at 129 (Dec. I8, 1861) (Sen. Bright) ("[Wlhen [Senator Lane] was
appointed a brigadier general there was in reality no such office for him to accept."). At
least one Senator also suggested that a President may not appoint a brigadier general absent
senatorial confirmation. See id. at 292 (Jan. 13, 1862) (Sen. Clark). See generally BUTLER &
WOLFF, supra note 226, at 93-94.
301 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 292 (Jan. 13, 1862) (Sen. Clark) ("I now
come to the acceptance of [the] appointment, and I say that the Senator from Kansas, in
no well-considered sense, in no sense which ought to bind him, accepted that office."). See
generally BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 94.
302 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 291 (Jan. 13, 1862) (Sen. Clark).
303 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at xxi.
304 Id. at 94. On January 18, 1862, during the debates on Stanton v. Lane, Senator Foster
noted a similar matter adjudicated by the House of Representatives against the individual in
question on January 17, 1803. This matter, In re Van Ness, involved a member from New York
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that the senators may have felt uncomfortable excluding Lane after an-
other of their members, Edward D. Baker of Oregon, had died at the Battle
of Ball's Bluff.s05 Even more broadly, they may have felt uncomfortable ex-
cluding military officers from Congress in the middle of a difficult war. Not
long before, for example, the House had taken no action when Clement L.
Vallandigham of Ohio had offered a resolution finding certain members of
the body ineligible because of simultaneous service in the military.
30 6
There is certainly some evidence to support these interpretations. For
example, although Senator Daniel Clark of New Hampshire, one of Lane's
supporters, conceded that Lane had "attempted to call around him the
choice spirits of Kansas," and that Lane's "heart was in the war," he went
on to chide his colleagues for seeking to "hang him up on the tenter hooks
of condemnation, a spectacle to the nation!" Similarly, Senator James R.
Doolittle of Wisconsin, another of Lane's supporters, noted that "I do re-
gret most sincerely that the honorable member from Kansas had not been
in the field from the very beginning of the war in Missouri. 3 °s
Without doubt, Senator Baker's death had exerted a powerful effect on
Washington, for he had been much admired, by both his fellow senators
and by President Lincoln. 309 Baker, about as much as Lane, had carried on
who, while serving in Congress, accepted appointment as a "major of militia" in the District of
Columbia. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (Jan. 8, 1862) (Foster's reference to In re
Van Ness); see also 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 292 (1802) (In r Van Ness begins); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 18o i-i829, at 71-75 (2OO *) (discussing In re
Van Ness). For a similar matter, see H.R. Rep. No. 38-1 1o (1864) (In re Blair) (Blair excluded for
holding military office after the House went into session.).
305 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 94. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., later a
member of the Supreme Court of the United States, was also wounded at this battle. See
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND His FAMILY 155
(1944) ("Holmes had not fired twice when a spent ball hit him in the stomach. When he got
his wind he struggled up .... Over by the grove they were fighting hand-to-hand now. Going
down on one knee, Holmes aimed .... The blow came again, in the chest this time.").
3o6 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., ist Sess. 44 (July 4, 1861) (Rep. Vallandigham); see
also HARRY C. BLAIR & REBECCA TARSHIS, LINCOLN'S CONSTANT ALLY: TI1E LIFE OF EDWARD D.
BAKER 132 (196o).
307 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 292 (Jan. 13, 1862). Clark also noted with irony
that many of his colleagues had helped with enlistment. "If you are going to turn from the
Senate all those gentlemen who have been raising troops," he asked, "what becomes of my
friend tLe Senator from New York... who, I believe, has raised three regiments? If Lane loses
a seat for two, he ought to lose a seat and a half." Id. at 293. Clark was referring to Senator Ira
Harris, who also supported Lane.
3o8 Id. at 344 (Jan. 15, 1862).
309 See DONALD,SUpra note 272, at3 18-i 9 ("On October z I, [General George] McClellan's
critics were infuriated when, after long inaction, an element of his army ventured across the
Potomac at Ball's Bluff (or Leesburg), ran into fierce Confederate opposition, and was thrown
back with heavy losses. Colonel Edward D. Baker, Lincoln's longtime friend and a senator
from Oregon, was killed. The Lincolns were devastated by the news and received no White
House visitors the next day. In Congress grief over the fallen senator exploded into wrath
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as both a military officer and a member of the Senate.310 Indeed, the histo-
rian Elijah Kennedy even suggested that Baker spoke in the Senate wear-
ing full uniform. According to Kennedy, when Republicans in the Senate
were seeking someone to respond to an anticipated speech from Senator
John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, they chose Baker, who at that moment
was "drilling with his regiment":
[Baker] was told he was wanted in the Senate. He sprang into his saddle
and rode to the Capitol. He was met on his arrival at the Senate Chamber
by some of his colleagues, who explained the situation. There was no time
to change his apparel, so he sat down at his desk. And that is how Colonel
311
Baker chanced to speak in his colonel's uniform in the Senate ....
And, like Lane, Baker took pains to deny dual service. Specifically, he
argued that, by rejecting a brigadier-generalship from the president, yet
accepting a colonelcy from a governor (in his case the governor of Pennsyl-
vania), he was staying within the letter of the Constitution. Unlike Lane,
however, Baker was never the subject of a contest.
at McClellan for having allowed such an ill-planned, poorly supported expedition."); see also
BLAIR & TARSHIs,supra note 305, at 137 ("Lincoln was grateful for Baker's continued service to
the country and to him in particular. Furthermore, he had high regard for Baker's judgment,
and sought his counsel more than he did that of some of his cabinet officers."); DORIS KEARNS
GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 380-81 (2005)
(discussing the impact of Baker's death on Lincoln and his family).
310 See CONG. GLOBE, 3 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. 294 (Jan. 13, 1862) (Sen. Sumner) (noting the
similarity between Lane's and Baker's situations).
31 1 ELIJAH R. KENNEDY, THE CONTEST FOR CALIFORNIA IN 1861: How COLONEL E.D.
BAKER SAVED THE PACIFIC STATES TO THE UNION 238-39 (1912). According to Kennedy, "[tlhe
circumstances relating to Senator Baker's reply to Senator Breckenridge were narrated to
[him] by a senator who was one of those who sent for the Colonel. Id. at 239 n. I. Blair and
Tarshis, however, note "conflicting reports about the time of Baker's presence in the Senate
chambers that day," see BLAIR & TARSHIS, supra note 305, at 135, suggesting that he might have
been there all along, and therefore not in uniform. If Kennedy is correct, it appears that Baker
made something of a habit of addressing Congress in military uniform:
After a few months [near the Rio Grande during the Mexican War,
Baker] was chosen by General Taylor as bearer of dispatches to the War
Department, and proceeded to Washington. Congress was in session,
and as he had not resigned his seat in the House he availed himself of
his privilege, as a member, to speak .... Having brought no civilian
clothes with him he spoke in his military uniform ....
KENNEDY, supra, at ioi-02.
312 See BLAIR & TARSHIS, supra note 305, at 137 (quoting letter from Baker to Lincoln of
August 31, 1861, declining the office of brigadier general) ("The opinion manifested by the
Senate of the United States as to the incompatibility of the office of a senator of the United
States with the office of General compels me to decline the commission."); KENNEDY, supra
note 311, at 287 n. I ("It was considered practicable to accept a commission as colonel from the
governor of a state ... and still retain the senatorship; but it was held that the acceptance of an
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Like In re Gallatin, Stanton v. Lane was argued in a lawyerly way, with re-
sort to constitutional text and theory, as well as legislative and judicial prec-
edent, even while politics provided the mortar between the stones. And, as
with In re Gallatin, the contest arose from an infirmity in Lane's qualifica-
tions that, if it existed at all, existed at the time he presented himself for
membership. Unlike In re Gallatin, however, the Senate entertained the
possibility not only of excluding Lane, but also of admitting the contestant,
Frederick P. Stanton.313 Although it did not reach the second question, re-
solving the first in Lane's favor, no senator expressed doubt that the body
could have admitted Stanton in Lane's stead-which was obviously the
hope of Lane's opponent in Kansas, Governor Robinson.
3. In re Ames (Senate, United States, 1870).--One of the Senate's many ex-
ercises of the privilege during Reconstruction pertained to Adelbert Ames,
whom the legislature of Mississippi sent to the Senate in 1870. A Brevet
major general in the Army of the United States at the time of his elec-
tion,3 14 Ames had led a distinguished military career. He was born in Maine
and joined the army in 1856,31 graduating from West Point in 1861316 and
receiving the congressional Medal of Honor for his service at Bull Run
and promotion on the field of battle at Gettysburg.1 7 After the war, and
after Congress returned the Confederate states to military jurisdiction, he318
became provisional governor of Mississippi. In 1869, President Ulysses
Grant made him commander of the Fourth Military District, which includ-
ed that state.3 19 Ames thus found himself in the middle of some of the most
divisive events of Reconstruction.3 2 0
appointment from the President of the United States would invalidate Colonel Baker's place
in the Senate."); id. at 287 (quoting letter from Baker to General McClellan of September 22,
i861) ("[Tihe President was pleased to appoint me a brigadier-general, an office which my
duty to the State of Oregon ... compelled me to decline. Yesterday I had conferred upon me
the appointment of major-general. Actuated by the same motive, I shall decline that also.");.
313 See supra note z86 and accompanying text.
314 See CONG. GLOBE, 41St Cong., 2d Sess. 2125 (Mar. 22, 1861).
315 See WILLIAM S. McFEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY 360 (1981).
316 See id.
317 See id. According to one historian, although Ames was "shot in the thigh" at Bull
Run, he would not leave the field and continued "giving fire commands until he collapsed
from loss of blood." RICHARD N. CURRENT, THREE CARPETBAG GOVERNORS 67-68 (1967).
318 See S. REP. No. 41-75, at I (1870); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at I5O;
CURRENT, supra note 317, at 71 (describing the circumstances of Ames' appointment); WILLIAM
C. HARRIS, THE DAY OF THE CARPETBAGGER: REPUBLICAN RECONSTRUCTION IN MIssIssIPPI 180-
81 (1979) (noting that a "squad of men in blue" was required to evict Ames' predecessor in
office).
319 See S. REP. No. 41-75, at I (1870); CURRENT, supra note 317, at 71-72.
320 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 318, at 53 (noting that, following Congress's instructions,
"Ames ... dismissed more than two thousand local and state officers who could not take the
ironclad oath, replacing them with so-called 'loyal men"'). People taking this oath attested
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An intricate series of events pertaining to both Mississippi and Ames
then unfolded. On November 30 and December 1, 1869, the voters of the
state adopted a new constitution and elected a new legislature.32 ' One
of this legislature's first duties was to elect people to represent the state
in the Senate. On January 18, 1870, while he was still serving as military
governor, the legislature chose Ames for one of these seats. Indeed, as
governor, he signed his own credentials."' Although his election was not
literally irregular, some members of the legislature did find fault with the
atmosphere in which he was chosen. As the historian William C. Harris
notes, Ames "appeared hat in hand (some said sword in hand) to claim the
senatorship as a reward for his service."3 4 "Although grateful to Ames for
his contributions to the party's success," adds Harris, "many Republicans
objected to his candidacy while he was still the military commander of the,,325
state ....
Some time thereafter, Ames resigned from the army to take his seat.
On February 25, two days after Mississippi had regained its right to rep-
resentation in Congress, Senator Thomas J. Robertson of South Caro-
lina presented his credentials to the chamber.32 7 The Senate immediately
referred them to the Committee on the Judiciary without first admitting
Ames to membership. 32  The sticking point in Ames's case was whether
he had been an "inhabitant" of the state at the time of his election, as the329
Constitution requires. Although literally present at the time, the ques-
tion remained whether Ames had chosen to make Mississippi his state of
residence.
that "they had never given any aid or comfort to the Confederacy. Id. at 7. Ames' active
participation in local politics no doubt ruffled feathers. See id. at 235 (noting that Ames
justified his political activity on the grounds that "it was absolutely necessary for him to enter
the political arena on the Republican side in order to prevent the 'rebels' from regaining
power").
321 See HARRIS, supra note 318, at 256-57. According to Harris, Ames extended the
election to two days. See id. at 256 n.83.
322 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2125 (Mar. 22, 1870) (receiving credentials of
Adelbert Ames).
323 See id.
324 HARRIS, supra note 3 18, at 265.
325 Id. That legislature also elected Hiram Rhoades Revels to serve in the Senate, the
first African American to do so. See id. at z66.
326 See HARRIS, supra note 318, at 268.
327 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1557 (Feb. 25, 1870).
328 See id.
329 The federal Constitution provides that "No Person shall be a Senator... who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
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On March 18, the committee reported against him.3 30 Although most, if
not all, members of the Senate were willing to acknowledge that a soldier
could become an inhabitant of a state by deciding to remain there, at least
some argued that the soldier must somehow make that decision manifest331
through an overt act. Ames had not really done so. In addition, he pro-
vided what appeared to be contradictory statements to the committee as to
his decision to stay in Mississippi, indicating at least to some that this deci-
sion was not complete. On the one hand, he suggested that he had decided
to stay in the state and buy property there before the election:
Upon the success of the Republican ticket in Mississippi I was repeat-
edly approached to become a candidate for the United States Senate. For
a long time I declined .... I hesitated because it would necessitate the
abandonment of my whole military life. Finally, for personal and public rea-
sons, I decided to become a candidate and leave the Army. My intentions
were publicly declared and sincere. (The intentions thus declared were
not only to become a candidate for the Senate, but to remain and reside in
Mississippi.) I even made arrangements, almost final and permanent, with
332
a person to manage property I intended to buy.
On the other hand, he made a statement to the committee that indicated
a lack of commitment to remain in the state should he have lost the elec-
tion. According to Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York, who spoke for
the committee, when asked "whether he could say that it was his intention
to remain in Mississi i if not elected to the Senate," Ames replied "that
he could not so say.' Another member of the committee recorded his
answer to this question as: "Doubtful if I should have become a citizen if I
,,334
had not been elected: but I felt certain of being elected. This statement
330 See S. REP. No. 41-75, at 2 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2052 (Mar. 18,
1870).
331 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., zd Sess. 2129 (Mar. 22, 1870) (Sen. Conkling) ("[A]
man in the military service does not establish a residence by obeying an order which takes
him from one place to another and by remaining under orders in that place. In order in such
circumstances to establish a residence two things must occur: first, he must do some act or acts
independent of the mere fact that he remains in the place to which he has been ordered; and
second, he must do those act with the ... intention absolute on his part to become and remain
a resident .... "); see also id. at 2135 (Sen. Thurman). At least some Senators took the position
that overt acts were not required. See id. at 2130 (Sen. Rice) ("He was not obliged to buy a
house unless he wanted one, nor a horse, nor a cow.").
332 Id. at 2125. According to Senator Charles Buckalew of Pennsylvania, the
parenthetical language in this statement was actually the committee's interpolation. See id. at
2 128. Also with respect to this statement, Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York argued that
the "property" to which Ames referred could not have been a dwelling, given that it required
a manager. See id. at 2127.
333 See id. at 21z8.
334 Id. (noting the transcription of Sen. Edmunds of Vermont).
[VOi. 95
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES
destroyed Ames' position, at least in Conkling's mind. "[A~lthough Gen-
eral Ames might have put an end to his former residence and established a
new one," he argued, "he had not done it, first, because the fact was absent
[i.e., he took no overt steps], and second, because the intention as far as it• , ,,335
existed was merely contingent, and therefore incomplete.
Responding to Conkling, Senator Benjamin E Rice of Arkansas argued
that, even assuming Ames's intention to remain was briefly in doubt, that
intention became complete the moment he was elected, thus satisfying
336
the Constitution. Others, proceeding along essentially the same lines
as Rice, took the position that Ames's expectation of success was so strong
that his intentions were clear.337
Ames certainly did not help himself with his answers, although perhaps
he deserves credit for candor. But In re Ames was also subject to political
considerations, which indeed cut both ways. Because Ames had exercised
military authority in Mississippi, numerous senators suspected that his
election had not been entirely voluntary, although they could point to no
339
technical defect. Indeed, Senator Conkling make oblique reference to
335 Id. at 2129; see also id. at 2135 (Sen. Thurman) ("[T]here is nothing in this case to
make General Ames an inhabitant ot Mississippi at the time he was elected, but his doubtful
declared intention, his conditional, contingent, lame, and impotent intention to become a
citizen there in case he should be elected a member of the United States Senate."). Although
Conkling argued against Ames on the question of eligibility, he otherwise spoke highly of
him, noting his bravery in war, and indicating as well that the legislature could ensure Ames'
admission in the Senate by electing him anew, now that his choice of Mississippi as his state
of inhabitance was beyond refute. See id. at 2125.
336 See id. at 2130 (Sen. Rice) ("But allowing that he had a doubt, coming down to
close questions of reasoning, if it did depend on whether he was elected Senator or not, the
very moment that he was elected that very moment the doubt was resolved, and they were
concurrent acts .... ).
337 See, e.g., id. at 2311 (Mar. 31, 1870) (Sen. Sawyer). Several Senators also took the
oblique (or not-so-oblique) position that Ames had to be an "inhabitant" of Mississippi
because otherwise he lacked a state to call home. See, e.g., id. at 2340 (Apr. I, 1870) (Sen.
Sherman) (noting that Ames "had no residence elsewhere, and no property or family to
indicate a residence elsewhere.").
338 See HARRIS, supra note 318, at 269 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41 St Cong., 2d Sess. 2125-26,
2130, 2334-38 (Mar. 22, 1870)) ("Asked by the judiciary committee to explain his intentions
in Mississippi, Ames botched his answer to such an extent that the Republican majority had
no choice but to delay action on his case. Although he insisted to the committee that he was
in the process of purchasing property in the state, he admitted, in all candor, that he probably
would not have done so had the legislature rejected his candidacy for the Senate.").
339 Seeid. at 269 (noting that "Republican members, even of the Radical persuasion, were
sharply divided on the wisdom of accepting [Ames] into their fellowship"). The strongest
statement in this regard was made by Senator Garrett Davis, a Democrat from Kentucky. See
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2169 (Mar. 23, 1870) ("What, then, is the case presented
to us? General Ames is sent here by a Legislature elected or chosen by his own absolute will
.. . )
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this concern, as did Senator Allen G. Thurman of Ohio.341 On the other
hand, Ames had been a hero in the war, and had known no home other than
his billet since before West Point. In addition, requiring the legislature in
Mississippi to elect him again might have struck some members as unnec-
essarily exalting form over substance. 34  In fact, that legislature remained
adamant in its choice of Ames, passing a resolution on March 24 urging the
Senate to admit him as a member.3 4 3 On April 1, the Senate voted 40-12
that Ames was eligible to serve, and he took the oath. 344
Like the earlier proceedings we have discussed, In re Ames was argued
almost entirely in legalistic terms, with elaborate reliance upon constitu-
tional text, dictionaries, judicial precedent, and other legislative contests.
Despite this focus, however, the senators were clearly aware of political
considerations as they proceeded, and one cannot know the exact reasons
for their votes. Perhaps the majority concluded, in a straightforward way,
that Ames in fact had determined to make Mississippi his home before his
election, and that the law of the Senate required nothing more. On the
other hand, perhaps some Republicans in the Senate were embarrassed to
admit as a colleague someone who had wielded military authority in Mis-
sissippi at the very moment that the legislature of that state had chosen
him to serve. Others, by contrast, might have resented the entire proceed-
ing as a purely theoretical exercise, given the state's apparent continuing
desire to send Ames to Washington.
In re Ames also resembles the earlier proceedings we have discussed
with regard to sequence. As with Gallatin and Lane, the alleged infirmity
in Ames's qualifications-his failure to be an "inhabitant" of Mississippi at
the time of election-accompanied him to the Senate instead of arising af-
terward. But In reAmes differs from In re Gallatin and Stanton v. Lane in one
important respect. Whereas the Senate admitted Gallatin and Lane and
then proceeded to adjudicate challenges to their qualifications, the Senate
did not admit Ames until after it had determined that he was qualified to
340 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2126 (Mar. 22, t870) ("[Ames] held
relationships and wielded powers among the people and the representatives by whom his
election was conferred .... I say that in popular estimation this circumstance gives hue to
the question.").
341 See id. at 2315 (Mar. 31, 1870) (describing as "a spectacle unworthy of a free
government, to see [a] military commander, with his epaulets still on his shoulder, his sword
still by his side, elevated to the great office of Senator of the United States by men elected
through his agency and under his will.
342 See, e.g., id. at 2158 (Mar. 23, 1870) (Sen. Williams) ("Of course there is no question
involved except the mere question of law and fact; because it is admitted on all hands that if
he is not now received, he will be reelected."). At least one Senator opined that the legislature
could not immediately elect Ames, however. See id. at 2310 (Mar. 31, 1870) (Sen. Pomeroy).
343 See id. at 2313-14 (joint resolution from the legislature of Mississippi); see aso HARRIS,
supra note 318, at 270.
344 See CONG. GLOBE, 41St Cong., 2d Sess. 2349 (Apr. i, 1870).
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serve. Given the plenary nature of the Senate's authority, no one sequence
is mandatory, but the sequence to which the Senate adhered in Ames' case
is the exception and not the rule. 4'
4. McChord v. Lewis (Constitutional Convention, Kentucky, 1890).-Even
legislatures convened for extraordinary purposes have been known to as-
sert and exercise the privilege. For example, the delegates to Kentucky's
constitutional convention of 1890 had a contest of their own to resolve.
345 The Senate's historians explain this practice as follows:
Generally, a senator with the proper credentials against whom a
challenge has been filed would be seated "without prejudice." Under
this arrangement, if a committee investigation later determined that
for some reason the individual was not entitled to a seat, he could be
"excluded" from the Senate by a simple majority vote, as opposed to
having to be expelled, which required a two-thirds majority. On six
occasions, the Senate excluded by majority vote as member who had
originally been seated.
BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at xviii (footnote omitted). The historians go on to note that
Albert Gallatin was one of the individuals excluded after admission by a simple majority vote.
See id. at 217 n.13; see also 99 CONG. REc. 7 (1953) (Sen. Taft) (debates on the contest of Hurley
v. Chavez) ("If a Senator takes the oath, I do not believe that that fact changes the basis of the
vote, or the percentage of the vote required, which is determined by the character of the case,
rather than by anything done at the time the oath is administered."); 68 CONG. REC. 989 (Dec.
22, 1927) (article by Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska) ("It is true that in other cases
Senators elect who for one reason or another had their right to sit in the Senate contested,
have, upon the presentation of the certificate of election, been sworn into the Senate and
the question involved then submitted to a committee, and the final issue determined upon
the report of this committee. But when thus determined it had reference to the beginning
of the term and not to anything that had happened subsequent thereto, and the vote, when
it finally came, was not a vote of expulsion but a vote as to the right that the Senator had at
the beginning of his term to occupy his seat, and hence no question of a two-thirds vote was
involved."); GEORGE W. MCCRARY, A TEATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS §§ 268-
71, at I8o-8I (Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 3d ed. 1887) (describing the process of admitting
individuals presenting prima facie evidence of election).
346 Kentucky's constitution of 185o included an express articulation of the privilege for
such delegates. See KY. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (185o) ("The convention, when assembled, shall
judge of the election of its members, and decide contested elections, but the General Assembly
shall, in calling a convention, provide for taking testimony in such cases, and for issuing a
writ of election in case of a tie."). A similar provision can be found in Kentucky's current
constitution. See KY. CONST. § 262 ("The Convention, when assembled, shall be the judge of
the election and qualification of its members, and shall determine contested elections. But
the General Assembly shall, in the act calling the Convention, provide for taking testimony
in such cases, and for issuing a writ of election in case of a tie."). Although article XII, section
2, of the constitution of 1850 and section 262 of the constitution of 189 o differ in that only
the latter refers explicitly to "qualifications," the delegates of 189o took no apparent notice of
the distinction. In fact, the only apparent remark in 189o pertaining to what became section
262 went to whether the word "judge" should be singular or plural. See 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION 1634, 1719 (1890) [hereinafter OFFICIAL
REPORT]. Indeed, legislatures have been known to assert the privilege in the complete
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The issue was whether W.C. McChord or John W. Lewis was the rightful
delegate from Washington County. 47 On September 8, 1890, the secretary
of state transmitted to the convention certificates of the various delegates'
election, including one that suggested on its face that Lewis had a rightful348
claim to a seat. The delegates were aware, however, that McChord de-
nied the regularity of Lewis's election, contending that the voters had cho-
sen him and not Lewis to represent them at the convention. 49 The issue
then arose as to whether Lewis should be admitted on a provisional basis,
pending resolution of the contest, or whether he should stand aside for the
time being.30 After considerable debate, the temporary chairman, George
Washington of Campbell County, determined that the certificates "ought
to be accepted at present as primafacie evidence" of Lewis's election and
•35,'
that "[t]he Convention can do hereafter as it pleases in the matter." As
noted above, legislatures do not invariably adhere to this practice, but it is
352
more the rule than the exception. 35
The convention then referred the contest to a special committee,
which reported unanimously against Lewis some three weeks later, on Oc-
tober4. In the committee's estimation, the only real issue in the case was
whether the general assembly had moved the boundaries of Washington
County in such a way as to re-assign certain voters to Anderson and Mercer
Counties.35 Because many of the affected individuals had cast their ballots
absence of textual authority. Virginia's House of Burgesses exercised the privilege under such
circumstances in 178o, see supra note 195, and Kentucky's constitutional convention of 1849
exercised the privilege with respect to at least two matters, notwithstanding an absence of
textual authority in the constitution of 1799. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 36
(1849) (In re Coffey referred to in committee); id. at 1071 (committee discharged from further
consideration of In re Coffey); id. at 56 (Lecompte v. Nutall referred to in committee); id. at 191
(Lecompte v. Nuttall resolved in Nuttall's favor).
347 See i OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 346, at 378.
348 See id. at 8 ("Washington-J.W. Lewis").
349 See id. at 6 (Mr. L.T. Moore) (noting the impending contest); id. at io (Mr. Straus) ("I
move that the oath be administered to all Delegates except where there is a contest.").
350 Compare id. at io (Mr. Straus), with id. at I I (Mr. Burnam) ("Whatever may be the
result hereafter of any contest, I suppose that the oath ought to be administered now to every
man who has been... reported.").
351 Id. at 19.
352 See supra note 345 and accompanying text. The organization of a constitutional
convention is complicated by the fact that it lacks a predecessor. See generally McCRARY,
supra note 345, § 587, at 385 (discussing a legislature's first organization) ("Of course the
first organization must be temporary, and if the law does not designate the person who shall
preside over such temporary organization, the persons assembled and claiming to be members
may select one of their number for that purpose.").
353 See I OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 346, at 47-48.
354 Seeid. at 378-8o.
355 See id.
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for Lewis, if the re-assignment were valid, McChord had won the elec-
tion.356 If not, Lewis had won.
Lewis's argument was two-fold. First, he argued that the statute pur-
porting to move the boundaries was unconstitutional.358 Second, he argued
that it had been repealed by subsequent legislation.3 9 But the committee
rejected both of these claims, concluding that the earlier act was valid and
that the alleged repealing acts were not.36° In Lewis's mind, however, nei-
ther the committee nor the convention as a whole had power to declare a
statute unconstitutional, such authority lying only in a "court of competent• .,• . ,361
jurisdiction." The committee did not concur in this argument, however,
noting the plenary nature of the privilege of a legislative body to determine
the eligibility of its members:
This Convention, as a deliberative body, by all sound parliamentary law, has
a right to decide upon the election and qualification of its members. The
Committee of the Convention act judicially. They are a quas[i-]court. They
were sworn in the presence of the Convention to decide this case according
to the law and facts; that is, according to their truest conceptions of what the
law and facts require; and the Committee, in this view, are sustained by au-
thorities so many and positive as to admit no argument to the contrary. The
parliamentary history of England and America afford numberless decisions
to this end, all concurring.
The convention then adopted the committee's resolution, excluding Lewis
and admitting McChord.
3 63 The latter took the oath that same day.
McChord v. Lewis illustrates the sweep of the privilege we have been
365"discussing. In addition to authorizing legislatures to find facts, it also
contemplates that they will engage in "judicial" review for the purpose of
resolving contests. In addition, it empowers legislatures both to exclude
a previously admitted member and to admit a contestant in that person's
place. Of course, this substitution was exactly what Stanton had sought
356 See id. at 379
357 See id.
358 See id.
359 See id.
360 See id. at 379-80.
36Id. at 379.
362 Id. at 379-80.
363 See id. at 380.
364 See id. at 38 i (McChord takes the oath.).
365 In Stanton v. Lane, for example, the Senate of the United States considered the
question of whether Lane had in fact accepted appointment to an incompatible military
position. See supra notes 269-313 for a discussion of this contest.
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against Lane, but the Senate of the United States in that instance had con-
firmed Lane's entitlement to the seat.
366
5. In re Vare and Wilson v. Vare (Senate, United States, 1926-1929).-The
twentieth century saw ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which
brought to an end the election of senators by state legislatures. Although
these elections were subject to manipulation and claims of improper influ-367
ence, popular elections were not themselves a guarantee of good conduct.
Particularly exasperating for the amendment's proponents was Pennsylva-
nia's Republican primary of May 18, 1926, in which William S. Vare de-
feated incumbent Senator George Wharton Pepper and Gifford Pinchot.36
This election saw expenditures by political machines that many con-
sidered outrageous, 369 with Prohibition perhaps being the biggest point of
contention. The day after the election, the Senate appointed a special
committee to investigate these expenditures and related allegations of cor-
rupt practices.3' Although Congress had little, if any, authority at the time
to regulate primaries directly, the houses could nevertheless examine
366 Seesupra notes 281-313 and accompanying text.
367 See 67 CONG. REC. 9679 (May 19, 1926) (Sen. Reed of Missouri) ("One of the great
arguments advanced in support of the [Seventeenth Amendment] was that men of great wealth
were gaining seats in the Senate by corrupt methods practiced upon the general assemblies of
the States .... It was ... hoped to render corruption impossible, for it was believed the masses
were incorruptible."); BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at xiv ("One frequent stalling tactic
was for the upper chamber of a legislature to block a U.S. Senate election by refusing to send
a quorum of its members to a joint assembly of the two houses.").
368 Perhaps the purplest prose came from Senator M.M. Neely of West Virginia. See 67
CONG. REC. 12,473 (July 1, 1926) ("[T]here is nothing else to be found in all the voluminous
record of the political weakness and wickedness of mankind to equal the admitted debauchery,
the revealed infamy, and the proved iniquity of the Republican primary election in the State
of Pennsylvania on the 18th day of May, 1926.").
369 See, e.g., id. at 9673 (May i9, 1926) (Sen. Harrison) ("Reputable correspondents of
reputable newspapers have been visiting Pennsylvania and have been writing stories as to
the great outlay of money being poured out for each of the candidates for the Republican
nomination in Pennsylvania."); BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 324 (describing
expenditures in the primary). At least one Senator was willing to defend the role of money
in campaigns, however. "We have 4,000,000 persons of voting age in Pennsylvania," noted
Senator David A. Reed of Pennsylvania on Vare's behalf. "You can not send a printed letter to
them for less than 6 cents per letter. There in one item is $240,000." 67 CONG. REC. 12,475
(July 1, 1926). Although Reed took Vare's side in the Senate, he had opposed him in the
election. See id. at 8I (Dec. 4, 1929) (Sen. Reed) ("I fought him all over the State as vigorously
as I knew how to do...."); Samuel J. Astorino, The Contested Senate Election of William Scott Vare,
28 PA. HIsT. 187, 194 (i961) ("Republican Senator David A. Reed of Pennsylvania was able to
swallow his personal contempt for Vare and to defend the expenditures in the Senate's debate
on the ground that they were an unavoidable evil of the primary system of nomination.").
370 See RICHARD Lowir, GEORGE W. NORRIs: THE PERSISTENCE OF A PROGRESSIVE, 1913-
1933, at 386 (197).
371 See 67 CONG. REC. 9678 (May 19, 1926).
372 See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 257 (1921); see also BUTLER & WOLFF,
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such elections with an eye toward exercise of their authority to judge the
elections and returns of incoming members.373 Despite the investigation,
and despite the dogged efforts of Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska,
who actually took the stump against his fellow Republican, Vare easily
defeated Democrat William B. Wilson in the general election of Novem-
ber 2, 1926. 3" A month later, the special committee presented an interim
report that described the enormous expenditures in the primary but made
no specific recommendations. This was not surprising, given the lack of
regulatory authority.
On January 8, 1927, the Senate took notice of a petition from Wilson
alleging gross irregularities in his loss to Vare.377 Indeed, he asserted that
the Republican machine in Philadelphia, which Vare controlled,378 had
made a "grotesque and fantastic travesty"37 9 of the election, complete with
dead and imaginary voters, misuse of funds, and Intimidation. Three
days later, the Senate referred the petition to the special committee and
authorized it to examine ballots and other records from the general elec-381
tion. Procuring these records was more easily said than done, however, in
part because the Senate adjourned in March 1927 without giving the com-
mittee much authority to proceed before the next session. After much
supra note 226, at 324 (noting that the Supreme Court ruled in Newberry "that the Senate had
not power to judge primary elections, and the amended Corrupt Practices Act specifically did
not apply to primary elections"). For developments on this point after Newberry, see Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1947); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
373 See Newberry, 256 U.S. at 258 ("As 'each house shall be the judge of the elections,
qualifications and returns of its own members,' and as Congress may by law regulate the
times, places and manner of holding elections, the national government is not without power
to protect itself against corruption, fraud or other malign influences."); see also 67 CONG. REC.
9678 (May 19, 1926) (Sen. Reed of Missouri) ("For even though we can not enact a statute
under which [a candidate in a primary] may be sent to jail, we do undoubtedly have the right
to inquire into his right to a seat in the councils of the Nation.").
374 See LowiTr, supra note 370, at 387-90.
375 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 324.
376 See 68 CONG. REC. 914 (Dec. 22, 1926). See generally S. REP. No. 69-1 197 (1926).
377 See 68 CONG. REC. 1260 (Jan. 8, 1927) (petition of William B. Wilson) ("Notwithstanding
the apparent majority given Mr. VARE your petitioner avers on information and belief that the
said WILLIAM S. VARE was not legally elected United States Senator from Pennsylvania, but
that on the contrary your petitioner was by an honest majority of the legally cast votes elected
United States Senator at the said election held November 2, 1926.").
378 SeeAstorino, supra note 369, at 187 ("William Scott Vare was the youngest of a trio of
brothers who had intermittently ruled Philadelphia in the name of the Republican Party since
the turn of the century.").
379 68 CONG. REC. 126I (Jan. 8, 1927) (petition of William B. Wilson).
38o See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 324-25.
381 See68 CONG. REC. 1414 (Jan. II, 1927).
382 See 70 id. at 421 1 (Feb. 25, 1929) (Sen. Reed of Missouri) (decrying a filibuster by
Senator Reed of Pennsylvania and other obstacles to the committee's progress); 68 id. at 173-
74 (Dec. 7, 1927) (same); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 325 (noting that Senator
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procedural wrangling and litigation, including an unsuccessful trip to the
Supreme Court of the United States,"' the committee finally obtained this
material on February 20, 1928.
384
Meanwhile, the matter was proceeding on other fronts. On January 8,
1927, the day the Senate took notice of Wilson's petition, outgoing Gover-
nor Gifford Pinchot of Pennsylvania, whom Vare had defeated in the pri-
385
mary, provided cryptic credentials, saying only that Vare "appears to have
been chosen.386 Later, Pinchot's successor, John S. Fisher, gave Vare a
conventional set of credentials. On March 3, just before Vare's term was
to begin, 3 8 Senator David A. Reed of Pennsylvania attempted to present
both sets of papers to the Senate.3' 9 After much debate, the Senate referred
them to the Committee on Privileges and Elections.3' 9 Ignoring the set of
credentials from Pinchot, on March 4 that committee advised that the cre-
391
dentials from Fisher were in order. On the same day, the Senate also re-
ceived a new document from Wilson, this one entitled a "complaint," which
1 392
it promptly referred to the Committee on Privileges and Elections.
On December 5, as the Senate began its new session, the chief clerk
called Vare forward to take the oath. His opponents quickly objected, how-
ever, offering a resolution that he be excluded and asking that he step aside
for the time being. Noting no objections, the vice president asked Vare to
step aside.393 On December 9, the Senate authorized the special commit-
tee to continue its investigation . 3  By this time, this committee and the
Reed of Pennsylvania filibustered to block a resolution continuing the special committee into
the Seventieth Congress, which left the committee powerless for nine months).
383 See Reed v. County Comm'rs, 277 U.S. 376,388-89 (1928).
384 See 70 CONG. REC. 4211 (Feb. 25, 1929) (Sen. Reed of Missouri); see also BUTLER &
WOLFF, supra note 226, at 325.
385 See LowiTT, supra note 370, at 386.
386 See 68 CONG. REC. 1338 (Jan. 10, 1927).
387 Seeid. at 5520 (Mar. 3, 1927).
388 See id. at 5518 (Sen. Shipstead) ("[Ilit seems to me the only possible disposition the
Senate can make of these credentials is to receive them ... and file them for presentation to
the United States Senate. Mr. VARE is not a Member of this Congress.").
389 Seeid. at 5513.
390 See id. at 5531.
391 Seeid. at 5914 (Mar. 4, 1927).
392 See id. at 5895. Wilson's hope of serving in the Senate depended on this complaint,
not the earlier petition, which the Senate had referred to the special committee.
393 See 69 id. at 4 (Dec. 5, 1927). Eventually there were objections, on the ground that
the Senate should admit Vare and then resolve the contest. See, e.g., id. at 298 (Dec. 9, 1927)
(resolution of Sen. Reed of Pennsylvania). As noted above, standard legislative practice is
to admit individuals who present the proper credentials for membership without prejudice
pending resolution of a contest, but the Senate of the United States has not invariably adhered
to this practice. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
394 See 69 CONG. REc. 337-38 (Dec. 9, 1927).
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Committee on Privileges and Elections were working somewhat in tan-
dem.
395
Over the next few months, the special committee amassed considerable
evidence of corrupt practices by Vare's campaign in the general election. 396
When the committee gave Vare a chance to respond to the evidence it had
gathered against him, he was slow to provide much by way of a defense,.... 397
his primary tactic appearing to be delay, although he did in fact suffer a
stroke in the summer of 1928.398 On February 22, 1929, after waiting for
what it considered to be a sufficient period of time, the committee submit-399
ted its report, concluding that Vare was not entitled to the seat. The
Senate took no action, however, owing to Vare's poor health. 
4 °
On September 9, 1929, during a special session of Congress, Norris
introduced a resolution to exclude Vare on the ground that his conduct
had been "harmful to the dignity and honor of the Senate."4 ' On De-
402 403cember 4, Vare (attended by his physician ) described the allegations of
fraud against him as politically motivated. "I do not believe there is one
man here to-day," he said, "who could conscientiously vote against me if
he knew the facts, and realized how unfair and unjust my accusers have
been in attempting to twist mere clerical irregularities and technicalities• . ,404
into acts of political fraud and conspiracy." He also defended his ex-
395 See id. at 782 (Dec. 17, 1927) (S. Res. 68); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226,
at 326.
396 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 326; Astorino, supra note 369, at 192-93.
397 See 70 CONG. REC. 4212-13 (Feb. 25, 1929) (Sen. Reed of Missouri).
398 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 327; Astorino, supra note 369, at 197.
399 See 70 CONG. REC. 4214 (Feb. 25, 1929) (Sen. Reed of Missouri) (precise statement
of the recommendation); id. at 4007 (Feb. 22, 1929) (Sen. Reed of Missouri) (submission of
report for printing); see also S. REP. No. 70 - 1858 (1929).
400 See 70 CoNG. REC. 4331-32 (Feb. 26, 1929); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226,
at 327.
401 71 CONG. REC. 3413 (Sept. 9, 1929). The basis for Norris's resolution evolved
somewhat. At first, he justified it almost entirely in terms of the primary. See id. at 3505 (Sept.
10, 1929) (Sen. Norris) ("[The resolution] simply says that upon the expenditure of money
shown and admitted to have been made in behalf of Mr. VARE in the primary and, perhaps,
for some other incidental things, he is not entitled to a seat in the United States Senate.").
He later expanded his remarks to include the general election. See 72 id. at 75 (Dec. 4, 1929)
(Sen. Norris) ("Mr. President, the primary was bad-that is true. But if anyone will read the
evidence in regard to the election which followed it in Philadelphia, and in Pittsburgh to some
extent, it will make him blush .... ). As debate proceeded, however, he offered to delete the
portions of the preamble not pertaining to the primary. See id. at 93; see also id. at 132 (Dec.
5, 1929) ("They do not want a vote on this resolution, because [it] lays before the country
the proposition that a man who spends an exorbitant sum of money for his nomination is
disqualified, even though he be afterward elected at the general election.").
402 The Senate had continued Norris's resolution to its regular session, which began in
December 1929. See 71 id. at 3531 (Sept. I, 1929).
403 See 72 id. at 75 (Dec. 4, 1929); Astorino, supra note 369, at 198-99.
404 Id. at 8o (Mr. Vare).
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penditures as necessary to establish an organization across the state. "Am
I to be condemned," he asked, "because without a newspaper, with the
State organization and county organizations against me and my friends,
we were compelled to spend one-third of what our principal opponents
spent in bringing the issues of the campaign to the 4,000,000 voters of the
State?"4 °
Not long after Vare's speech, the Committee on Privileges and Elec-
tions submitted its report, concluding that Vare had received enough legal
votes in the general election to overcome any evidence of irregularity.
This report put the senators in somewhat of a bind, although not an unex-
pected one. If Wilson had not defeated Vare, the Senate's only remaining
choices were to admit Vare or exclude him for not being qualified. But he
was obviously thirty years old, nine years a citizen of the United States,
and an inhabitant of Pennsylvania. The matter thus implicated the vexing
question of whether the houses of Congress could exclude a prospective
member for not meeting an unstated qualification. Senator Norris, who
led the charge against Vare, certainly took the position that they could,40'
and indeed argued that his resolution was logically distinct from Wilson's
contest. Much later, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
408
houses of Congress lack the authority that Norris was asserting, but as of
1929 this rationale remained available.
405 Id.
4o6 See S. REP. No. 71-47, at 48 (1929); see also 72 CONG. REC. 140 (Dec. 5, 1929) (Sen.
Waterman, presenting the committee's conclusions) ("It is fair, in my judgment, to say that Mr.
VARE did actually receive a plurality of the legal votes case in the election ....").
407 See 69 CONG. REC. 122 (Dec. 6, 1927) ("It is argued .... that the word 'qualifications'
... refers only to the technical validity of the credentials of a Senator elect. If 'qualifications'
does not mean qualifications except in a limited sense, and if that limited sense and meaning
is to be defined by those who desire to have Mr. SMITH and Mr. VARE admitted, then the
Senate is helpless. Unfortunately for those who thus argue, there is no legal or justifiable
reason for putting this limitation on the word.") McCrary took the opposite position. See
McCRARY, supra note 345, § 590, at 387 ("[The privilege] does not authorize an inquiry into
the moral character of a person elected and returned as a member. Such an inquiry can only
be made, if at all, in the prosecution of proceedings for expulsion.").
4o8 See Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486,550 (1969) ("[ln judging the qualifications of
its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution.").
Powell might not have helped Vare, however, because with Powell as precedent the Senate
perhaps could have excluded him as not having been "elected." Although the Senate's
resolution of the matter was not quite consistent with this theory, because surely the voters
of Pennsylvania had elected either Wilson or Vare, the Senate has never felt entirely bound
to such logical presuppositions in the exercise of the privilege. In the later contest of Durkin
v. Wyman, for example, the issue was who had received more votes, and the voters of New
Hampshire appeared to have chosen one or the other. Nevertheless, the Senate ultimately
concluded that neither was eligible to serve and a special election ensued. See 121 CONG. REC.
25,954-55, 25,960 (July 30, 1975); BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 424; DONN TIBBETrS,
THE CLOSEST U.S. SENATE RACE IN HISTORY: DURKIN V. WYMAN 159 (1976).
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Meanwhile, other senators advised that they would vote against Vare on
the ground that his election had been irregular. "[A]lithough the contestee
has a plurality of 19,000 votes plus," argued Senator Sam G. Bratton of
New Mexico, "he, or others, acting in his behalf, have engaged in practices
which taint his title to a seat in this body."'  "[T]herefore," Bratton noted,
"he must be rejected, not because he failed to get a plurality, but because
his title is tainted with fraud., 410 Bratton's colleague from New Mexico,
Bronson M. Cutting, similarly observed that he would "deny Mr. VARE a
seat on the ground of fraud and corruption, and when I say 'fraud and cor-
ruption,' I am not particularly concerned with whether that fraud commit-
ted in a general election or in a primary election .... ,,4' Rejecting at least
part of Norris's analysis, Cutting added that he was "not going to vote for
the resolution on the ground that the amount of money spent by Mr. VARE
was ipso facto a ground for reversing the decision made at the 
polls .... ,412
On December 6, the Senate voted fifty-eight to twenty-two to deny Vare
a seat, after which it voted sixty-six to fifteen that Wilson had not been
elected.41 3
Without doubt, In re Vare and Wilson v. Vare implicated legal principles,
such as the scope of the Senate's privilege and the attributes of a "regular"
election. But much of the energy in the debates arose from such volcanic
political forces as "Progressivism," "machines," and the virtues of feder-
alism. On the one hand, the Senate did have before it an abundance of
evidence, albeit of uncertain quality, that Vare had won his election by im-
proper means. On the other hand, one could readily conclude that the
Senate's actual basis for excluding Vare had not been corrupt practices per
se, but distaste for how much money he and his supporters had spent in
the primary, even if no one could connect this spending inexorably to Va-
re's victory. Indeed, this was the rationale for Norris's resolution excluding
Vare, which the Senate expressly adopted.
414
409 72 CONG. REC. 156 (Dec. 5, 1929).
410 Id.
411 Id. at 19o (Dec. 6, 1929).
412 Id.
413 Id. at 197 (Vare denied a seat); id. at 198 (Wilson not elected). The Governor of
Pennsylvania promptly appointed Joseph R. Grundy to the vacancy. See id. at 525 (Dec. 12,
1929). Grundy was heavily implicated in the same matters that had perplexed the Senate with
respect to Vare. See id. at 536 (Sen. Blease) ("What is the difference between buying a seat in
the Senate and openly stating that you bought a governor and having that governor appoint
you Senator?"). The Senate promptly referred Grundy's credentials to the Committee on
Privileges and Elections, but allowed him to take the oath. See id. at 539-40. The committee
eventually reported in Grundy's favor, and the Senate took no further action. See S. REP. No.
71-147, at 2 (1930); 72 CONG. REC. 2762 (Jan. 31, 1930); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note
226, at 340.
414 See 72 CONG. REC. 197 (Dec. 6, 1929).
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But the full implications of this rationale are somewhat staggering to
behold. "Suppose," asked Senator S.D. Fess of Ohio, that every candidate
in the primary had spent "an inordinate amount.., so that it mattered not
whether it was VARE or Pepper or Pinchot; all of them [had done so] ....
Could we deny in toto the representation of Pennsylvania because we did
not like the manner in which the election was held?"'" Ironically, Vare's
opponents in the primary had spent at least as much as he had, yet had
lost.4 16 "What was Mr. VARE up against in the State of Pennsylvania? 417
asked Senator Thomas D. Schall of Minnesota. "He was up against the
Grundy machine, backed by Mellon's millions," he said, answering his own
question. Moreover, noted Schall, "while it is charged that the nomination
went to 'the highest bidder,' the fact is that it did not go to the highest bid-
der. The Grundy machine in the primaries spent three times as much as
VARE ....
The sequence of events in In re Vare and Wilson v. Ware was similar to
that of the other contests we have discussed, in the sense that the infirmity
in Vare's claim to a seat, whatever it was, arose before he presented himself
for membership and served as the basis for the Senate's refusal to admit
him. In fact, the Senate's refusal to do so, even on a provisional basis, led to
an interesting wrinkle in the contest. As noted above, the special commit-
tee encountered substantial difficulty in procuring testimony and records419
in support of its investigation. Ultimately, this gave rise to extensive
litigation, including two separate trips to the Supreme Court of the United
States. One in particular, Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, bears fur-4ZO
ther mention. While the committee was gathering evidence, it called as
415 Id. at 88 (Dec. 4, 1929) (Sen. S.D. Fess of Ohio); see also 69 id. at 171 (Dec. 7, 1927)
(Sen. Reed of Pennsylvania) ("Is it not a striking thing, Mr. President, that if this resolution
[finding Vare not eligible to serve] passes in the form in which it is, a vacancy will be created
in the Senatorship the appointment to fill which will belong to a governor elected on a ticket
that spent three times as much as did Mr. V~aRE?").
416 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 2z6, at 324.
417 72 CONG. REC. 194 (Dec. 6, 1929).
418 Id. at 194-95; see also id. at 195 (Sen. Schall) ("It seems to me that this kind of
progressivism, this idealism that we western Senators have been priding ourselves upon, is
being strained when we vote to disfranchise the people of a State."). In fact, the political
scientist John T. Salter later argued that the Senate's distaste for Vare arose as much from
socioeccnomics as political morality. See Astorino, supra note 369, at 200 ("[The] Senate
refused Vare admission, not for any illegal act, but for general reasons similar to those that
closed the portals of the Union League to him-he was a ward politician without any social
background; in addition to that, his campaign expenditures had been excessive." (quoting
JohnT Salter, TheEndofWar, 50 POL. SCL Q. 218 (June 1935))). Schall himself had been the
subject of a contest in the Senate, and would later be the subject of a second. See BUTLER
& WOLFF, supra note 226, at 316-17 (discussing Johnson v. Schall); id. at 349-50 (discussing
Hoidale v. Schall).
419 See supra notes 381-84 and accompanying text.
420 Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). The other was Reedy.
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a witness Thomas W. Cunningham, a public official with a salary of $8,000421
per year. Although Cunningham had contributed $50,000 to Vare's cam-
paign, he refused to answer several of the committee's questions in this
regard, describing the subject as "personal" and outside the committee's
jurisdiction.422
This recalcitrance led to a resolution to "take the body of Cunningham
into custody, and ... bring him before the bar of the Senate, 423 whereupon.. -425
he sought habeas.424 The district court denied relief, but the court of
426appeals thought habeas was appropriate. Reversing, the Supreme Court
County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928). See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
421 See Barry, 279 U.S. at 609 ("He had been clerk of a court for 21 years and was then
receiving a salary of $8,ooo a year.").
422 72 CONG. REC. 46-47 (Dec. 3, 1929) (excerpt from a report of the special
committee):
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. To whom did you give any money?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I handed money to Thomas E Watson [treasurer
for Vare's campaign], $25,ooo, on the Ioth day of April, 1926.
* 0 *
[The CHAIRMAN.] Was any money given to you for use in that
campaign?
[Mr. CUNNINGHAM.] Not one cent-
The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get that money?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I got that money out of my own private funds.
Mr. GOLDER [counsel to Cunningham]. I have advised Mr.
Cunningham that, in my judgment, this committee has no jurisdiction
[The CHAIRMAN.] What was my last question?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I refuse to answer that question, Senator, as a
personal question. It is my own private business.
423 Barry, 279 U.S. at 61o-I I.
424 Id. at 61 1
425 See id. at 611-12 (citing United States ex re. Cunningham v. Barry, 25 E2d 733 (E.D.
Pa. 1928), rv'd, 29 F.zd 817 (3d Cir. 1928), rev'd, 279 U.S. 597 (1929)).
426 See id. at 612 (citing United States ex rel. Cunningham v. Barry, 29 F2d 817 (3d Cir.
1928), rev'd, 279 U.S. 597 (1929)).
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began its analysis by noting that the Senate has power to take appropriate
steps to judge the eligibility of its members, including the power to call
witnesses before the chamber as a whole, without regard to limits it has set, • • . 127
on a particular committee's jurisdiction. The Court then proceeded to
Cunningham's broader argument that the Senate lacked jurisdiction over
In re Vare because it had yet to admit Vare as a member Rejecting this
contention, the Court noted that the word "member" in this context em-
braces individuals who present themselves to the chamber for admission:
When a candidate is elected to either House, he of course is elected a mem-
ber of the body; and when that body determines, upon presentation of his
credentials, without first giving him his seat, that the election is void, there
would seem to be no real substance in a claim that the election of a "mem-
ber" has not been adjudged. To hold otherwise would be to interpret the
word "member" with a strictness in no way required by the obvious pur-
pose of the constitutional provision, or necessary to its effective enforce-
ment in accordance with such purpose, which, so far as the present case is
concerned, was to vest the Senate with authority to exclude persons assert-
ing membership, who either had not been elected or, what amounts to the
same thing, had been elected by resort to fraud, bribery, corruption, or other
sinister methods having the effect of vitiating the electon.
6. Hatfield v. Holt (Senate, United States, 1935).-The Great Depression
effected a dramatic shift in American electoral politics. 430 Although Demo-
crats had held the White House only four terms between 1861 and 1933,
a period of seventy-two years, they served five consecutive terms as pres-
ident immediately thereafter. As a result, many people born circa 1930
would have been in high school before being aware of a sitting President of
the United States other than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Whereas before
the Depression Republicans tended to dominate the legislative branch of
the federal government, after the crash, control fell decisively to the other
side of the aisle. 4 1 But exercise of the privilege we have been discussing
does not appear to depend on partisan developments. This makes sense,
given that the privilege inheres in a branch, not a party.
427 See id. at 613-14.
428 See id. at 614.
429 Id. at 615.
430 See TOM CONNALLY & ALFRED STEINBERG, My NAME Is TOM CONNALLY 138 (1954)
("The year 1932 was to be the year for the Democratic return to national power. I had no
doubt of it when the names of dozens of Democrats popped into the newspapers as willing
candidates for the presidency.").
431 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 286 (1998) ("The
1932 landslide swept an unprecedented 31o Democrats into the House, leaving only 117
Republicans; the Senate, on a six-year cycle, saw the number of Republicans shrink to 35
from 56 four years earlier.").
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On November 7, 1934, the voters of West Virginia elected Democrat
432
Rush D. Holt over former Republican Senator Henry D. Hatfield. Un-
fortunately for Holt, his thirtieth birthday would not occur until more than
43'
seven months later, on June 19, 1935, and the federal Constitution ex-
434plicitly requires senators to be thirty years of age. His proposed resolu-
tion of this dilemma was to not present himself for membership until his
birthday arrived.435
On January 3, 1935, the Senate received his credentials, 436 but as noted,
Holt had promised not to take his seat until June 19. On April 18, Hatfield
brought a petition arguing that the Senate should admit him instead of
Holt on the ground that Holt was not qualified and Hatfield had received
the second most votes.43 ' Hatfield also strongly intimated that Holt had
misled the voters by telling them that he was qualified to serve. "Through-
out his campaign," noted Hatfield, Holt "proclaimed to the voters [that]
he was eligible for the said office because of the fact that Henry Clay, of
Kentucky, was permitted to take his seat in the Senate of the United States
before he was 30 years old . . . .,4 "This misled innumerable people to
cast their ballot for him," he continued, "believing they were voting for an
eligible candidate and one who could represent them for the full term of
the office for which they voted.",43' To add to Holt's troubles, in May nu-
merous citizens of West Virginia submitted a memorial asking the Senate
to declare the seat vacant so the governor could appoint someone pending
the next regular election. 40 The Senate referred the entire matter to the
Committee on Privileges and Elections. 441
When Holt arrived at the Senate on June 19 to take his oath, the com-
mittee asked that he stand aside until it could deliver its report, and Holt
agreed. 44 The same day, a majority of the committee reported in his fa-
432 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 359.
433 See id.
434 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.").
435 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 359.
436 See 79 CONG. REC. 4 (Jan. 3, 1935).
437 See id. at 5915-17.
438 Id. at 5916 (petition of Henry D. Hatfield). The Senators generally recognized,
however, that the Senate had never taken up the question of Clay's eligibility. Indeed, Clay
himself might not have been aware of the issue. See id. at 9652 (1935) (report recommending
Holt's admission) ("No objection was made to the seating of Henry Clay, and it appears that
he himself was probably unaware of the age qualification.").
439 Id. at 5916 (Apr. 18, 1935) (petition of Henty D. Hatfield).
44o See id. at 7547 (May 15, 1935).
441 See id. (citizens' petition referred to Committee on Privileges and Elections); id. at
5917 (Apr. 18, 1935) (Hatfield's petition referred to Committee on Privileges and Elections).
442 See id. at 9650-51 (June 19, 1935).; see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 359.
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vor.43 After considering a variety of authorities, including text and legis-
lative precedent, they concluded that the rule most consistent with the
Framers' intentions was that a person should be thirty years of age when he
or she assumes office, not at the time of election or at the beginning of the
term for which he or she was elected.444 Holt could take his seat under this
rule because he did not present himself to the Senate before his thirtieth
birthday.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied heavily on the lawyer-
ly argument that, whereas the authors of the Constitution had added the
words "when elected" to the requirement of inhabitancy, they had added
no such language to the requirements of age and length of citizenship.445
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius-to say the one is to exclude the other. In
a more theoretical vein, the majority argued that the framers had specified
a minimum age of thirty to keep "immature" people out of the Senate,
and that Holt had met this specification by waiting until his thirtieth birth-
day."6 Last, they could rely on the precedent of John Young Brown of Ken-
tucky, who had been elected to the House of Representatives at the age
of twenty-four, and who had still been that age when the term for which
he had been elected began, but who had waited until after his twenty-fifth
birthday to take the oath of office.447
For Holt's detractors, all of this proved too much. If the voters could
elect Holt at twenty-nine, they could elect him at twenty-five. "While in
the case of Mr. HOLT the age requirement lacked a little less than 6 months
in time, the principle involved would be the same if he lacked 5 years and 6
months,"" 8 the minority wrote. This construction, they said, "would estab-
lish a principle which might readily result in greatl diminishing the num-
ber of Senators provided for by the Constitution." From the perspective
of those who argued against Holt, one became a "senator" for purposes of
the requirements of age and citizenship when one's term began; otherwise,
states might lack proper representation and the nation might lack adequate
leadership. As Senator Tom Connally of Texas asked, could the "Constitu-
tion makers ever [have] intended that the Senate should be composed of
443 See 79 CONG. REC. 9651-53 (June 19, 1935).
444 See id. at 9653; see also id. at 9752 (June 20, 1935) (Sen. George); BUTLER & WOLFF,
supra note 226, at 359-60.
445 See 79 CONG. REC. 9652-53 (June 19, 1935).
446 See id.
447 See id. at 9754 (June 20, 1935) (Sen. George discussing the Brown case). The federal
Constitution requires members of the House to be twenty-five years of age. See U.S. CONST.
art. I., § 2, cl. 2; see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (Dec. 3, 186o) (Brown takes the
oath); id., ist Sess. 2 (Dec. 5, 1859) (Brown appears in the House).
448 79 CONG. REC. 9653 (June 19, 1935) (minority report).
449 Id.
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men who were not eligible to meet at any moment and to discharge their
functions?" 
40
The majority's response to this provocative argument was provocative
in its own way. Speaking for the committee, Senator Walter F. George of
Georgia noted that history itself, and the modest manner in which the peo-
ple of the United States had exercised their electoral privileges, responded
to the horribles depicted by Holt's detractors:
The answer, Mr. President, is in the reaction of the American people to the
precedent set by the House of Representatives in the John Young Brown
case more than 75 years ago. In that case the House, by its action, did ex-
actly what we are asked to do here today and no more; and yet immature
men under 25 years of age have not been elected in sufficient number to
4511prevent the orderly functioning of government.
Holt's defenders were also able to turn the tables and suggest that the
main argument against him proved too much. If the nation requires a full
complement of senators at all times, they said, then a governor (or a legis-
lature, before ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment) may not delib-
erate over a vacancy. In Andrew Jackson's case, noted George, "the very
commission which he brought to the Senate contained the language that he
was elected for the term which began months before his actual election. 4 2
In a slightly different vein, Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana observed
that many governors elected to serve in the Senate, including himself, had
continued to serve in the former capacity until well into their term as sena-
tors, even though one could not constitutionally hold both offices. Because
only actual incompatibility made a difference, Long argued, Holt's service
450 Id. at 9777 (June 20, 1935) (Sen. Connally); see also id. at 9776 (Sen. Connally) ("It
was the conception of the founders of the Government, those who shaped and molded the
Constitution, and it was their expectation and their hope that every State should have two
Senators here at all times."). Connally did not appear to enjoy opposing Holt:
I get no pleasure out of taking the position which I take here today.
I should much prefer to vote to seat the gentleman from West Virginia..
.. He belongs to my party. He sits on my side of the aisle .... [E]very
impulse of my carnal nature calls for a vote for Mr. Holt. On the other
hand, every impulse of my intellectual nature tells me that I cannot do
it.
Id. at 9775. Indeed, Connally's relations with the Democratic leader in the Senate suffered
somewhat because of his position in Haztfeldv. Holt. See CONNALLY, & STEINBERG, supra note
430, at 166 (noting that Senator Joe Robinson of Arkansas was "irascible toward me in 1934
when I opposed the seating of youthful Rush Holt...").
451 79 CONG. REC. 9754 (June 20, 1935).
452 Id. at 9753.
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would only violate the Constitution if he attempted to exercise the func-
tions of senator before reaching his thirtieth birthday.
453
The majority also rejected Hatfield's second, largely implicit, ground
for exclusion: that Holt had falsely certified and represented that he was
eligible to serve in the Senate. As George noted on behalf of the com-
mittee, Holt was "merely stating his view. '454 "[Elven if he had drawn an
erroneous conclusion," he continued, "no imputation of bad faith could be
drawn in the case, and certainly no such implication of bad faith as would
justify the Senate in saying that he should not for that reason be entitled
to take his seat.
a4 55
Finally, the majority rejected Hatfield's claim that he should serve in
Holt's stead, assuming the latter's disqualification. "The rule is well set-
tled," they wrote, "that in election cases the ineligibility of a majority can-
didate for a seat in the Congress gives no title to the minority candidate or.. .. ,,456
to the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes." No one. . 451
took issue with this conclusion. On June 21, the Senate admitted Holt
458
by a vote of sixty-two to seventeen, and he took the oath of office.
Hafield v. Holt is fairly easy to defend, given the various lawyerly ar-
guments and sources of authority on which the majority could rely. This
is not to say, however, that Holt's opponents were at a loss for arguments
and authority of their own. In fact, these senators were able to rely on two
453 See id. at 9763 (Sen. Long) ("A number of us, Mr. President, have come here to
this body a few months-and in my case a year and 3 months-after our terms began. To
argue that the lack of 5 months of requisite age is such a terrific disability that one would be
disqualified is so contrary to what we have done in these other cases that I do not understand
how it can have much application.")
454 Id. at 9751.
455 Id.
456 Id. at 9652 (June 19, 1935) (majority report); see also McCRARy, supra note 345, §§
293-94, at 199 (noting that this country has never adopted the British rule that the second
highest vote getter is returned as elected when the majority vote getter is disqualified); id. §
295, at 200 ("[Tlhe weight of authority is decidedly against the adoption here of the English
doctrine. And we think that sound policy, as well as reason and authority, forbid the adoption
of that doctrine in this country.").
457 Although the determination that Hatfield could not sit reflects standard practice,
on occasion legislative bodies have admitted the runner-up after finding the winner not
qualified. In Brown v. Lamprey, for example, the Senate of New Hampshire refused to admit
two people on the ground that they had not been inhabitants of their district at the time of
election and went on to admit the two people who had received the next highest number of
votes. See Brown v. Lamprey, 206 A.2d 493,494-95 (1965). When asked to review this action,
the Supreme Court of the state declined. "For this court to interfere," it said, "would be a
usurpation of the authority of the Senate granted to it by the Constitution." Id. at 495.
458 79 CONG. REc. 9842 (June 21, 1935); id. at 9841 (S. Res. 155, 74th Cong. 0935))
("Resolved, That RusH D. HOLT is entitled to his seat in the Senate of the United States as
a Senator from the State of West Virginia, it appearing that he was 30 years of age at the time
when he presented himself to the Senate to take the oath and to assume the duties of the
office.")
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senatorial precedents, In re Gallatin and In re Shields, to great effect.459 In
these cases, much as in Haifieldv. Holt, the Senate had judged the qualifica-
tions of people who had not been nine years a citizen at the time of their
election, or at the beginning of the term for which they had been elected,
but who would have reached that point during their term. Unlike Holt,
however, they had been excluded from the chamber.460 Even more telling
for Holt, the Senate had amended the resolution excluding James Shields
to specify that his election was "void" because he had not been nine years
a citizen "at the commencement of the term for which he was elected,"
46'
thereby Erecluding him from returning when he had been a citizen long
enough. The Senate had adopted this amendment at the instance of
Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. 463 Although the majority was
able to distinguish In re Gallatin and In re Shields on the ground that Galla-
tin and Shields had actually taken their oaths before having been citizens
nine years they could not easily avoid the Senate's rationale for Shields'
exclusion. Nor, for that matter, could they readily explain why, if Holt
could serve, Gallatin and Shields could not simply have gone away and
returned when they had been citizens long enough-i.e., why their act of
taking the oath before their tenth year of citizenship precluded them from
466
returning when they had reached that milestone.
7. In re Raney (Senate, Kentucky, 1962).-The houses of Kentucky's general
assembly have also seen a variety of contests and petitions implicating the
privilege of which we have been speaking, and their approach to these
matters has resembled that of the two houses of Congress. One famous
459 See id. at 9773 (June 20, 1935) (Sen. Connally) (describing In re Shields as "an absolute
precedent for this case, because age and alienage are in the same clause..."); id. at 9655-57
(June 19, 1935) (Sen. Johnson's report); id. at 9653 (minority report); see also BUTLER & WOLFF,
supra note 226, at 360.
460 See supra notes 227-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Gallatin.
461 79 CONG. REC. 9760 (June 2o, 1935) (Sen. Johnson) (quoting the resolution excluding
Shields).
462 Id. at 9827 (June 21, 1935) (Sen. Austin) ("There was offered in the Senate a
resolution to postpone action until sufficient time had elapsed, and then to have the Senate
consider the matter after the defect of time in the title had been cured, and the Senate voted
not to allow that continuance or postponement to take place on the grounds stated in the
debate; that it could not change the facts ... ")
463 Id. at 9653 (June I9, 1935) (majority report).
464 See id. (majority report).
465 Senator (later Justice) Sherman Minton of Indiana argued that Calhoun's rationale for
Shields was "dictum." Id. at 9762 (June 20, 1935) (Sen. Minton). Somewhat similarly, Senator
E Ryan Duffy of Wisconsin candidly argued that the Senate should "overrule" Shields." Id.
at 9764.
466 See id. at 9773 (Sen. Tydings) (describing this as "a dilemma"); id. at 9773-74 (Sens.
Tydings and Connally speculating in this area); id. at 9767-69 (Sens. Tydings, Barkley,
Connally, Robinson, and Logan similarly speculating).
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example is the case of In re Raney. In November 1959, the voters of Ken-
tucky's thirty-first senatorial district chose Tom Raney to represent them in
the state's senate, and he began serving there on January 5 of the following
467
year. On April 1, 1960, after the senate adjourned, Raney was appointed
a deputy sheriff in Pike County and served in that capacity until the last
day of 1961. 4  As the Kentucky's court of appeals later noted, under the
state's constitution, as with many such documents, these two positions are
"incompatible" and acceptance of the second office vacates the first.469
When the senate came back into session in 1962, Senator Rex A. Lo-
gan of Allen, Edmonson, and Warren Counties introduced a resolution
"to investigate the charge that the office of State Senator of the Thirty-
First District is vacant. ' 47° After some procedural wrangling, the senate
referred Logan's resolution to the joint committee on state government
operations. According to Senator J.D. Buckman, Jr., of Bullitt, Hardin,
Larue, Meade, and Spencer Counties, sometime thereafter the commit-
tee "returned the resolution to the Senate without action. 472 In any case,
on February 13, eleven days after Logan had introduced his resolution,
Buckman introduced another resolution to recognize Raney as the "legally
qualified" senator from the thirty-first district.47 This resolution included
the following as its final paragraph:
[T]he Senate hereby expresses its full confidence in the authority and abil-
ity of Senator Raney to perform the duties of Senator in full compliance
with the Constitution and Statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.474
The senate proceeded to adopt the resolution by a vote of twenty-five to
six.475
Matters did not come to an end with this vote, however. Shortly there-
after the treasurer, Thelma Stovall, refused to pay Raney on the ground
467 See Ky. SEN. JOUR., Session of 196o, at 4 (Jan. 5, 196o); see also Raney v. Stovall, 361
S.W.2d 518, 519 (Ky. 1962).
468 See Raney, 361 S.W.2d at 519.
469 Id.; see also Ky. Co NsT. § 165 ("No person shall, at the same time, be a State officer or
a deputy officer or member of the General Assembly, and an officer of any county, city, town,
or other municipality, or an employee thereof ....").
470 See Ky. SEN. JOUR., Session of 1962, at 158 (Feb. 2, 1962).
471 Logan moved that the Senate refer his resolution to the "regularly selected and acting
investigating committee .... see id., but the President of the Senate ruled the motion out of
order and "stated that the resolution would be referred to the Committee on Committees."
Id. at 158-59. Three days later, on February 5, the Senate referred Logan's resolution to the
joint committee. See id. at 195 (Feb. 5, 1962).
472 Id. at 472 (Feb. 13, 1962) (Sen. Buckman).
473 Id. (S. Res. 35).
474 Id. at 473.
475 Id.; see also Raney v. Stovall, 361 S.W.zd 518,519 (Ky. 1962).
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that he was ineligible to serve, and Raney and the commissioner of finance
brought suit against Stovall in response to her refusal. 476 The lower court
upheld the treasurer's determination that Raney was ineligible, but the
court of appeals reversed on this point. Although the Court was willing
to assume that "from a judicial standpoint the acceptance of an incompat-
ible office would create a vacancy," it nevertheless refused to intervene in• 477
the senate's determination. "[T]he fact that the legislature may make a
wrong decision," wrote the Court:
is no reason why the judiciary should invade what has been designated as
the exclusive domain of another department of government. We must as-
sume the Senate in good faith will not knowingly permit violations of other
constitutional provisions. With respect to this subject matter, the people
have reposed that responsibility in the legislature. The courts are without
jurisdiction to review its solemn determination.
In re Raney illustrates the minimalist approach to exercise of the privi-
lege that is perhaps common at the local level. Although the evidence
of Raney's acceptance of an incompatible office was virtually unassailable,
the senate chose to recognize him as "duly qualified" nevertheless. The
senate ultimately justified its determination on the simple statement that
he was "authori[zed] and [able] ... to perform the duties of Senator in full
compliance with the Constitution and Statutes of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. ' 479 Because the decision to retain Raney lacked an express ra-
tionale, one must speculate on the senate's actual basis. Given the virtual
if not literal impossibility of discerning a lawyerly ground for the decision,
one is left to conclude that the senate chose to exalt substance over form,
and to take the position that Raney's two offices presented no real danger
of a conflict of interest.
Although In re Raney does not stand alone among the contests we have
discussed in exalting substance over form, it does stand alone with respect
to sequence. In these other contests, as well as the vast majority of those
we have not discussed, the basis for the contest arose before the would-be
member appeared in the chamber for admission. But this was not true of
Raney. In his case, as with very few exercises of the privilege, the basis for
the investigation actually arose after the senate had admitted him to mem-
bership.
8. In re Powell (House of Representatives, United States, 1967-1969).-In
1967, the House of Representatives of the United States took up anew an
476 See Raney, 361 S.W.2d at 520.
477 Id. at 52i.
478 Id. at 523-24 (citation omitted).
479 See supra note 482 and accompanying text.
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issue that had often perplexed members of Congress-whether the houses
may exclude a prospective member for failing to satisfy a qualification not
set forth in the Constitution. As noted earlier, one of the grounds for ex-
cludingWilliam S. Vare in 1929 had been that he had spent so much money
in the primary that he had disqualified himself from serving in the Sen-
ate.480 Although some in the chamber had denied the Senate's authority
to exclude Vare on these grounds, others had defended it, including Vare's
chief antagonist, Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska.
The matter at hand in 1967 was In re Powell. On November 8, 1966,
the voters of New York's 18th congressional district had overwhelmingly
elected the Reverend Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., to the Ninetieth Congress,
which would convene the following January. This would be his twelfth
term as a member of the House. 482
Although Powell was quite popular in his district, his putative re-
entry into the House was no simple matter. His problems fell into two
categories. The first involved alleged misdeeds on his part as chairman
of the powerful Committee on Education and Labor. During the Eighty-
ninth Congress, a special subcommittee had investigated this committee's
affairs.483 On January 3, 1967, just before the new Congress convened, this
subcommittee had submitted a report, in which it had concluded that Pow-
ell and others had deceived the House regarding outlays for travel. 484 It
had also presented evidence suggesting that he had improperly caused a
salary to be paid to his wife.48 ' Although these alleged misdeeds were hard-
480 See supra notes 367-429 and accompanying text.
481 See id.
482 See 113 CONG. REC. 15-16 (Jan. 1o, 1967) (Rep. Udall) (noting that Powell had won re-
election in 1966 by a 3-to-I majority); see also CHARLES V. HAMILTON, ADAM CLAYTON POWELL,
JR.: THE POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 447 (1991) ("[Powell] was a proud,
defiant black congressman, and his constituents loved him for it.").
483 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,489-90 (1969).
484 See H.R. REP. No. 89-2349, at 6 (1966) ("The deceptive practice of using the names of
staff employees on airline tickets which were not used by the named employees appears to be
a scheme devised to conceal the actual travel of Representative Powell, Miss Huff [a member
of Powell's staff], and others, in some instances at least, so as to prevent questions being
raised by the Committee on House Administration as to the official character of the travel
performed."); see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 490; HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 447 ("Subpoenaed
records indicated that scores of tickets were purchased-all authorized by Powell-through
the use of committee credit cards of some staffers, but those particular persons never took
the trips.").
485 See H.R. REP. No. 89-2349, at 7 (1966) ("The record of the hearings raises a strong
presumption that Y. Marjorie Flores (Mrs. Adam C. Powell) is receiving compensation, as a
clerk for Representative Powell, in the sum of $20,578 per year in violation of Public Law 89-
9o , 89th Congress, in that she is not performing the services for which she is compensated in
the offices of Representative Powell in the District of Columbia or in the State or the district
which he represents, as required by said statute."); see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 490; HAMILTON,
supra note 482, at 448.
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486
ly unique in the annals of Congress, the desire for action was neverthe-
less strong. On January 9, on the eve of the new Congress, the Democratic
members-elect met in caucus and removed Powell from his chair, replacing
him with Representative Carl Perkins of Kentucky. 48' But few if any ap-
peared to deem this removal an adequate response to the report.
Powell's second set of problems arose from litigation in New York, in
which a judgment had been entered against him for defamation, and in
which he was asserting legislative immunity as a ground for avoiding pro-488
cess. Many considered this assertion unfounded, and the entire matter
489had become quite notorious.
On January 10, as the members-elect prepared to take the oath, Repre-
sentative Lionel Van Deerlin of California asked that Powell stand aside. "I
intend at the proper time," he said, "to offer a resolution providing that the
question of eligibility of Mr. POWELL to a seat in this House be referred to491
a special committee... .-49 The House acceded to this request. Debate
then proceeded along several axes. Some members, such as Representa-
tive Mo Udall of Arizona, argued that the House should admit Powell pro-
visionally, pending resolution of the investigation.49 "We do not have the
486 See HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 18 ("Surely, [Powell] was not the only committee
chairman who had held up legislation ... and he was hardly the only congressman to have a
spouse or relative on the payroll in a questionable capacity. And how many would seriously
claim that his was the only face on European junkets at taxpayers' expense?").
487 See id. at 451; see also H.R. Rep. No. 90-27, at 1-2 (1967); I 13 CONG. REC. i6 (Jan. to,
1967) (Rep. Udall) ("Let me make it clear that the ax has fallen, the ax has come down, the
story of ADAM POWELL free-wheeling chairman is ended....").
488 See HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 441 (noting that Powell considered "his New York
legal problems [as] more than personal, but also rais[ing] issues about the constitutional rights
of congressman to speak off the floor"). According to a jury in New York, Powell had defamed
a woman by describing her on television as a "bag woman" for the police. Powell had made
the same point previously on the floor. See id. at 434 (speech on the floor); id. at 435 (statement
on television); id. at 436 (verdict).
489 See HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 15-16 (describing the "'Powell matter' that had
developed over the years") ("[Powell] had been embroiled in a protracted, complex, five-year
court battle in New York, defending against a defamation-of-character lawsuit brought by a
Harlem resident he had accused on television ofbeinga 'bag woman'(handler of payoffmoney
from gamblers to the police). After several judgments against him he had been charged with
criminal contempt of the New York courts for failing to cooperate with the state courts or to
appear when subpoenaed."); seealso id. at 36 ("The two civil contempt citations against Powell
meant that he could not appear in New York City except on Sunday without running the risk
of being arrested."); id. at 435-44 (discussing the litigation).
The special subcommittee that met during the 89th Congress did not take up the
litigation in New York. See 113 CONG. REC. 25 (Jan. Io, 1967) (Rep. Hays).
490 113 CONo. REC. 14 (Jan. Io, 1967).
491 See id.
492 Seeid. at 16.
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
facts,
' 49 3 he said. "We have had no judicial hearing."4 94 His resolution to
admit Powell on this basis drew some support,49 s including an inadvertent
remark from Majority Leader Carl Albert of Oklahoma (at least according
to one historian) that "[the American way is first give a man a trial and then
convict him." But others argued against provisional admission, citing
491
legislative precedent, or suggesting that the evidence against Powell was
reliable enough to deny him a seat for the time being.498 "Certain diver-
sions have been made in the argument ... today," contended Van Deerlin,
"and among these is that the gentleman from New York has somehow or
other not had his day in court.' '4 99 "This may be technically true," he said,
"but I would point out that there are nearly a dozen judges in the State of
New York who will tell you where the fault hes. In a similar vein, Rep-
resentative Glenard P. Lipscomb of California argued that "Congressman
[Wayne L.] Hays [of Ohio, chairman of the special subcommittee,] gave ev-
eryone an opportunity to be heard .... But Mr. POWELL did not choose for
one reason or another to appear before that committee even though he was
given ample opportunity." Finally, several members argued, or at least
implied, that even provisional admission would preclude expulsion under
the House's own precedent, leaving the body virtually powerless to act.s02
"[E]xcept in contests involving the outcome of an election," said Van Deer-
lin, "there is no precedent.., in which the House of Representatives has
493 Id.
494 Id.
495 See id. at 21 (Rep. Conyers) ("I plead with and urge each of you ... to join with those
who would not leave the i8th District of a great State without a Representative in Congress.");
id. at 19 (Rep. Thompson of New Jersey) ("The people of the 18th Congressional District
of New York I feel are entitled to a Representative, beginning today, and to representation
beginning today."); see also HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 15 ("[Udall's] motion had the support
of the leadership of the Majority Party, Powell's party....").
496 HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 14. The Congressional Record, however, quotes Rep.
Albert as saying that "the American way is first to give a man a trial and then to passjudgment
on him." 113 CONG. REC. 18 (Jan. in, 1967) (emphasis added).
497 See 113 CONG. REC. 18 (Jan. to, 1967) (Rep. Goodell) ("[W]e have had gentlemen
sitting as Members of the House in two of the election contests in the last 4 years where
neither party member was seated when there was a certificate of election from the duly elected
and proper officials of the State."). Goodell's reference to "gentlemen sitting as Members of
the House" would have to mean individuals appearing on the floor for admission; otherwise
this statement would contradict itself.
498 See id. at 19 (Rep. Van Deerlin).
499 Id.
500 Id.
5ol Id.
5o2 Id. (Rep. Van Deerlin); see also id. at 21 (Rep. Goodell) (noting that there were no
precendents for "seating a member and putting him in limbo pending investigation" and that
provisionally seating Powell might leave the House without "the freedom to make a final
judgment").
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expelled a Member, once seated, for matters having to do with his conduct
in a previous Congress .... 03 In other words, they contended that refus-
ing to admit Powell was the only possible way to separate him from the
chamber and that even provisional admission would preclude this option.
Meanwhile, on another axis, some members denied that the House
could refuse to admit Powell on the grounds in question. One such person
was Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, chairman of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary and a widely-respected member. "I heard nothing
from the minority side," he said, overlooking that Van Deerlin was actually a
Democrat, "which indicates anything that could successfully challenge the
qualifications constitutionally of the gentleman from New York .... " 54 An-
other member taking this position was Representative Abraham J. Multer,
also of New York, who maintained that "[o]nce the voters of a congressional
district have chosen their Representative, his fitness to serve is determined
beyond question by us, his colleagues, providing only that he meets the
three qualifications set forth."'  On the other hand, many appeared to
assume not only that exclusion on the grounds presented was an option,
but that it was the only option. They opposed provisional admission for
this reason.50 To complicate matters further, at least two representatives
from New York, Samuel S. Stratton and Samuel Kupferman, suggested that
Powell might not meet the constitutional requirement of being an "inhab-
itant" of the state because he was avoiding process there,5 °7 or because he
had been away from Congress during an important vote. Stratton's point
seemed to be, however, that Powell could cure this problem by accepting
process. Powell himself denied these allegations, noting that he paid
taxes in New York and had gone there regularly to preach.
503 Id. at 19.
504 Id. at 20.
505 Id.
506 See supra notes 502-03 and accompanying text.
507 See 1 13 CO NG. REC. 20 (Jan. 1o, 1967) (Rep. Stratton) ("If a Representative-elect
chooses to remain outside of his State rather than comply with the duly constituted orders of
the courts of his own State, then I believe there is a very real question of whether he is in fact
still a resident of the State he purports to represent ....").
508 See id. at 21 (Rep. Kupferman) ("Anyone who was a resident of New York and
believed in civil rights would have been present to vote [on the Civil Rights Bill of 1966] at
that time unless unavoidably detained. The gentleman from the 18th District of New York
was reported to be in Bimini.").
509 See 113 CONG. REC. 5002 (Mar. 1, 1967) (debate on a later resolution to admit Powell)
("I propose.., to offer an amendment to this resolution, that the oath shall not be administered
to Mr. POWELL until he has first purged himself of all contempt and thereby made it clear
that he is an inhabitant of the State of New York within the meaning of the precedents of
this House.") The idea of a cure "nunc pro tunc" would not have satisfied Adelbert Ames'
detractors in 1870. See supra notes 314-345 and accompanying text.
510 See 113 Co NG. REC. 23 (Jan. 1o, 1967). Representative William L. Dickinson of
Alabama had briefly objected to Powell being permitted to speak, but he did not persist in
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At the conclusion of debate, the House re ected Udall's proposal to ad-
mit Powell pendente lite by a vote of 305-126. Adopting a substitute of-
fered by Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford of Michigan, it then referred the
matter to a select committee by a vote of 363-65.
5 1 -
With Celler in the chair, the committee proceeded to hold hearings, at
which it invited Powell to testify. The invitation referred not only to the
stated qualifications for service in the House, i.e., age, citizenship, and in-
habitancy, but also to Powell's "alleged official misconduct since January 3,
1961." On February 8, Powell appeared before the committee but on the
advice of counsel answered only questions relating to the stated qualifica-
514
tions. Two days later, the committee sent another invitation to Powell,
this time informing him that, under its charge, it would report not only on
the question of exclusion ve/ non but also on the question of expulsion ve/
non. Although Powell did not reappear before the committee, his attor-
neys argued for him that only the stated qualifications were relevant to the
question of exclusion and that expulsion could not be a question before the
House had admitted him to membership.
5 16
On February 23, the committee submitted its unanimous report. Find-
ing that Powell met the stated qualifications, it recommended admission."
Also finding, however, that he had committed various acts of misconduct, it
also recommended censure, a fine of $40,000, and loss of seniority.518 The
House received this report on March 1 and debate began.
Although the committee had reported largely in Powell's favor, the
tide was against him. As one of the committee's members, Representative
Charles M. Teague of California, noted during debate, representatives "on
both sides of the aisle" had received mail "100 to 1" to "'throw the rascal
this objection. See id. at 15; see also HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 18 ("[Dickinson] ... quickly
withdrew his objection when his Republican colleagues quietly but audibly murmured 'no'
to his move.").
511 See 1 13 CONG. REC. 24 (Jan. 1o, 1967).
512 See id. at 26-27; see also HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 20 (At this point, "[tlhe second
telephone call was made to the White House....").
513 See In re Adam Clayton Powell: Hearing on H.R. I Before the H. Select Comm. to Investigate
Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., 9oth Cong. 5 (1967).
514 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,491 (1969).
515 See In re Adam Clayton Powell: Hearing on H.R. t Before the H. Select Comm. to Investigate
Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., 9oth Cong. I o 0(1967); see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 491. Under the
federal Constitution, "[elach House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member."
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. z.
516 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 491-92.
517 See H.R. REP. No. 90-27, at 32-34 (1967); see also I 13 CONG. REC. 4997 (Mar. I, 1967)
(Rep. Celler).
518 See H.R. REP. No. 90-27, at 32-33 (1967); see also 113 CONG. REC. 4997 (Mar. 1, 1967)
(Rep. Celler).
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out .... .[U]nder this kind of pressure," he observed, "it would be most dif-
ficult for them to vote to seat ADAM CLAYTON POWELL even with the severe
punishment we have suggested." 9 But the committee tried.
Celler spoke first. He began by defending the proposed punishment
as harsh enough. "[W]e went beyond censure," he said, emphasizing the
impact of that punishment alone. But exclusion was not a constitutional
option in his estimation. "Some may demand exclusion-ouster at the
threshold by majority vote. The Constitution lays down three qualifica-
tions for one to enter Congress-age, inhabitancy, citizenship. Mr. POWELL
satisfies all three. The House cannot add to these qualifications." 2  Later
in the debate, Representative Arch A. Moore of West Virginia reiterated
Celler's basic points, arguing as well that the House had never before ex-
cluded or expelled a member for the grounds at issue in In rePowell. "Some
Members may ... say, 'But there have been other instances of which indi-
viduals for far less indiscretion and far less misconduct have been excluded
or expelled.' I only say to those Members that a clear reading of the cases
will show that some third force always intervened." ' The majority leader
also expressed support for the committee's recommendation.
After Celler spoke, the floor went to the first of Powell's detractors,
Representative Alton A. Lennon of North Carolina. Lennon, like many
others, could not abide Powell's financial misdeeds. "How can you say
to me," he asked, "that the Members of the House, in conscience and in
morality, can say to the world and to the people of America, that the gentle-
man from New York should be seated? In a similar vein, Representative
Louis C. Wyman of New Hampshire, himself later a contestee in the Sen-525
ate, argued that "when a former Member who asks to be seated, refuses
to answer questions about his own collateral embezzlements, conversions
and possible thefts of moneys entrusted to him by this House, surely we
are not compelled to seat him until at least he explains to this House."
6
Powell's detractors also defended exclusion on the grounds presented.
The House could constitutionally deny him a seat, contended Representa-
519 113 CONG. REC. 5002 (Mar. 1, 1967); cf. HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 457 (discussing
public sentiment when the 9oth Congress first met) ("In 1967, as the House of Representatives
prepared to decide his fate, 'Powell's People' had to contend with representatives who were
listening to 'their own people' as well. The mail was running heavily against him.").
520 113 CONo. REC. 4998 (Mar. 1, 1967).
521 Id.; see also id. at 5005 (Rep. Conyers) (noting that Powell had been elected and
returned, and that he had satisfied the stated qualifications) ("The committee felt, quite
definitely, that if those criteria were satisfied that the Constitution and the burden of the
precedents allows the House no option but to seat such a duly qualified Member-elect.").
522 Id. at 4999.
523 Id. at 4998 (Rep. Albert).
524 Id. at 4999.
525 See supra note 408.
526 113 CONG. REC. 5010 (Mar. 1, 1967).
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tive Clarence Long of Maryland, because the stated qualifications were not
exhaustive. "In the language of mathematics," he said, "these are neces-
sary but not sufficient conditions. They say that a man must meet these
conditions to be seated, but they do not say that he must be seated if he
does meet them." '  Long went on to argue that legislative precedent as
well permitted exclusion on the grounds in question. On four occasions,
he said, the House had excluded someone for failing to meet an unstated
qualification, and "[n]o court has ever considered or reversed any of these
decisions . . . .""8 Although the minority leader did not embrace this argu-
ment, he did not reject it either, expressing a desire to adopt the commit-
tee's recommendation and to pretermit the question of the House's author-
ity to exclude on the grounds presented. "[AIfter seeing what they have
proposed," said Ford, "I am going to vote for the resolution without any
hesitation, qualification, or reservation. 29 Nevertheless, he would reserve
the abstract question of the House's authority to exclude a would-be mem-
ber for failing to meet an unstated qualification. "I do not admit that we do
not have the authority to exclude the gentleman from New York.
530
Adding a third perspective to the debate, Representative Stratton of
New York renewed his argument that Powell had not satisfied the require-
ment that he be an inhabitant of that state at the time of his election, al-
though he took the somewhat improbable position that Powell could cure
this deficiency by accepting process from the courts of New York.13 1 In
Stratton's view, Powell avoidance of process raised "a very grave cloud...
over the question of his inhabitancy. .. ." 53Z "Surely," he argued, "obeying
the orders of the courts is one of the duties and responsibilities of a Mem-
ber from New York State. Yet Mr. Powell has ... defied this duty and has
deliberately moved out of [the] State to avoid his responsibility." 3 3 The
problem with Stratton's argument was that, if his premises were accurate,
Powell had not been an "inhabitant" of New York at the time of his elec-
tion, and a cure after the fact would not appear to suffice. In any case, Cel-
ler was quick to respond that, in the committee's estimation, Powell had
satisfied the constitutional requirement of inhabitancy.S34
527 Id. at 500.
528 Id.
529 Id. at 5018.
530 Id.
531 Id. at 500z.
532 Id. at 5001.
533 Id. at 5002.
534 See id. at 5002 (Rep. Celler) ("Applying established criteria to the facts in this case,
the committee concluded that Mr. POWELL was an inhabitant of the State of New York on the
day of his election within the spirit of the [C]onstitution.").
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On March 1, the House refused b a vote of 222-202 to bring the com-
mittee's recommendation to a vote. Representative Thomas B. Curtis
of Missouri then offered an amendment to exclude Powell and declare his
seat vacant:
Resolved, That said ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, Member-elect from the
18th District of the State of New York, be and the same hereby is excluded
from Membership in the 90th Congress and that the Speaker shall notify
the Governor of the State of New York of the existing vacancy.'36
On the question of whether the House required a majority or two thirds to
sustain this amendment, the speaker had stated throughout the proceed-
ings, and repeated here, that a simple majority would suffice, although
Curtis himself took the position that "exclusion" in this context was actu-
ally an exercise of the power to expel, and therefore required two thirds:
[T]his is a motion of exclusion .... During the debate on the resolution,
for which this is a substitute, I advanced my own theory on what power was
derived from the power of expulsion. I said that I felt the power of expul-
sion very clearly implied the right of exclusion .... [I]f this is true, then in
my own judgment exclusion would require a two-thirds vote.538
By taking this position, Curtis evaded, or at least sought to evade, the ques-
tion of the House's power to exclude for alleged misconduct during a previ-
539
ous term.
Familiar arguments were then made, with Long and others defending
the House's power to exclude on the grounds presented, and Celler and
others taking the opposite position. Celler also spoke at some length on
precedent, acknowledging that the House had excluded individuals in the
past for failing to meet unstated qualifications, but urging his colleagues to
reject these precedents as ignoble. "Despite a laudable record of faithful
obedience to the constitutional mandate," he noted, "the Congress has in
rare instances of extreme political tension waivered from its usual adher-
ence to constitutional principle and precedent":
These deviations occurred in three categories of cases reflecting anti-Mor-
mon-case of Brigham Roberts-anti-Confederate-cases of Kentucky
members-and antiradical--case of Victor Berger-feeling. I urge the re-
pudiation of such precedents which reflect the prejudices of prior eras.
535 See id. at 5020.
536 See id.
537 See id. at 5ozo (Speaker McCormack); id. at 17 (Jan. lo, 1967) (same);.
538 Id. at 5020 (Mar. i, 1967) (Rep. Curtis).
539 Seeid. at 5020-21 (Rep. Curtis).
540 Id. at 5023 (Rep. Celler).
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Another familiar argument was Stratton's point that the House should
exclude Powell until he accepted process from the courts of New York.5
41
Indeed, Representative Kenneth W. Hechler of West Virginia took the sim-
ilar but less complicated position that the House should simply exclude
Powell for this reason, if not for others as well. s4
Then came something of an unfamiliar argument, one proceeding as
much from game theory as from constitutional law. An uncertain number
of members opposed excluding Powell, perhaps for constitutional reasons,
instead preferring that he be admitted and then expelled. If, however, they
voted against excluding him, both their consciences and their constituents
would hold them responsible for opposing the only action against Powell
likely to come before the body. Given this "dilemma," as Representative
Charles S. Gubser of California described the situation, their only political-
ly feasible option was to support Curtis's amendment, even if they opposed5 44 "r
it in principle. "Mr. Speaker," he said, "I want to expel ADAM CLAYTON
POWELL, by seating him first, but that will not be my choice when the Cur-
tis amendment is before us. I will be forced to vote for exclusion, about
which I have great constitutional doubts, or to vote for no punishment at
all. 
545
After additional debate, the House adopted Curtis's amendment by a546
vote of 307-116. Finally, it adopted the preamble supporting the reso-
lution in a separate vote of 310-9.547 This preamble, which the commit-
tee had written, referred only to Powell's alleged misconduct, and made
no reference to inhabitancy or any stated qualification for service in the
House.
548
In Powell's case, as in Raney's, 49 this was not the final chapter of the
story. On March 8, Powell and several voters from his district brought suit
541 See id. Stratton's argument was not a formal amendment, however. See id.
542 See id. at 5025.
543 See generally Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Dedsionmaking, and the Voting
Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971,989 (1989) ("[W]hen preferences are not.., conveniently arrayed,
rules of order are likely to determine outcomes-and no expert in choice theory can make it
otherwise.") (emphasis added).
544 113 CONG. REC. 5031 (Mar. 1, 1967) (Rep. Gubser).
545 Id.
546 See id. at 5037-38 (adopting H.R. Res. No. 278, as amended). This was a vote of over
seventy-two percent. See also HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 462-63.
As Representative Phillip Burton of California noted during these votes, this amendment
purported to exclude Powell even if the voters sent him back from a special election, and even
if the voters from the whole state sent him to the Senate while the 9oth Congress continued
to exist. See 1 13 CONG. REC. 5037 (Mar. I, 1967).
547 See 113 CONG. REC. 5039 (Mar. 1, 1967).
548 See id.
549 See supra notes 467-79 and accompanying text.
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in federal court for various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief in-, ..550
tended to compel Powell's admission to the chamber. Called upon to de-
fend the suit were the speaker, John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, and
several members of the House, as well as several of the House's employees,
including the clerk, the sergeant at arms, and the doorkeeper.5 5 1 The dis-
trict court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction,"' and the court of
appeals affirmed, on the slightly different rationale that the case presented
a non-justiciable political question.55
Meanwhile, the voters of the ei ,hteenth district re-elected Powell at
a special election on April 11, 1967, even though Curtis had written his
resolution excluding Powell in such a way as to apply for the duration of
the Ninetieth Congress.5 Powell chose not to present his new certificate
of election to the House, however, preferring to await the decision of the
courts. The historian Charles Hamilton describes this decision as strate-
gic. If Powell had presented his certificate to the Ninetieth Congress and
the House had admitted him, Hamilton notes, Powell might have lost his
seniority. "For the moment, then, the constitutional challenge was more. ,556
important."
On November 5, 1968, just before the Supreme Court granted the writ
of certiorari in the case, the voters of the district re-elected Powell to repre-
sent them in Ninety-First Congress. Again, Powell won by an overwhelm-
ing margin,55' although his victory in the Democratic primary the previous158
June had been less decisive than had been the custom. On January 3,
1969, after some debate, the House admitted Powell to membership, im-
posing a fine of $25,000 upon him in the process.59
As the Supreme Court took up the case, then, it confronted several is-
sues. Was it moot, given that Powell was now serving in the House? Were
the legislative defendants immune, given the Speech or Debate Clause
of the Constitution and the precedent arising thereunder. Should the
Court evaluate the House's act as an expulsion, notwithstanding the actual
550 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 493-94 (1969); see also HAMILTON, supra note
482, at 463.
551 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 493.
552 See Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354,359-60 (D.D.C. t967).
553 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.zd 577, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
554 See HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 463. Powell took 86. 1 percent of the vote. See id.
555 See supra note 536 and accompanying text.
556 HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 463.
557 See id. at 467. Powell took 8o.6 percent of the vote. See id.
558 See id. at 466-67. Turnout was low, and Powell defeated John H. Young, a former aide,
by a margin of3-2. See id.
559 See 115 CONG. REC. 33-34 (Jan. 3, 1969) (adopting H.R. Res. 2); see also HAMILTON,
supra note 482, at 468.
560 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, (the
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
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circumstances of March 1, 1967?561 Did the Court lack jurisdiction to hear
the case, or, as the court of appeals had held, did the case present a non-
justiciable political issue?
On June 16, 1969, the Court resolved these questions almost uniformly
in Powell's favor. The case was not moot, it noted, because he retained a
claim for back pay.16 Nor was the Speech or Debate Clause a bar, it said,
because he could proceed against the non-legislative defendants, even if
the Constitution protected members of the chamber.s63
Next, the Court held that it should evaluate the House's act as an ex-
clusion, not an expulsion. 64 This holding proceeded from several consid-
erations. First, by its own resolution the House had "excluded" Powell.
5
It had not expelled him, even if the resolution's sponsor, Representative
Curtis, had understood the exclusion as a form of expulsion. Second, the
Court refused to see the difference between exclusion and expulsion as
"merely one of form," observing that both houses had historically "distrust-
ed their power" to expel someone for conduct during a prior Congress.
Finally, the Court noted evidence in the record that some members voting
to exclude might instead have voted to admit Powell and then punish or
567
expel him, if given an option. In making this observation, the Court
relied heavily on an article by Congressman Robert C. Eckhardt of Texas.
"On this last vote, as a practical matter," Eckhardt had written, "members
who would not have denied Powell a seat if they were given the choice to
punish him had to cast an aye vote or else record themselves as opposed to
the only punishment that was likely to come before the House." "Had
the matter come up through the processes of expulsion," he went on to say,
"it appears that the two-thirds vote would have failed, and then members
would have been able to apply a lesser penalty."169 Moving to the fourth is-
sue, the Court denied that it lacked jurisdiction, noting that the case "arose
under" the Constitution, thus providing both a constitutional and a statu-
tory basis for it to proceed s. 7
561 Under the federal Constitution, the House may expel a member, but only upon a
vote of two thirds. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings, punish its members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.").
562 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,496 (1969).
563 See id. at 504; see also id. at 549-50 (affirming dismissal of the action against the
legislative defendants).
564 See id. at 55o.
565 See id. at 5o8 n.28 (quoting 113 CONG. REC. 5o2o (Mar. 1, 1967)).
566 Id. at 508.
567 Seeid. at Sio-ii.
568 Id. at 511 (quoting Robert C. Eckhardt, The Adam Clayton Powell Case, 45 TEx. L. REV.
1205, 1209 (1967)).
569 Id. at 5 i (quoting Eckhardt, supra note 568, at 1209).
570 See id. at 514 (constitutional basis for jurisdiction); id. at 516 (statutory basis for
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Finally, and perhaps most notably, the Court held that the case did not571
present a non-justiciable political question. Respondents' main argu-
ment on this point was that the House's authority to "be the Judge of the ..
. Qualifications of its own Members" was a "textually demonstrable consti-
tutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.""'
A more "textually demonstrable" commitment of an issue would be hard
to find, given the Framers' use of the words "be the Judge of."' 73 But the
Court plausibly avoided some of the thornier aspects of the case by noting
that the precise issue presented was not whether the House could deter-
mine conclusively if Powell met the qualifications to serve, but instead
what those qualifications were. As the Court noted, the existence vel non
of a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department" and the scope of any such commitment
were themselves questions the Court could resolve. After extensive re-
view of the historical record, which the Court acknowledged was not uni-515
vocal, the Court concluded that the houses of Congress lacked authority
to exclude prospective members for failing to meet a qualification not set
forth in the Constitution, such as moral fitness.
576
In its historical analysis, the Court devoted considerable attention to
the case of John Wilkes, a member of Parliament of the late eighteenth
century, as well as the history of the founding era, both of which it cited for
the proposition that legislatures may not scrutinize voters' choices except
insofar as a prospective member is alleged not to have met a fixed qualifica-577
tion. Given their significance for the Court's analysis in Powell, these two
subjects merit close consideration.
jurisdiction).
571 See id. at 549.
572 Id. at 58 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
573 See William W. Van Alstyne, Foreword: The Constitution in Exile: Is It Time to Bring It in
From the Cold?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-10 (2001); Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Pierre Pressure: Legislative
Elections, the State Constitution, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota, 50 S.D. L. REV. zI8, 220
(2005) (discussing a "non-binding judicial opinion" on a legislative contest) ("The idea of
judicial intrusion into this legislative process has traditionally been considered unthinkable,
both because the legislature's resolution of such matters was itself deemed to be a judicial
process and because, from the plain language of the constitutional text, the exclusion of
others-and in particular of others who are judges--could not be more evident.") (internal
quotations omitted).
574 Powell, 395 U.S. at 521.
575 See id. at 541-42 ("Unquestionably, both the House and the Senate have excluded
members-elect for reasons other than their failure to meet the Constitution's standing
qualifications."); id. at 543-44 (discussing precedents from the Civil War).
576 See id. at 548.
577 See id. at 528.
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In re Wilkes was certainly not without its human interest. Wilkes was a
radical for his time, and perhaps for any time, 78 and Commons learned an
important lesson after denying him a seat on numerous consecutive oc-
casions. On April 23, 1763, while serving in Commons, Wilkes published
a scathing attack against the ministers of George III in the circular North
Briton No. 45, using a recent speech by the King as a hook for his re-
marks. 79 "As a propaganda piece," notes historian Arthur Cash, this article
"was outrageous-page after page of invectives and sarcasms against the
ministers." In fact, Wilkes succeeded not only in offending the King's
ministers, but the King himself, by implying that he had been 
duped. 58
Shortly thereafter, the secretaries of state had him arrested and put in the
Tower of London,"' but the Court of Common Pleas granted habeas on the
183
ground of legislative privilege.
On November 15, at the instance of George Grenville, the King's first
minister, and Lord North, at that time junior lord of the treasury, the House
declared the piece a "false, scandalous, and seditious Libel. The same
day, Wilkes's opponents laid before the Lords a parody of Alexander Pope's
"Essay on Man" entitled "Essay on Woman" whose "publication," such as.... .585
it was, could be attributed to Wilkes by various imperfect means. Along
578 See ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY I
(2006) ("[Wilkes] never hid his libertine indulgences and went to prison for printing the
dirtiest poem in the English language.").
579 See KEIR, supra note 8o, at 310 ("Among a number of scurrilous attacks on the
government in various papers, particular scandal was caused by an article in No. 45 of the
North Briton, offensively criticising the King's speech at the close of the preceding session
of Parliament."); 'ThoMAs, supra note 214, at 27-28; see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 527. The chief
purpose of the North Briton was to criticize the foreign policy of Lord Bute (John Stuart)
and George Grenville, George III's first ministers from 1762 to 1763 and from 1763 to 1765,
respectively. See R.W. POSTGATE, THAT DEVIL WILKES 35 (1929) (Bute); id. at 51 (Grenville).
580 CASH, supra note 578, at IOO.
581 See id. at 99-1O; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 27-28.
582 See CASH, supra note 578, at I07-09; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 29-30.
583 See E. NEVILLE WILLIAMS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTION, 1688-1815:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 232 (1965) ("The third matter insisted upon for Mr. Wilkes
is, that he is a member of parliament... and intitled to privilege to be free from arrests in all
cases except treason, felony, and actual breach of the peace .... and we are all of the opinion
that he is intitled to that privilege, and must be discharged without bail .... (quoting 19
T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 18o9-I826, at 989 (London, T.C.
Hansard 1813)); see also CASH, supra note 578, at 116; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 31.
584 WILLIAMS, supra note 583, at 234 (quoting 29 H.C. JOUR. 667 (Nov. 15, 1763)); see
also CASH, supra note 578, at 150-5 1; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 40-42. Wilkes tried to assert
privilege at the beginning of this session, but the King's ministers beat him to the punch. See
POSTGATE, supra note 579, at 79-80.
585 See CASH, supra note 578, at 151-53 (proceedings in Lords); id. at 144 (discussing
the status of the writings, including An Essay on Woman) ("The many notes of the ministers
and printers, the legal records of the House of Lords, and the judgments of the Court of the
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with being bawdy, the poem made uncharitable reference to the bishop
of Gloucester, the Reverend Dr. William Warburton, who as heir to Pope's
copyright had published the original on a routine basis along with his own
586
footnotes. Like Commons, the Lords adopted a resolution declaring it
"a most scandalous, obscene, and impious libel."187 Nine days later, the
House declared that the privilege did not extend to libels such as North
Briton No. 45, 588 a decision in which the Lords concurred, 89 leaving Wilkes
defenseless against further prosecution. He soon left the country.
To add insult to injury, on January 19, 1764, Commons expelled Wilkes
from its ranks.59 Although Commons cited North Briton No. 45 as grounds
for its action, Wilkes had yet to be convicted of any crime.59 ' A month later,
his woes accumulating, Wilkes was tried in absentia on two separate charg-
es of libel, one for North Briton No. 45, the other for "An Essay on Woman."
This was before the King's Bench, Lord Mansfield presiding.5 94 Two dif-S595
ferent juries sat, and each brought in a verdict of guilty. On November 1,
having failed to appear for his sentence, Wilkes was declared an outlaw.
5 9 6
In 1768, after his return, and after dissolution of the Parliament from
which he had been expelled, Wilkes sought and obtained re-election to
King's Bench never use the word book and never indicate that these papers were intended to
be unified in one work."); T"ioMAs, supra note 214, at 42 ("Simultaneously with this expected
attack on Wilkes in the Commons the ministry exploded the Essay on Woman bombshell in
the House of Lords.").
586 See CASH, supra note 578, at 31 ("An Essay on Woman" has been called the dirtiest
poem in the English language, but it is not pornographic in the modern sense; rather, it
reaches the extreme of indecorum, boundlessly bawdy, using every indecent word, yet in
couplets that are astonishingly close to those of Pope. The mock footnotes imitate the turgid
notes of Warburton.")
587 POSTGATE,supra note 579, at 8i-82.
588 See WILLIAMS, supra note 583, at 234 (quoting 29 H.C. JOUR. 675 (Nov. 24, 1763)); see
also THOMAS, supra note 214, at 44-45.
589 Although the Lords agreed with Commons on this point, there was a lengthy and
impassioned dissent from seventeen members. See WILLIAMS, supra note 583 at 235-38
(quoting 3o H.L. JOuR. 426 (Nov. 29, 1763); id. at 237 ("It is not to be conceived that our
Ancestors, when they framed the Law of Privilege, would have left the Case of a Seditious
Libel (as it is called) the only unprivileged Misdemeanor: Whatever else they had given up
to the Crown, they would have guarded the Case of supposed Libels, above all others, with
Privilege, as being the most likely to be abused by outrageous and vindictive Prosecutions."
(quoting 30 H.L. JOuR. 426 (Nov. 29, 1763)); see also THOMAS, supra note 214, at 45.
590 See CASH, supra note 578, at 162-63.
591 See id. at 163-64; see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527 (1969).
592 See CASH, supra note 578, at 169-70; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 49; WILLIAMS, supra
note 583, at 234-35 (quoting 29 H.C. JOUR. 723 (Jan. 19, 1764).
593 See POSTGATE, supra note 579, at 89.
594 See CASH, supra note 578, at 170-7 1.
595 Se id. at 171-72. Both trials took place on February 21, 1764. See id. at 170-71.
596 See id. at 178; TOiMAS, supra note 214, at 54.
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Commons from the county of Middlesex. 97 He then presented himself to
the courts, eventually receiving a sentence of twenty-two months.5 98 On
February 3, 1769, while he was still in prison, Commons again expelled him,
citing not only North Briton No. 45 and the "Essay on Woman," but also an
allegedly libelous preface to a published letter that he had written.s99
But Wilkes was hardly through with Commons. On February 16, a by-
election was held to fill the seat made vacant by his expulsion and Wilkes
prevailed without dissent and without being able to appear. The next
day, however, at the instigation of the adminstration, Commons resolved
that he was "incapable" of serving in "this present Parliament."'601 Atten-
dance for this vote was poor, and this decision was regretted by many, even602
at the time. To Edmund Burke, for example, holding someone "inca-
pable" of service had the flavor of making law, which, he posited, Commons
could not do alone.6 3 Moreover, this artifice, if resorted to without scruple,
could fundamentally alter the nature of representative government, be-
597 See CASH, supra note 578, at zoo ("By the end of 1767 Wilkes had decided on an
incredibly bold and unusual step that would address both his weakness and his strength. He
would go to England and offer himself as a candidate for a seat in Parliament...."); THOMAS,
supra note 214, at 75. Wilkes's first idea was to earn election from London, but in this endeavor
he was not successful. See CASH, supra note 578, at 2o8; POSTGATE, supra note 579, at 124-26.
He went on, however, to prevail in a subsequent election in Middlesex. See id. at 211.
598 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527 (1969); CASH, supra note 578, at 227;
KEIR, supra note 80, at 340-41; ThOMAS, supra note 214, at 87.
599 See WILLIAMS, supra note 583, at 239-40 (quoting 32 H.C. JOUR. 178 (Feb. 3, 1769)); see
also CASH, supra note 578, at 246-47; POSTOATE, supra note 579, at 146 ("This triple charge was
intended to assure the government's majority, for it was calculated that members who would
not vote to expel him because he had libeled the government might yet do so because he had
libeled the king, and those who resisted both those arguments might reject him as an obscene
writer."); THOMAS, supra note 214, at 96-98.
600 See CASH, supra note 578, at 248; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 98-99.
6oi WILLIAMS, supra note 583, at 240 (quoting 32 H.C. JOUR. 228 (Feb. 17, 1769)):
Then the Main Question being put, That John Wilkes, Esquire,
having been, in this Session of Parliament, expelled this House, was,
and is, incapable of being elected a Member to serve in this present
Parliament;
The House divided ... [235-89]
So it was resolved in the Affirmative.
Id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 2 14, at 99.
602 See FRANK O'GoRMAN, THE RISE OF PARTY IN ENGLAND: THE ROCKINGHAM WHIGS,
176o-82, at 241 (1975) ("The expulsion of Wilkes and the seating of Luttrell appeared not
only to violate the independence of Parliament from the executive but also to violate the
rights of electors.").
603 See CASH, supra note 578, at 249.
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cause it would enable the party in control of the body to declare members
604of the opposition incapable of service.
On March 16, Wilkes prevailed without opposition at the second by-
election,60 5 but again failed to obtain recognition in Commons. 60 6 Indeed,
he went on to prevail at yet a third by-election on April 13, this time howev-
er with opposition from Colonel Henry Lawes Luttrell and William Whita-607
ker, an attorney. Although his count (1,143 votes) was overwhelming,
608Luttrell did earn 296 votes and Whitaker five. Two days later, Commons
took the unusual step of requiring the clerk to amend the return to identify
Luttrell as the winner.
This left Wilkes without apparent recourse, but sentiment in London,
as well as on this side of the Atlantic, ran very much in his favor and against
the decision to admit Luttrell. 6 10 Although the latter had some suRport,
including a pamphlet by Samuel Johnson entitled The False Alarm, the
mood in the capital as well as in the colonies was decidedly in the opposite
direction. Indeed the government fell in January 1770 in part because of
'affaire Wilkes.612 613
On April 17 Wilkes left prison He then immersed himself in mu-
nicipal6politics in London, becoming an alderman, a sheriff, and eventually
mayor. Then, on October 20, 1774, the Parliament from which he had
been expelled having been dissolved by George III, Wilkes stood for and
obtained a seat in Commons from Middlesex. On December 2, he took
616
his seat, shortly thereafter beginning his campaign to cleanse his records
604 See id.
605 See id. at 250-5 1; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 99-1oo.
606 See CASH, supra note 578, at 251; see also THOMAs, supra note 214, at 10O ("Next day
in the Commons Richard Rigby moved to void the return. No MP directly opposed this,
although Dowdeswell did enquire whether it was prudent to have a Middlesex election every
month....").
607 See CASH, supra note 578, at 252-53; TIoMAS, supra note 214, at ioo-o.
6o8 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 528 (1969); CASH, supra note 578, at 254;
KEIR, supra note 8o, at 341; WILLIAMS, supra note 583, at 222.
609 See CASH, supra note 578, at 254; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 101-02; WILLIAMS, supra
note 583, at 241-42 (quoting 32 H.C. JouR. 387 (April 15, 1769)).
6 1o See CASH, supra note 578, at 254-55 ("All London was on edge. The streets were full
of soldiers, and people hesitated to go out unless they had footmen to protect them. Luttrell
was assaulted as he left St. Stephen's Chapel and began to go about armed.").
611 See id. at 255.
61z See id. at 261-62; TOMAS, supra note 214, at 104-05.
613 See CASH, supra note 578, at 265;THOMAS, supra note 214, at 1 15.
614 See CASH, supra note 578, at 267 (Wilkes invested as alderman); id. at 309 (Wilkes
elected mayor); POSTGATE, supra note 579, at 192 (Wilkes elected sheriff); THOMAS, supra note
214, at I16 (Wilkes elected alderman while still in prison); id. at 145 (Wilkes elected sheriff);
id. at 152 (Wilkes elected mayor).
615 See CASH, supra note 578, at 309-10; THOMAS, supra note 214, at 153.
616 See CASH, supra note 578, at 315.
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in the House. In 1782, after eight years of effort, Commons agreed to
expunge the various resolutions expelling him and to denounce its prior
actions as "subversive of the Rights of the whole Body of Electors of this
Kingdom.
' 618
The impact of In re Wilkes on American history would be difficult to
overstate. As various historians have noted, leaders of the Revolution were
devoted to Wilkes and indeed corresponded with him. "Wilkes's every
move was followed in the American press, and his victories over government
celebrated in the colonies, ' 6 19 writes Cash. "He corresponded with Samuel
Adams, John Hancock, and other of the founding fathers and was among
the foremost supporters of American causes through essays, petitions, and
speeches in Parliament."'61° "The treatment accorded to [Wilkes] by the
ministries of Grenville and Grafton," observes Peter Thomas, "seemed to
colonists confirmatory evidence that the government of George III threat-
ened the liberty of his subjects in both Britain and America, thereby stiff-
ening colonial resistance to administration policies."'611 Although many on
this side of the Atlantic might have seen Wilkes as simply a champion of
liberty, others saw in his experience the more precise lesson that "popular
sovereignty," not the criteria of prospective colleagues, should determine. .. .. 622
abstract qualifications for membership in the legislature. This was cer-
tainly the lesson that Adam Clayton Powell's supporters in the House drew
623
from In re Wilkes, and the Supreme Court reiterated their point in its deci-
sion holding largely in Powell's favor:
617 See id. at 316-17;THoMAS, supra note 214, at 177 ("Wilkes .... had his annual motion
to make: to rescind the resolution of 17 February 1769, declaring him incapable of election
after his expulsion.").
618 WILLIAMS, supra note 583, at 244 (quoting 38 H.C. JOUR. 977 (May 3, 1782)); see also
CASH, supra note 578, at 369-70. Just one month earlier the Government of Lord North had
fallen, and just one month before that Commons had advised the King, by a vote of 234-215,
that the war with the former colonies in North America should no longer be prosecuted. See
id. at 369; see also POSTGATE, supra note 579, at 237 (noting that Commons "revolted" after
Yorktown and "Lord North flung up his office in despair").
619 CASH, supra note 578, at z.
620 Id.; see also POSTGATE, supra note 579, at 173-74 ("Names like Quincy, Hancock, and
Adams now bulk enormous in American history; Wilkes is forgotten. But here they are small
men patiently soliciting the attention of a great man ....
621 THoMA, supra note 214, at 159.
622 Cf. KEIR, supra note 8o, at 341 (evaluating In re Wilkes from the perspective of British
constitutional law) ("Whatever be the correct legal view regarding this difficult case, the line
taken by the Commons was an affront to the notion of popular sovereignty, and it engendered
an agitation for radical constitutional reform.").
623 See 113 Cong. Rec. 5034 (Mar. 1, 1967) (Rep. Celler) (discussing In re Wilkes); id. at
5017-18 (Rep. Jacobs) (same).
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With the successful resolution of Wilkes' long and bitter struggle for the
right of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice,
it is evident that, on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, English
precedent stood for the proposition that "the law of the land had regulated
the qualifications of members to serve in parliament" and those qualifica-
tions were "not occasional but fixed. 62 4
Indeed, the Powell Court went on to note that the delegates in Philadel-
phia were sufficiently anxious to protect popular sovereignty that they re-
jected not only a requirement that members of Congress possess a certain
amount of property, but also proposals that would have vested discretion
in the legislature to determine what the criteria for service might be.6 5 As
the Court noted, on August 10, 1787, the Committee on Detail proposed
that the "Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish
such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to
property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient."' 616 Governeur
Morris then moved that the words "with regard to property" be struck,
so that the legislature might be left "entirely at large" in the setting of
617
uniform qualifications. Using words that bore the imprint of In re Wilkes,
Madison spoke in opposition to the committee's proposal, implicitly taking
issue with Morris's motion as well:
Mr Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper & danger-
ous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected
were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by
the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can
by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into
an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being
elected, as the number authorised to elect .... It was a power also, which
might be made subservient to the views of one faction agst. another. Quali-
fications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger
in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.6 8
624 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 528 (1969) (quoting 16 WILLIAM COBBETr,
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 589-9 (London, TC. Hansard 18o6-zo)).
625 See id. at 535-36 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 250,
254 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand]).
626 Id. at 533 (quoting 2 Farrand, supra note 625, at 179).
627 Id. at 535 (quoting 2 Farrand, supra note 625, at 250).
628 2 Farrand, supra note 625, at 249-50 (quoted in Powell, 395 U.S. at 533-34); see also
Powell, 395 U.S. at 532-33 (quoting 2 Farrand, supra note 625, at 123) (noting a proposal similar
to Morris's motion by John Dickenson of Delaware, on which the delegates did not act)); 2
Farrand, supra note 625, at 123 ("Mr Dickenson. was agst. any recital of qualifications in the
Constitution," believing that "[it was impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial one
would by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions ...
.11).
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In light of this history, the Powell Court could take the position that the
presumptively correct interpretation of the clause authorizing the houses
of Congress to "be the Judge of" their members' qualifications extended
only to the criteria set forth by the Constitution, and therefore to reject•. 629
legislative precedent that cut in the opposite direction. There being no
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" to the House of Pow-
ell's moral fitness to serve, and there being no other ground for holding the
case non-justiciable, 630 the Court determined that it could render judgment
in Powell's favor.63 1 It then remanded the case for further consideration on
the question of remedy.63'
Considering the historical record and the need to protect popular sover-
eignty, the Court reached a defensible holding in Powell. To be sure, such
legislative precedent as In re Vare clearly cut in the opposite direction, and
the Court could plausibly have interpreted the words "be the Judge of" to
permit exclusion on any ground. Nevertheless, the decision was arguably
within our constitutional tradition, particularly in light of the applicable
constitutional text, which confers on the houses of Congress authority
to resolve questions about members' "Elections, Returns and Qualifica-
tions,"63 3 but which elsewhere sets forth qualifications.6
Evaluating the House's handling of In re Powell is more complicated.
Given the Court's later decision, one could simply say that the House was
acting out of bounds, but of course such famous lights as Senator George
W. Norris of Nebraska had very definitely taken up cudgels in the opposite
direction. 63 Without doubt, politics played a role in In re Powell, 63and of
course the entire matter was fraught with racial overtones. As Representa-
tive Elmer J. Holland of Pennsylvania argued in Powell's defense, "ADAM
POWELL is being judged not for his sins alone. He is being punished for the
statements of Stokely Carmichael and the bad poetry of Cassius Clay and
the sins of every other [person of his race] in the country .... ,,637 Indeed,
629 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 546-48.
630 See id. at 548-49.
631 See id. at 550.
632 See id.
633 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
634 See id. § 2, cl. I (representatives); id. § 3, cl. 3 (senators).
635 Cf. John C. Eastman, Open to Merit of Every Description? An Historical Assessment of the
Constitution ' Qualifications Clauses 73 DFNv. U. L. REv. 89, 136 (1995) (arguing that states may
impose qualifications for service in Congress in addition to those set forth in the Constitution)
("[The arguments against the exclusive interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses, and in
favor of the power of states to superadd to the qualifications listed in them, are stronger and
more consistent, both logically and with the historical record and the nature of the American
regime.")
636 See HAMILTON, supra note 482, at I6.
637 113 CONG. REC. 5028 (Mar. 1, 1967); see also HAMILTON, supra note 482, at 462
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as Hamilton has noted, Powell's alleged misdeeds were not unique, al-
though they may have been overwhelming in the 
aggregate.639
Before we proceed to discuss the next contest, we should note two deci-
sions that sound in the same general area as Powell, one an opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, another an opinion by the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.
A case quite similar to Powell, and for that reason similarly defensible, is
Bondv. Floyd.6 In this case, the Court held that Julian Bond could chal-
lenge the decision of the House of Representatives of Georgia not to admit641
him because of things he had said about the war in Vietnam. Much as
the House of Representatives could not exclude Powell for his failure to
meet a qualification not set forth in the Constitution, so too the lower house
in Georgia could not exclude Bond because of his vocal opposition to the
war. As a matter of mechanics, of course, Bond differed from Powell in that
Powell turned on the scope of the House's power to "be the Judge of" its
members' qualifications, whereas Bond turned on the First Amendment,
which applies to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 64
A case somewhat similar to Bond is Mundo-Rios v. Vizcarrondo-Irizary,643
whichJustice Cooper cited in his separate opinion in Stephenson v. Wood-
ward. In this case, the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico refused
to admit Mundo to membership, even though Mundo had a certificate of
election, on the ground that criminal charges were pending against him.
Mundo brought an action in federal court to compel his admission, which
the court granted in the form of a temporary restraining order requiring the
defendants (members of the legislature) to administer the oath by noon
the following day. Although the defendants gave Mundo the oath the fol-
(discussing Rep. Holland's speech).
638 See HAMILTON, supra note 482, at I8.
639 See id. at 16 ("Many of [Powell's colleagues in the House] were beginning to say out
loud what they had been muttering softly for years: enough is enough.").
640 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), rmvg 251 E Supp. 333 (N.D.Ga. 1966).
641 Seeid. at 131-32.
642 See id. (noting as the "central question" in the case "whether Bond's disqualification
because of his statements violated the free speech provisions of the First Amendment as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment").
643 Mundo-Rios v. Vizcarrondo-Irizarry, 228 F Supp. 2d 18 (D.P.R. 2002).
644 See Stephenson v. Woodward, 18z S.W.3d 162, 177 (Ky. 2005) (Cooper, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mundo-Rios, 228 F Supp. zd at 30).
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lowing day, they did not do so by the deadline, provoking a motion for con-645
tempt on Mundo's part. 646.
Although the court declined to hold the defendants in contempt, it
was quite emphatic in stating that the house had been wrong to exclude
Mundo and that the privilege is not "absolute." 64' "The Legislature can-
not refuse to seat an elected member," it noted, "who has been provided
an electoral certification of election, even if there are irregularities alleged
1648in the election ...." The conclusion that Puerto Rico's house was acting
beyond its authority in refusing to admit Mundo was both uncontrover-
sial and unobjectionable. The house had refused to admit him because
of his possible failure to satisfy a qualification-lack of pending criminal
charges-not set forth in the constitution. Thus, its action was conceptu-
ally indistinguishable from the House's exclusion of Powell or Commons'
treatment of Wilkes, and merited comparable treatment.
But the court's language, taken in the abstract, raises disturbing impli-
cations about the scope of the privilege that courts should not endeavor
to pursue. If the mere presentation of prima facie evidence of admission
suffices to bind the legislature, then the power to "judge" qualifications,
elections, and returns is meaningless, and the real "judge" on these issues
will be the administrative or judicial officials who determine whether to
grant a certificate of election. This has not been the law in the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases sounding in this area, nor should it be.649 Holding up
the admission of a prospective member when the legislature has questions
about the regularity of an election lies at the heart of the privilege's pur-
pose. As the House of Commons of Georgia noted in correspondence with
the royal governor in 1756, inquiry into such matters "is not only the first
step in point of form, but also the surest Method of securing to the Subject
the essential Privilege of being fairly represented which it is our proper
Business to take care of."650 In addition, the Supreme Court of the United
645 See Mundo-Rios, 228 F.Supp. 2d at 20-21.
646 See id. at 3o.
647 See id. at 28 ("[Tjhe 'absolute power' of legislatures to judge the qualification of its
members 'was pierced by the Supreme Court more than [thirty] years ago in ... Bondand..
. Powell.'" (quoting Legislature of Virgin Islands v. Mapp, Civ. No. 1989-129, 1989 WL 53841
(D.V.I. 1989))).
648 Id. (citing Santa Aponte v. Secretario del Senado, 5 P.R. Offic. Trans. 1050 (1977)).
649 It also appears that the defendants in Mundo-Rios did not raise any textual equivalent
of the privilege, asserting only the Speech or Debate Clause by way of defense. See id. at
21. Puerto Rico's Constitution does contain an express recognition of the privilege, however.
See P.R. CONsT. art. III, § 9 ("Each house shall be the sole judge of the election, returns and
qualifications of its members ...."). The court's willingness to grant a temporary restraining
order against members of the legislature is also somewhat troubling, particularly where the
House may have been on its way to admitting Mundo anyway. See Mundo-Rios, zz8 E Supp.
2d at 20.
650 GRFENE,supra note 166, at 191 (quoting GA. H.C.JoUR. (Feb. 13, 1756) in 13 COLONIAL
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States almost certainly precluded the broad implications of Mundo-Rios in
1972, only three years after Powell. In Roudebush v. Hartke, a lower federal
court had enjoined a recount in a race for the federal Senate on the ground
that the recount would interfere with the Senate's authority under the fed-. . 651
eral version of the privilege. Reversing, the Court held that the recount
could proceed because it could not constitutionally bind the Senate. "[A]
recount can be said to 'usurp' the Senate's function," it said, "only if it frus-
trates the Senate's ability to make an independent final judgment. 65 2 In
the eyes of the Roudebush Court, the privilege obviously included a power
to exclude a candidate notwithstanding an earlier judicial finding that the
person had procured the most votes in the election. The Mundo-Rios court
did not cite Roudebush.6 s3
9. Humble v. Hoover (House of Representatives, Kentucky, 1987).-A recent
exercise of the privilege in Kentucky was Humble v. Hoover. Mae Hoover
and Donald Humble were opposing candidates in a special election for
the fifty-third legislative district in January 1987. This election had been
made necessary by the death of Hoover's husband, who had held the seat
until December 16, 1986. Effective with the election of Hoover's deceased
husband, the boundaries of the district had been changed to exclude the.. . 654
part of Russell County in which she had been living. Seeking to comply
as best she could with the requirement that she live in the district that
she hoped to represent, Hoover moved to Clinton County on December
29. By doing so, she became a resident of the district, but of course she
nevertheless failed to satisfy the constitutional requirement that she live in
the district for a full year preceding the election. She went on to defeat
Humble, who brought a contest against her admission.
RECORDS OF GA. 95-98 (1904-1937)).
651 Roudebush v. Hartke, 495 U.S. 15, 25 (1972).
652 Id. at 25
653 The Mundo-Rios court also suggested that the House's refusal to admit Mundo may
have implicated equal protection, because a similarly situated individual of the majority party
had received disparate treatment. SeeMundo-Rios, 228 F. Supp. 2d. at 27. This suggestion is
vulnerable to criticism because it indicates that the exercise of the privilege is subject to a
legislative equivalent of stare decisis which is then enforceable in a court of law. If this were
the case, then the distinctive nature of the privilege as it has come to be exercised in Congress
and in the legislatures of the states would be destroyed, and exercise of the privilege would
merely be a prelude to judicial review.
654 See Ky. HOUSE JOUR., Extraordinary Session of 1987, at 91 (Oct. 19, 1987).
655 See Ky. CONST. § 32 ("No person shall be a Representative who, at the time of his
election,... has not resided in this State two years next preceding his election, and the last
year thereof in the county, town or city for which he may be chosen.").
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656
Hoover presented a prima facie claim to the seat, but as we have seen,657
this does not conclude the legislature. During a special session in Oc-
tober 1987, the house took up the contest, referring it to a speciai commit-658
tee. On October 16 the committee completed its report, which it pre-659  ..
sented on October 19. The committee began this report by reciting the
facts of the case and setting forth what it thought were the applicable legal
principles. After noting that the house is "sole judge of the qualifications
of its members,'66 it continued by recognizing both the precedential and
the theoretical basis for the requirement that Hoover reside in the district661
she sought to represent. Although the committee acknowledged that she
did not meet the constitutional requirements for service, it nevertheless
recommended that the house admit her as a member, emphasizing among
other things her familiarity with the district, her success at the polls, and
the unusual nature of the situation:
A technical reading of the case law would compel the conclusion that
Mae Hoover was not a resident of the geographical area she was elected to
represent and, therefore, should not be seated.
However, she certainly is familiar with the district and its people. She
did all that was possible to adjust her residency, and she won the election.
The situation as far as the change in district boundaries is concerned
is certainly a unique factual circumstance, the like of which has apparently
never been the subject of an official determination.
This Board unanimously recommends to the House of Representatives
as the sole judge of the qualifications of its members that Mae Hoover be
662seated as the Representative of the 53rd Legislative District.
Although Humble v. Hoover was itself "humble," in the sense that it oc-
cupied no more than a page or two in the Kentucky House Journal, it never-
theless captured much of the flavor of the protracted proceedings we have
discussed. It saw reference to constitutional text, constitutional theory,
656 See Ky. HousE JOUR., Extraordinary Session of 1987, at i (Oct. 14, 1987)
("Representative Stumbo moved that the Journal show that members elected by Special
Election, Representative Mae Turner Hoover and Representative Jack Will, have produced
certificates of election and that these certificates be confirmed. Agreed.").
657 See McCRARY, supra note 345, § 383 at 255 (noting that a certificate of election, even
if granted pursuant to mandamus, "is only primafacie evidence of the title to the office, and
may be attacked and overthrown by other proof").
658 See Ky. HousE JoUR., Extraordinary Session of 1987, at I0 (Oct. 14, 1987).
659 Seeid. at91 (Oct. 19, 1987).
66o See id.
661 Seeid.at91-92.
662 Id. at 92.
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and judicial precedent. But it ultimately proceeded on a form of analysis
that exalted substance over form, noting Hoover's substantial requirement
with the constitutional provision, the voters' preference for her, and the
unique nature of the situation presented. Moreover, as in almost all of the
proceedings considered in this Subpart, the infirmity in Hoover's qualifi-
cations, which was not only alleged but real, existed when she was still a
prospective member, and did not arise after she was admitted. Indeed, the
Journal is unclear as to the exact moment of her admission. Although the
house's "membership" was described as "duly sworn" after her certificate
of election had been "confirmed" on October 14, 66 the committee recom-
mended that Hoover "be seated" in the report that it presented on October
19.
10. Concluding Observations.-In this Subpart, we have examined nine ex-
ercises of the legislative privilege to judge the qualifications, elections, and
returns of members. As we have seen, these cases have arisen in every
epoch of our nation's history and in every imaginable context, both con-
troversial and mundane. Although their study yields few, if any, absolutes,
we believe we can make a few general observations about practice in the
area.
For one thing, legislators are quite lawyerly in discharging this function,
declaiming text, citing precedent, and seeking to justify their positions in
terms of theoretical principles-in other words, resorting to conventional
legal analysis. Indeed, as they moot these issues, they appear to combine
the functions of an attorney making an oral argument with those of a judge
asking questions of counsel. In Hatfield v. Holt, for example, Holt's op-
ponents relied heavily on the senatorial precedents of In re Gallatin and
In re Shields, and his supporters tried to distinguish these precedents, clas-
sify their most difficult language as "dictum," or candidly call for their re-
pudiation.' Similarly, in In re Ames the senators found themselves quite
elaborately parsing the word "[i]nhabitant" and trying to determine how
a soldier transitorily present in a state can manifest a decision to remain
there.665
Nevertheless, legislatures often reach conclusions that a court of law al-
most certainly could not reach. We have noted this phenomenon in various
ways, observing that they sometimes march to the beat of a different drum-
mer or exalt substance over form. Whatever the formulation, the point is
that exercise of the privilege is not and never has been a purely legalistic
process, instead lying somewhere at the intersection of law and politics.
Examples of this phenomenon abound, and we have seen many in this
663 Id. at I (Oct. 14, 1987).
664 See supra notes 459-66 and accompanying text.
665 See supra notes 329-45 and accompanying text.
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Subpart. Although Lane was almost surely a general when he entered the
Senate of the United States, thus violating the rule against dual service,
the body nevertheless retained him as a member, perhaps because he had
acquitted himself with his legal arguments, but most likely because a dif-
ficult war was in progress and the game of excluding him was not worth
the candle. 666 Similarly, although Raney in fact took up the incompatible
office of deputy while serving in the Senate of Kentucky, the body never-
theless recognized him as qualified, not because of any lawyerly argument
he made, but (presumably) because it saw no real conflict of interest.66'
Hoover likewise had not resided in her district long enough to satisfy the
relevant provision of the constitution, but as her case was extraordinary and
as she satisfied the spirit of the provision, the House of Representatives of
Kentucky was willing to admit or retain 
her as a member.
In a slightly different vein, a legislature might conclude that no can-
didate has prevailed in an election, even though neither a tie nor corrupt
practices per se has occurred. This appears to have been the conclusion of
the Senate of the United States in Durkin v. Wyman, a contest that took
place not long ago. In this case, which one journalist described as "the
closest U.S. Senate race in history,"669 the Senate decided that it could not
satisfactorily determine whether John A. Durkin or Louis C. Wyman had
prevailed, yet no one had established that the two had received the same
number of votes. Instead, the Senate took the pragmatic step of declaring
the seat vacant and notifying the governor of New Hampshire to that ef-
fect.
6 7 0
Before we leave the general subject of law and politics, we should also
note that, although exercise of the privilege generally redounds to the ben-
efit of the party in power, this is not always true. A Senate dominated
by Republicans excluded Vare, a Republican, and a House dominated by
Democrats expelled Powell, a Democrat. Republican George W. Norris
successfully led the fight against Vare, and Democrat Lionel Van Deerlin
first asked Powell to stand aside and not take the oath of office. James H.
Lane's "prosecutor," so to speak, was Republican Lafayette Foster of Con-
necticut; Adelbert Ames' chief opponent was Republican Roscoe Conkling
of New York; and Rush Holt's most effective opponent was Democrat Tom
Connally of Texas. Similarly, Kentucky's house of representatives, domi-
nated by Democrats, recognized Mae Hoover, a Republican, as satisfying
the requirements for service.
666 See supra notes 269-313 and accompanying text.
667 Seesupra notes 467-79 and accompanying text.
668 See supra notes 654-63 and accompanying text.
669 See DONN TIBBETTS, THE CLOSEST U.S. SENATE RACE IN HISTORY: DURKIN V. WYMAN
(1976).
670 See 121 CONG. REC. 25,960-61 (July 30, 1975).
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The examples we have set forth in this Subpart also help demonstrate
the breadth and scope of the privilege. Although as per Powell v. McCor-
mack and Bondv. Floyd the privilege does not readily run to unstated quali-
fications, it is plenary with regard to stated qualifications, elections, and
returns, and it arises inexorably with the gathering of the body. That is,
it operates as a basis for admission or exclusion both at the threshold of
service and after an individual has become a member. Indeed, any other
formulation would render the privilege in large measure absurd, given that
infirmities relating to "elections" and "returns" would never arise after an
individual became a member.
As we have seen, in the vast majority of cases the basis for a contest or
challenge arises before a would-be member appears in the chamber for
admission, thus providing the grounds for exercise of the privilege either
before the person is admitted or excluded, or after the person has been
admitted, either provisionally or simpliciter. This was true of Gallatin, who
671
was excluded after being admitted simpliciter, of Lane and (apparently)67127... . .. 673-
Hoover, who were retained after being admitted simpliciter, of Lewis,. .. 674 675
who was excluded after being admitted provisionally, of Ames and
676 677
Holt, who were admitted upon resolution of a contest, and of Lewis,
67' 679
Vare, and Fortescue, who were excluded after resolution of a contest.
And, needless to say, it was also true of every contestant we have discussed,
who by definition would not be admitted provisionally, inasmuch as they
lack prima facie evidence of election.
We have also seen that the privilege operates at the threshold of service
without regard to the distinction between "qualifications," "elections,"
and "returns." This makes perfect sense, given that the various consti-
tutional provisions recognizing the privilege refer to these three items in
series without chronological distinctions. Thus, Gallatin's alleged infirmity
(insufficient length of citizenship) preceded his appearance in the Senate,
as did that of Lane (dual service), Ames and Hoover (insufficient length
of residence), Lewis (lack of election), and Holt (insufficient age). The
privilege has arisen in each of these contexts without regard to whether
qualifications, elections, or returns were at issue.
The privilege, then, is broad indeed. And in keeping with this plenary
nature, courts throughout the United States have almost invariably refused
671 See supra notes 227-68 and accompanying text.
672 See supra notes 269-313, 654-63 and accompanying text.
673 See supra notes 269-313, 654-63 and accompanying text.
674 See supra notes 346-66 and accompanying text.
675 See supra notes 314-45 and accompanying text.
676 See supra notes 430-66 and accompanying text.
677 See supra notes 346-66 and accompanying text.
678 See supra notes 367-429 and accompanying text.
679 See supra notes 139-6I and accompanying text.
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to intervene in such matters, holding either that they lacked jurisdiction
or that the case presented a non-justiciable political question. In the next
Subpart, we consider some cases in this area.
D. Judicial Precedent
Given the unequivocal language of such provisions as section 38, the long
history they reflect, and the theory that supports them, courts in the United
States almost invariably refuse to interfere with the legislative privilege of
determining members' eligibility. The list of cases standing for this propo-
sition is quite long, and we do not purport to be making an exhaustive
study. For purposes of analysis, we have divided these cases into two basic
categories: (1) cases in which someone seeks to invoke or preclude a judi-
cial or administrative proceeding in advance of a legislative contest; and (2)
cases in which someone seeks by quo warranto or an equivalent to exclude
an individual from the legislature for lack of eligibility. Although these
categories do not account for every judicial treatment of the subject, they
account for most.60 Without respect to category, however, the theme that
runs through practically every case is that the privilege is plenary. "The
courts will not undertake to decide upon the right of a party to hold a seat
in the legislature," notes McCrary, "where by the constitution each house
is made the judge of the election and qualifications of its own members."'6 1
"[I]t is well settled," writes the author of a note in the Vanderbilt Law Re-
view, that a constitutional articulation of the privilege "vests in the legisla-
ture the sole and exclusive power to judge the election and qualifications
68o For an example of a court taking note of the privilege in another context, see Reif v.
Barrett, 188 N.E. 889, 898 (I11. 1933) (upholding a law that would not have passed without the
vote of someone whom the House had admitted but who was alleged to be ineligible because
of indebtedness to the state) ("No court has the right to review the decision of the House or
command it to take action or nonaction upon the qualifications of its own members."), overruled
in part on other grounds, Thorpe v. Mahin, 25o N.E.2d 633, 637 (I11. 1969). See also McCRA.RY,
supra note 345, § 595, at 396 ("The cases in which the official acts or votes of members of a
legislative body who are such defacto only, and not dejure, have been held valid....").
A further example of the breadth of the privilege is found in municipal practice.
Although few if any constitutions recognize a privilege for municipal councils to judge the
qualifications, elections, and returns of members, see generally McCRaRY, supra note 345, § 350,
at 239, state legislatures have been known to confer such privileges by statute, and courts have
been known to defer to such arrangements. In Witten v. Sternberg, 475 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1971),
for example, the highest Court of Kentucky rejected a challenge to an election for the office of
alderman in the City of Louisville, where the legislature had specifically authorized the board
itself to resolve such disputes. See id. at 497. "[Ilt is plain," the Court noted, "that the board
of aldermen.., is the sole judge of the election of its members (where the offices of less than
a majority of the board are in question), and contests of elections for such office are excluded
from the jurisdiction of the courts." Id. (citation omitted).
681 McCrA.R, supra note 345, § 35 o , at 239. The courts of Kentucky have cited McCrary's
treatise on forty-six separate occasions, according to an electronic search.
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of its own members and deprives the courts of jurisdiction to determine
these matters. 68' Although there is language in a very small number of
cases that calls into question the broad scope of the privilege, this language
is uniformly unnecessary to the resolution of the case, and also tends to
reflect a profound lack of appreciation for the history and theory underlying
613
the privilege.
1. Actions Regarding a Proceeding in Advance of a Contest.-Although ultimate
authority to judge the qualifications, elections, and returns of members
lies with the legislature, courts and administrators often play an important
complementary role with regard to exercise of the privilege. As McCrary
observes, courts will often require electoral officials to "discharge their du-
ties" and "arm the parties elected to [a] legislative body with the creden-
tials necessary to enable them to assert their rights before the proper tri-
bunal." Such judicial relief does not threaten the privilege because it does
not bind the legislature. "[T]he award of a certificate of election under
such mandate," McCrary notes, "will not conclude the legislative body in
determining the election." These actions do not derogate from the privi-
lege, observes the author of the Vanderbilt note, because their "sole purpose
[is] to facilitate proving to the legislative body that the candidate [has] a
prime facie right to a seat, rather than to admit the candidate to office.,685
In this portion of the article, we discuss a few cases in this area.
a. People ex rel. Fuller v. Hilliard.-One of the earliest cases in this
6816vein was People ex rel. Fuller v. Hilliard. In this case, Fuller sought by
mandamus to compel a clerk to provide him with a certificate of election
to the House of Representatives of Illinois. Hilliard, the clerk, argued that
such relief would fall within the house's exclusive province, and that there-
fore the courts should deny relief. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme
Court of Illinois emphasized the distinction between an order requiring an
682 Vanderbilt Note, supra note 7, at 1410. See also JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS & ALBERT H.
PUTNEY, HANDBOOK ON ELECTION LAWS § 54, at 196-97 (1912) (citing cases); PAUL MASON,
MASON'S MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL
BODIES § 560, '1 30, at 400 (1953) (citing cases) ("When a legislative body is made the sole
judge of the election and qualifications of its members, its determination is conclusive and not
subject to review even by the Supreme Court.").
683 See infra notes 717-39 and accompanying text.
684 McCRARY, supra note 345, § 350, at 239; see also Vanderbilt Note, supra note 7, at
1412-13 ("It should be noted, however, that state courts have assumed jurisdiction in certain
ancillary matters. For instance, courts have taken appellate jurisdiction in cases dealing with
the appointment of ministerial officers concerned with election procedure. Also, state courts
have compelled a canvassing board to issue a certificate of election to a candidate." (footnotes
omitted))
685 Vanderbilt Note, supra note 7, at 1413.
686 People ex rel. Fuller v. Hilliard, 29111.413 (186z).
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official to perform a purely ministerial act, which would not bind the legis-
lature, and an order requiring the legislature to accept Fuller as a member.
Whereas the courts could provide the former kind of relief, they could not
provide the latter. "The relator asks not to be admitted to an office," said
the Court, "but that evidence of his having been elected to an office shall
be furnished him."
It is not to turn one man out and put the relator in office, that this proceed-
ing is had. A mandamus will not lie for such purpose, and a decision in this
case cannot affect the right of another claiming the office. That is for the
House of Representatives to determine.68'
In other words, because the certificate would simply give Fuller a prima
facie claim to the seat, its issuance would not interfere with the house's
final authority to resolve the dispute:
Though the House of Representatives is the sole and exclusive judge of the
qualifications of its members, this application [for mandamus] has no refer-
ence whatever to the point of qualifications. Its sole purpose is to procure
the requisite evidence, to present to that body, of a primafacie right to a seat
in it, independent wholly of the question of qualification.
b. Roudebush v. Hartke.-A recent and famous case in this vein is
Roudebush v. Hartke, which the Supreme Court of the United States decid-
ed in 1972. 6 9 Although, unlike Fuller, Roudebush involved a judicial rather
than an administrative proceeding in advance of a legislative contest, the
principle recognized by the Court was the same-that the non-legislative
matter could proceed because it would not bind the legislature.
On November 3, 1970, the voters of Indiana appeared by a slight margin
to re-elect incumbent Senator R. Vance Hartke, an outspoken critic of the
war in Vietnam, over Richard L. Roudebush, whom President Nixon had
persuaded to give u9 a safe seat in the House to run against Hartke. The
election was bitter. On November 17, Roudebush asked the Indiana691
courts for a recount, as authorized by the laws of that state, but Hartke
succeeded in obtaining a federal interlocutory injunction to prevent this• . 692
process from beginning. Roudebush and the attorney general of Indiana,
687 Id. at 419.
688 Id.
689 Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
690 See BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 2z6, at 419.
691 See id.
692 See Hartke v. Roudebush, 321 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 15
(1972).
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who had intervened as a defendant, then sought review of this decision in
693the Supreme Court.
On January 21, 1971, while Roudebush's appeal was pending, the Sen-
ate admitted Hartke "'without prejudice' to the lawsuit pending in the U.S.
Supreme Court." The exact meaning of this phrase is hard to discern,
given that Roudebush was seeking review of the injunction, not Hartke's
claim to the seat. As the Supreme Court later noted in its opinion reversing
the district court, "[w]hich candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate
is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question-a question that would
not have been the business of this Court even before the Senate acted. 695
But, the Court continued, "[t]he actual question before us ... is a different
one. It is whether an Indiana recount of votes in the 1970 election is a valid
exercise of the State's power ... .696
On February 23, 1972, the Court handed down its opinion. It began by
rejecting Hartke's claim that the appeal was moot, given that the Senate
had already admitted him provisionally. Because the Senate had "post-
poned" its final decision on this issue, the Court had little difficulty recog-697
nizing a live controversy. After holding that the Anti-Injunction Act did• 698
not preclude the relief granted below, it proceeded to the merits of the
case.
The district court had justified the injunction on two distinct grounds.
First, it had concluded that those who undertook the recount "would be
judging the qualifications of a member of the Senate," describing this as "a• ,,699
usurpation of the power that only the Senate could exercise. Second, it
had found that the recount presented a sufficient danger of degradation of
the ballots that it would "hinder[] the Senate's exercise" of its power.00
The Court rejected both of these grounds for the injunction. States
have broad authority to regulate elections, the Court said, subject only to• 701
such regulations as Congress may adopt. Although the Court acknowl-
edged that a recount and the Senate's exercise of its privilege were "not
totally inseparable," it nevertheless recognized-much like the Court in
693 See Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 18; see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 419.
Roudebush and the Attorney General were able to take an appeal directly to the Supreme
Court because a three-judge district court had convened to hear the case. See Roudebush, 405
U.S. at 18 n.4 (citing z8 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (West 1970)).
694 118 CONo. REc. 7 (Jan. 21, 1971 )(Senator Bayh); see also BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note
226, at 419.
695 Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 19.
696 Id.
697 Id.
698 Id. at 23.
699 Id. at 23-24.
700 Id. at 24.
701 See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. i).
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Fuller-that "a recount can be said to 'usurp' the Senate's function only if
it frustrates the Senate's ability to make an independent final judgment."7 2
In other words, the recount would only have to stop if it would somehow
prevent the Senate from deciding for itself. This not being the case, the re-
count could continue and the injunction was improper. As the Court went
on to note, "[t]he Senate is free to accept or reject the apparent winner in
either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct its own recount." The Court
concluded its analysis by refusing to assume that the recount Roudebush
had requested would somehow impair the Senate's determinations.
The recount sustained Hartke's victory. On June 12, Hartke acted to
"terminate" the matter, and on July 24, Senator Howard W. Cannon of Ne-
vada, chairman of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, which by
then took jurisdiction over such matters, announced that Hartke was "the
duly elected Senator from the State of Indiana and [was] entitled without
reservation or qualification to his seat in the Senate."
05
Like Fuller, Roudebush turned on the distinction between a proceeding
in advance of a legislative determination and the legislative determination
itself. Because the earlier proceeding simply yields prima facie evidence
of election, it does not interfere with exercise of the privilege.
c. O'Hara v. Powell.-Another interesting case in this category is 0'Hara
v. Powell.7°6 In this case, O'Hara sought a seat in the United States House of
Representatives from North Carolina. Believing that electoral officials had
improperly excluded certain favorable precincts from their canvass, causing
the certificate to issue to the wrong person, O'Hara sought mandamus to
compel them to reconvene and perform their count anew. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina refused relief, however, justifying its decision on
two distinct grounds. First, the Court observed that mandamus was an in-
adequate and clumsy remedy for the alleged errors, particularly given the
amount of time that had transpired since the election. Were the Court to
award mandamus, it observed, local returns might change, but local officials
lacked authority to grant certificates of election. In other words, O'Hara
would have to seek mandamus yet again against officials at a higher level
708
of government.
Second, the Court emphasized that nothing the administrative or ex-
ecutive officials of North Carolina could do or fail to do could prevent the
702 Id. at 25.
703 Id. at 25-26 (footnotes omitted).
704 See id. at 26.
705 See 118 CONG. REC. 25,022 (July 21, 1972); see also BUTLER& WOLFF, supra note 226, at
420; Rowland L. Young, Supreme Court Report, 58 A.B.A. J. 510, 514 (May 1972).
706 O'Hara v. Powell, 80 N.C. 103 (1879).
707 See id. at so6.
708 See id. at Io6-07.
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House of Representatives from entertaining a contest. "In the election of a
member of the general assembly, or a representative in congress," it noted,
"contesting claims to a seat must be tried before the body to which the
certificate of election or commission accredits the person holding it, and
the decision there made is final and irreversible."
If [O'Hara's opponent in the election], to whom we must assume the com-
mission has been given in accordance with the count and determination of
the board, should take his seat as a member of the house of representatives,
can he be disturbed or the relator assisted in his efforts to displace him by
any action which the court is competent to take? The power to do this re-
sides exclusively in the house, and in our opinion not less so after the case
has passed beyond further control of the state and its officers by the issuing
709
of the commission.
At bottom, the Court's refusal to provide relief on these grounds reflects
the rule against advisory opinions. If a court perceived the awarding of
prima facie evidence of election as inherently preliminary-and therefore
incompetent to readjust the rights of the parties-because of the legisla-
ture's ultimate authority, it might deny jurisdiction and leave the plaintiff
to his or her legislative remedy. On the other hand, prima facie evidence of
709 See id. at io8. For other cases in this general vein, see O'Ferrall v. Colby, z Minn.
18o, 188-89 (1858) ("Another position urged by the defense is, that, as by the constitution
the senate is made the judge of the election and eligibility of its members, no other tribunal
can or ought to take jurisdiction of this case. This position, we think, is sufficiently answered
by the fact that this is not a proceeding to try the right of any party to the office of senator,
but simply to determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled, at the hands of the defendant,
to certificates of election to that office. Nor can our decision in the least affect the question
of the election of either of the candidates. That question can be definitely settled by the
senate alone. The aid of this court is sought to prevent the consequences of an usurpation of
authority on the part of this board of canvassers, and to compel the defendant to do his duty.
All that we can do is to arm the parties entitled, with the credentials necessary to enable them
properly to assert their rights before the proper tribunal. Whether they, or either of them,
were legally elected is not a question here. One candidate may be entitled to a certificate of
election, while his opponent may have a clear right to the office."); State ex rel. MeDill v. Bd.
of State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498, 505 (1874) ("We cannot determine the right to the office,
but only the duty of the board of state canvassers in respect to the canvass. The power to
determine the right is, by the constitution of the United States, vested exclusively in the
house of representatives. Hence we cannot go behind the returns and investigate and correct
frauds and mistakes, and adjudge which of the candidates was elected, but can only determine
whether the board of state canvassers ought to include in its canvass and statement of the
votes cast for representative in congress those returned from Wood county. This proposition
is not controverted." (citation omitted)).
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election is hardly meaningless,1 nor can courts ever know with certainty
that their decisions will have operative effect."'
d. Missouri ex rel. Carrington v. Human.-Missouri ex rel. Carrington v.
Human falls into the same general category as O'Hara, in that in this case
as well the Court refused to reach the merits due to the preliminary nature
of the relief it was asked to provide."' In this case, Carrington and Whit-
more were Democrats running for the same seat in Missouri's house of
representatives. After Whitmore defeated Carrington in the primary, Car-
rington established in court that Whitmore did not reside in the district and
obtained an order excluding him from the ballot for the general election.
Because Carrington's name as well was not on the ballot, and because no
Republican had thrown a hat into the ring, the general election depended
entirely on write-in votes, in which Whitmore again defeated Carrington.
After the general election, Carrington obtained a preliminary writ of pro-
hibition from a lower court to prevent the boards of election in the district
from transmitting Whitmore's totals to the secretary of state. Before the
writ became absolute, the Supreme Court of Missouri took up the case."'
To Carrington, the issue presented was whether the boards could in-
form the secretary of state of Whitmore's votes when their members knew,
both constructively and actually, that a court had found Whitmore ineli-
gible to serve. The Court, however, looked at the proceeding from a
very different perspective, ultimately predicated on Missouri's version of
the privilege. To the Court, the real issue in the case was not whether Car-
rington deserved to have his totals transmitted, but whether a judicial offi-
cer could award relief that would prevent the ultimate tribunal from having
a particular category of information at its disposal.'] Given the scope of the
legislative privilege, the Court observed, no form of judicial relief could
readjust the rights of the parties in a permanent way.
7 10 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman's Guide to the Electoral Count Act
Of 1887, FLA. L. REV. 541, 571 (2004) ("That the governor's certificate of election was not
conclusive did not mean that it was of no value.").
711 See Gordon C. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and
Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1189, 1247 ("[Tjhe hypothesis that
the Constitution prohibits federal courts from issuing opinions which mayprove unnecessary is
clearly false. Any opinion ultimately may prove to have been unnecessary as a result of a wide
variety of circumstances including the winning party's decision to ignore it.").
712 Missouri ex rel. Carrington v. Human, 544 S.W.zd 538 (Mo. 1976).
713 Seeid. at 539.
714 See id.
715 See id. ("Relator's formulation fails to recognize the more crucial threshold question
of our power and right to pass upon the issue presented-that is, whether, in the face of
[Missouri's version of the privilege], we should interfere with the forwarding of the write-in
vote totals received by the candidates, including intervenor, from the election boards to the
Secretary of State.")
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There is nothing a court can do to prevent the general election from bring-
ing [Missouri's version of the privilege] into effect .... The passage of
time and occurrence of events often render undecidable causes of action
at various stages of the judicial process, and courts recognize this process
by various names such as mootness, nonjusticiability, political question, or
lack of jurisdiction. In any of these cases, the court is powerless to regain
its ability to decide.716
e. Hayes v. Gill.-As the foregoing cases illustrate, courts asked to re-
solve an electoral dispute pertaining to a seat in the legislature have two
basic options consistent with separation of powers. One is to proceed to
judgment, recognizing that the decision, although competent to furnish a
candidate with prima facie evidence of election, will not bind the legisla-
ture. The other is to refuse jurisdiction on the ground that courts should
not render decisions that may not be fully implemented. But a small num-
ber of courts, in fact perhaps as few as two, have suggested a third alterna-
tive, under which a court exercises jurisdiction on the premise that the leg-
islature will not act inconsistently with its earlier conclusion. Although this
alternative has obvious appeal, given courts' customary expectation that
their decisions will be fully implemented, it fails to appreciate the text,
history, theory, and precedent supporting the privilege.
Hayes v. Gill falls in this third category."' Hayes, who sought a seat in
Hawaii's house of representatives, expected to complete her third year as a
resident of the state on January 10, 1971,718 three years being the length of
residence required for service in that body.719 The regular session for the
term for which she sought election would begin ten days later, on January
20,72 but a statute appeared to require her to certify, as a condition for ac-
cess to the ballot, that she would be eligible to serve as of the general elec-
tion, which would take place on November 3, 1970. 71' Because she could
not so certify, the lieutenant governor of the state, Gill, refused to put her
name on the ballot.
722
In proceedings before the Supreme Court of Hawaii, Hayes raised two
points of relevance to this article. First, she argued that the constitution
716 Id. at 540. For another case in this vein, see Indiana ex nel. Wheeler v. Shelby Circuit
Court, 362 N.E.zd 477, 480 (Ind. 1977) ("[The privilege] effectively prevents the courts of
this state from engaging in cooperative efforts together with the Legislature to determine the
correct outcome of elections for legislative offices .... ).
717 Hayes v. Gill, 473 P.2d 872 (1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Hayes v. Lieutenant
Governor of Haw., 401 U.S. 968 (1970.
718 See id. at 874.
719 See id. (quoting HAw. CONsT. art. III, § 6).
720 See id.
721 See id. (quoting HAw. REV. STAT. Ann. § 12-3(6) (LexisNexis 1970)).
722 See id. at 875.
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required three years' residence before the beginning of the legislature's
regular session, not before the general election. Second, she argued that
excluding her from the ballot would interfere with the house's authority to
determine the eligibility of its members. Although the Court could have
rejected both arguments without deviating from the pattern established by
other courts, it did not do so.
Rejecting Hayes's first argument, the Court construed the statute to
do nothing more than reflect the constitutional requirement for residency
and expressed concern that an emergency might require her to attend a
session before she was eligible to serve. 71 4 "Petitioner's argument ignores
the possibility," it noted, "that there may be an emergency which requires
the calling of a special session between the date of the general election and
the convening of the first regular session .... ." "It may well be," it went on
to note, "that the emergency which requires the convening of such special
session will involve a situation where the need of the constituents to be. , 725
effectively represented is the greatest." Rush Holt's detractors could not
have put the matter more succinctly in the Senate of the United States in
1935.
Rejecting Hayes's second argument, the Court took the position that
the house's power to judge its members' qualifications did not include a
power to construe those qualifications contrary to a prior judicial construc-
tion. Although the Court acknowledged that the houses of Congress had in
the past assumed such an authority, it went on to state that "such actions do
not establish that each house in fact has such power." Taking Powell v. Mc-
Cormack as its cue, the Court concluded that, were the question presented
to the Supreme Court of the United States, it would hold that "the power
of each house to judge the qualifications of its members does not include
the power to construe the constitutional provision on qualifications con-
trary to the construction of the court."'7 27
This conclusion is acutely vulnerable to criticism. First, as a matter of
judicial practice, the Court should not have reached a constitutional issue
of such magnitude where the circumstances did not so require. Like virtu-
ally every other court to address an issue of this type, the Court could have,
and should have, emphasized the distinction between denying access to
the ballot, on the one hand, and determining the eligibility of would-be
members to serve in the legislature, on the other, and concluded its analysis
at this point. In fact, not only should it have taken this step as a matter of
judicial practice, in the process of doing so it might also have taken note of
the fact that no legislature in the history of the United States appears ever
723 See id.
724 See id. at 876.
725 Id.
726 See supra notes 43o-66 and accompanying text.
727 Hayes, 473 P.2d at 876.
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to have admitted as a member an individual who has not stood for elec-
tion.
Second, the Court's analysis is exceedingly light, and indeed practically
nonexistent, apart from speculation as to how the Supreme Court of the
United States might extend Powellv. McCormack. The Court can surely take
the position that mere construction of the qualifications for office does not
translate into a legitimate power to do so, but it still must explain why such
a practice is wrong. This is particularly true where the houses of Congress
have not only on occasion assumed a power to construe the qualifications
for service set forth in the federal Constitution but have in fact made such
construction the warp and woof of their debates. In re Gallatin, for example,
would have made no sense if the Senate lacked authority to determine how
one becomes a "Citizen of the United States,"" and In re Ames would have
been an exercise in the fantastic if the Senate could not decide for itself
what constituted becoming an "[i]nhabitant" of a state for purposes of ser-
vice in that body." 9 And this was true most of all for such proceedings as In
re Shields and Hatfieldv. Holt (as well as, somewhat obliquely, In re Gallatin),
in which the precise issue presented was when the would-be member had
to possess the prerequisites for membership. The degree of ahistoricism
and inattentiveness to legislative practice displayed by the Supreme Court
of Hawaii in Hayes v. Gill was thus more than slight and more than a little
objectionable. "[O]ne of the striking pecularities of our history ... ," James
Boyd White once observed, is that "our constitutional discourse has been
most fully developed by the courts."7 30 In writing this, White's point of
emphasis instead might have been that courts, at least in cases like Hayes v.
Gill, have a tendency to overlook constitutional discourse that is not their
own. In doing this, their degree of solicitousness for the other branches of
government is open to criticism.
To be sure, the Court in Hayes v. Gill limited its observations to situa-
tions in which a court has previously held a particular individual ineligible
to serve, but this limitation appears to float in mid-air. If the legislature
lacks authority to construe the qualifications for service, that absence of
authority would apply in the presence or absence of a prior judicial de-
termination. In any case, the Supreme Court of Hawaii's rationale on this
point appears to mistake comity-a voluntary principle-for separation of
powers, and in fact appears to stand separation of powers on its head, pre-
serving it as a rule of decision except where another branch deems its prior
determination preclusive. "[Tihe necessary date for the fulfillment of the
728 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. See supra notes 227-68 and accompanying text for a
discussion of In re Gallatin.
729 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. See supra notes 314-45 and accompanying text for a
discussion of In re Ames.
730 JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 247 (1984).
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residency requirement set forth in [Hawaii's Constitution]," noted Justice
Levinson in his dissent in Hayes, "is open to conflicting interpretations."
"In the light of the [privilege's] clear language," he argued, "I think it is
apparent that the State constitution has delegated to the house of repre-
sentatives the right to make a final determination as to when the residency
requirement.., must be met by its members." '731
Contrary to the view taken in Hayes, courts working in this area have
almost universally recognized that, due to its plenary nature, exercise of the
privilege will sometimes yield inconsistent legislative and judicial determi-
nations. In People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney,"' for example, Mahaney argued
that the exercise of the privilege could not be exclusive because other-
wise legislatures might reach conclusions of law inconsistent with those of
courts. Without denying this possibility, the Supreme Court of Michigan
nevertheless confirmed the privilege's exclusive nature. "It may happen,"
it noted, "that with each house, not only deciding for itself questions of
fact, but also construing for itself the law, we may sometimes witness the
extraordinary spectacle of the two bodies construing and enforcing the law
differently, while a third construction is enforced by the courts upon the
public at large." "But with this possibility in view," it went on to state, "the
evils of allowing the courts a supervisory power over the decisions of the
houses upon the admission of members, are so great and so obvious that it
is not surprising that the framers of the constitution refrained from confer-
ring the power."3 4 Continuing, the Court observed that "[iut can make
no difference that in this case, according to the pleas, the question passed
upon by the house was purely a question of law. The question of the legal
election of a member is usually a question compounded of law and fact, and
the house must necessarily pass upon both." "In [Mahaney]," the highest
court of Kentucky noted some 100 years later, "it was pointed out that the
legislature and the courts might have conflicting views as to the qualifica-
tions of a member of that body but that the exclusive power to make the
final determination had been lodged in the legislature by the Constitu-
tion.""'
731 Hayes, 473 P.2d at 88o (Levinson, J., dissenting); see also id. ("The residency
requirement is one of the constitutionally listed qualifications for membership in the house of
representatives, and the constitution plainly states that each house shall judge the qualifications
of its own members. To sit in judgment necessarily implies the power to interpret the law
affecting the case...."). Justice Levinson discussed In re Gallatin, In re Shields, and Haifieldv.
Holtat some length. See id. at 88o-8i.
732 People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (1865).
733 Seeid. at 493-94. Mahaney's precise argument was that the House of Representatives
would have lacked authority to make a statute adverse to him operate immediately without
the votes of several members who, he argued, were not eligible to serve. See id. at 491-92.
734 Id. at 493-94-
735 Id. at 494.
736 Raney v. Stovall, 361 S.W.zd 518, 522 (Ky. 1962); see also id. at 523 ("[T]he fact that
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Finally, the Supreme Court of Hawaii's purported extrapolation from
Powell was essentially repudiated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Roudebush v. Hartke.7 37 In Roudebush, the Court recognized the au-
thority of the houses of Congress to adjudicate questions pertaining to the
eligibility of prospective members as plenary and exclusive, apart from the
power to impose unstated qualifications. As may be recalled, the Roudebush
Court permitted a recount to proceed in the courts of Indiana, notwith-
standing the federal Senate's authority to judge the "elections" and "re-
turns" of its members, because the Senate was "free to accept or reject the
apparent winner" and even "to conduct its own recount" if it so chose.
78
This would entail, one would have to conclude, defining the terms "elec-
tion" and "return," including such concepts internal to these words as "bal-
lot" and "valid ballot." '739
2. Actions to Exclude People from the Legislature.-Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines quo warranto as "[a] common-law writ used to inquire into the author-
ity by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed." '  Although
this writ evolved as a means to contest virtually any claim to public office,
it never has extended to seats in the legislature. "Following English prac-
tice," writes Stephen A. Siegel, "the only exception [to the broad scope of
quo warranto] was legislative office because, by common-law tradition, the
legislature itself was the appropriate tribunal for determining the elections
and qualifications of its own members."'7 4 The cases reflect this principle,
even when litigants do not resort to quo warranto by name.
a. Kansas ex rel. Attorney General v. Tomlinson.-Perhaps the most
powerful example of a court refusing to exclude someone from the legis-
the legislature may make a wrong decision is no reason why the judiciary should invade what
has been designated as the exclusive domain of another department of government.").
737 Roudebush v. Hartke, 495 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1972).
738 Id. at 25.
739 Only one court appears to have reiterated the dictum of Hayes v. Gill, and courts
typically cite Hayes for the uncontroversial proposition that the judiciary may entertain cases
in advance of an election. In Comerv. Ashe, 514 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1974), the Supreme Court
ofTennessee held that Coiner's name could not appear on the ballot because of his age. See id.
at 741 ("We do not hold that [Ashe] is ineligible to sit in the Senate on or after January i, 1975;
merely that he is ineligible prior to that time and, being ineligible, is not qualified to have his
name appear upon the ballot."). Taking up the question of the privilege, the Court then went
on to observe that the Senate should not "nullify, abrogate or alter any prior determination
made by the courts." Id. As in Hayes, the Court could have, and should have, relied on its
authority to govern access to the ballot and pretermitted the delicate question of the extent of
the Senate's authority. Moreover, in adopting the language of Hayes as its own, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee overlooked the history, precedent, and theory underlying the privilege as
much as the Supreme Court of Hawaii had in Hayes.
740 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1285 (8th ed. 2004).
741 Siegel, supra note 71o, at 570.
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lature is Kansas ex rel. Attorney General v. Tomlinson.14 In this case, Kansas's
expanding population had put its house of representatives in something
of a quandary. As new counties organized and voters took to the polls,
people arrived at the capital with indicia of election but without a clear seat
to occupy. Although the constitution authorized and in fact required the
house to "admit one member from each county in which at least [250] legal
votes were cast at the nexyt receding general election," 4 1 it also limited
the house to 125 members. In addition, it provided that "each organized
county in which less than [2001 votes were cast at the next preceding gen-
eral election shall be attached to [the district to the 
east]."
These provisions were clumsy, to say the least. For one thing, once 250
people had cast legal votes in enough new counties, the house would have
to choose between discharging its duty to admit new members and its duty
to observe the upper limit of 125. Second, the constitution appeared to
overlook counties in which more than 199 but fewer than 250 legal votes
had been cast. Did they attach? Did they wait in limbo until they amassed
250 voters?' 46 Third, the document did not specify how counties with small
populations "attached," and the legislature had enacted no enabling stat-
ute in that regard.147 Finally, even if attachment were a simple matter, it
presumably would not occur until electoral officials saw that fewer than 250
legal votes had been cast in a particular county, and thus the voters of the
attaching county would have had no role in choosing the representative
from the more heavily populated county to the east who in theory repre-
sents them.
Some of these concerns played out in the elections of 1876. When the
house convened in 1877, 127 people appeared seeking admission, includ-
ing 123 representatives-elect from established districts and from four new
counties-Rooks, Barbour, Edwards, and Rush.748 The number of legal
votes cast in these four counties at thepreceding general election had been,
respectively, 161, 199, 336, and 143. Arguably, the house should have
admitted only the member-elect from Edwards County, but this option
presumably would have left the voters of the other three counties without
having had a direct role in the election of any member of the house. No
solution being perfect, the house decided to admit all four, including W.P.
Tomlinson, member-elect from Rush County.50
742 Kansas ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Tomlinson, 2o Kan. 692, 1878 WL *i (1878).
743 Id. at *1 (quoting KA. CONST. art. II, § 2 (as amended in 1873)).
744 Seeaid. (citing KAN. CONsT. art. II, § 2 (as amended in 1873)).
745 Id. (quoting KArN. CONsT. art. II, § 2 (as amended in 1873)).
746 See id. (reporter's footnote).
747 See id. (reporter's footnote).
748 See id. at *3.
749 See id. at *2.
750 See id. at *3.
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Aware that its actions implicated the constitution, the house, along with
the senate, authorized a joint committee to "inquire into the constitutional-
ity of the present legislature" and, if necessary, to "prepare a case for the
supreme court [so] that this question may be settled." In particular, the
committee was charged to "ask the supreme court to decide what mem-
bers are not entitled to their seats . . . ." Unable to prepare a case before
adjournment, the committee asked the attorney general of the state to do
so. That officer then sought quo warranto, alleging that Tomlinson unlaw-
fully held office.75 3 Although the Supreme Court of Kansas acknowledged
both the deplorable nature of the situation and the legislature's decision to
seek its advice, it nevertheless held that it could not provide relief given
the scope and exclusivity of the legislative privilege at issue:
That our decision ... may not be misunderstood, or misconstrued, we desire
to say, that we do not decide that the house of representatives can consist
of more than [1251 members ... but our decision is, that whether the house
does or does not admit a greater number of persons as members than [1251,
this court has no jurisdiction to inquire by quo warranto, or otherwise, as to
the right of any person to a seat as a member with a view of ousting him
from his seat.
The Court also emphasized the absence of contrary authority:
We are not cited to a single case in the federal or state courts, where any
member of congress, or any member of a state legislature, from the founda-
tion of the government to the present time, has been ousted by quo warran-
to. And the admission of this fact of itself, after the extensive investigation
of this subject by the learned attorney-general, is almost conclusive that
none can be found, and that the exercise of such power is not only unwar-
ranted, but unknown.55
75 1 Id. at *4 (quoting 1877 KA. SEN. JOUR.. 265 (Sen. Res. No. 25)).
752 See id.
753 See id.
754 Id. at *9;see also id. at *8 ("This power is exclusively vested in each house, and cannot
by its own consent, or by legislative action, be vested in any other tribunal or officer.").
Although the Attorney General made a credible argument that the Court should
distinguish a determination whether someone is eligible to serve from a determination
whether a seat exists in which to serve, see id. at *5, counsel for Tomlinson noted that the
House of Representatives of the United States had in the past decided whether a district
existed for the purposes of electing a member. See id. at *6--7.
755 Id. at *8. The Tomlinson Court distinguished the case of Prouty v. Stover, i i Kan. 235
0873), on the ground that, in that case, the legislature had been acting in a non-legislative,
electoral capacity. See Tomlinson, 1878 WL 986, at *9.
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b. Heller v. Legislature of Nevada.-The situation presented in Tomlin-
son was obviously extreme, and most likely would not occur in an era such
as ours when legislatures do not expand in size. But the trope on which the
Court relied-the complete absence of contrary precedent-is a staple of
holdings in this area. A recent example with less striking facts is Heller v.• 756
Legislature of the State of Nevada. In Heller, the secretary of state of Nevada
sought mandamus to challenge certain people's service in both the legisla-757
tive and executive branches of state government. Construing the action
as a quo warranto, and assuming arguendo the absence of other flaws in the
petition, the Supreme Court of Nevada nevertheless denied relief on the
basis of separation of powers. As the Court noted, "any attempt through
a judicial proceeding to exclude or oust executive branch employees from
the legislature is barred by the separation of powers."758 Like the Court
in Tomlinson, the Court in Heller noted the complete absence of contrary
precedent: "The Secretary has not identified, nor are we aware of, any case
in which the separation-of-powers barrier was breached to oust a member
of the legislature for any reason, including dual service."
759
c. Taylor v. Beckham.-Given that Stephenson v. Woodward arose in Ken-
tucky, we would be remiss to conclude this portion of the article without760
mentioning Taylorv. Beckham, a famous case in which Kentucky's highest
court denied relief to an aggrieved contestee, albeit one who had been ex-
cluded from the office of governor. Although the case was not technically
a quo warranto, it was an attempt to overturn the legislature's resolution
of a contested election and thus approximated such an action. Moreover,
even though the case does not concern a legislature's authority to decide
contested elections among its own members, Taylor v. Beckham does dem-
onstrate that courts have tended to view legislatures' constitutionally del-
egated powers to decide election contests in the most sacrosanct of lights.
Kentucky is one of many states in which contests arising from guberna-
torial elections go to the legislature. Although resolving such contests does
not literally partake of the privilege we have been discussing, it implicates
many of the same principles of majoritarian democracy and separation of
powers, in that it empowers an otherwise political body to sit in a judicial
capacity. Indeed, the constitutional provision that authorizes this proce-
756 Heller v. Legislature of the State of Nevada, 93 P3d 746 (Nev. 2004).
757 See id. at 748.
758 Id. at 756-57.
759 Id. at 754. Although the Heller Court preliminarily concluded that quo warranto may
lie against a legislator, see id. at 751-52, it went on to hold that separation of powers would not
permit a court to exclude or oust individuals from a legislature. See id. at 756-57.
760 Taylor v. Beckham, 56 SW. 177 (Ky.), appeal dismissed, 178 U.S. 548 (19oo).
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dure is functionally identical to the provision that recognizes the legislative
761
privilege to decide whether members are eligible to serve.
The gubernatorial election of November 7, 1899, between incumbent
State Senator William Goebel, a Democrat, and Attorney General William
762
S. Taylor, a Republican, was bitter and close. When the official count
was in, Taylor appeared to have prevailed. 761 "[Tihis was the signal," noted
Thomas D. Clark, "for Democrats to start challenging votes":
It was claimed that [incumbent] Governor Bradley's troops had prevented
an honest election in Louisville. Most outrageous of all, however, was the
fact that by political chicanery or "oversight," votes of many eastern Re-
publican counties were registered on "tissue paper" ballots, which, it was
claimed, were not printed on legal weight paper. This charge, a fine piece ofS764
Kentucky chicanery, was trumped up to throw out the election.
The matter then went to a special board that the legislature had recently
established on Goebel's initiative. Although believed by many to be pre-
disposed to find for Goebel, 76S on December 9 the board determined by a766
split vote that Taylor in fact had won by more than 2000 votes. Three
days later, Taylor assumed office, with John Marshall as his lieutenant gov-767
ernor.
On January 3, 1900, just after the legislature convened, Representative
G.W. Hickman and Senator L.H. Carter laid the contest of Goebel v. Taylor
before the house and senate respectively.M As specific grounds for the
761 Compare Ky. CONST. § 38 ("Each House of the General Assembly shall judge of
the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, but a contested election shall be
determined in such manner as shall be directed by law.") with id. § 90 ("Contested elections
for Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall be determined by both Houses of the General
Assembly, according to such regulations as may be established by law.").
762 See THOMAS D. CLARK, A HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 431-32 (1954); KENTUCKY'S
GOVERNORS, 1792-1985, at 1 I I (Lowell H. Harrison ed., 1985) [hereinafter Harrison]; 2 SAMUEL
M. WILSON, HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 547 (1928) ("It was a fight to the finish and the campaign
lasted right up to the last minute.").
763 See WILSON, supra note 762, at 547.
764 CLARK, supra note 762, at 432.
765 See CLARK, supra note 762, at 429 ("Senator Goebel virtually had the Kentucky
electorate in his power, since he was entrusted, as a reward for his activities, with the selection
of the first state election board."); Harrison, supra note 762, at 114 (describing the "so-called
Goebel election law") ("Designed as a reform measure to insure fair elections, it centralized
powers under an election commission, which was manned by three allies of Goebel.")
766 See CLARK, supra note 762, at 433; Harrison, supra note 762, at I 1 i; WILSON, supra
note 762, at 547; see also Taylor v. Beckham, 56 S.W. 177, 184 (Ky.), appeal dismissed, 178 U.S.
548 (19oo).
767 See CLARK, supra note 762, at 433; Harrison, supra note 762, at I 1i.
768 KY. HOUSE JOUR. 45 (Jan. 3, 19oo); KY. SEN. JOUR. 60 (Jan. 3, 19oo). Goebel's running
mate, J.C.W. Beckham, brought a similar contest against John Marshall for the office of
Lieutenant Governor. See KY. HOUSE JOUR. at 52 (Jan. 3, 19oo). Given the similarity of the
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contest, Goebel alleged various electoral irregularities and corrupt practic-
es, including the use of "transparent" ballots and the unlawful calling out
of the militia. 69 The next day, a committee of eight representatives and
three senators was chosen and began deliberating. For a variety of rea-
sons, Taylor and his supporters objected to the comrosition and proceed-
ings of the board and anticipated an adverse report.
Matters then took a turn very much for the worse. On January 30, Goe-
bel was shot while walking toward the capitol. Taylor promptly called out
the militia, which prevented legislators from entering the capitol.7 73 Later
that day, he also declared a state of insurrection and required the legislature
774to meet in London, Kentucky, quite a distance away. Undaunted, the
Democrats met in a nearby hotel, adopted the board's report, which had
been favorable to Goebel, and resolved the contest accordingly.
77 5
Whether this occurred in a regular manner is not entirely clear. On
that question, noted Samuel M. Wilson in 1928, "there has never been any
contests, however, we will refer only to Goebelv. Taylor.
769 Ky. HOUSE JOUR. 46-48 (Jan. 3, 19oo); Ky. SEN. JOUR. 61-62 (Jan. 3, 1900).
770 See Ky. HOUSE JOUR. 71-72 (Jan. 4, 19oo); Ky. SEN. JOUR. 105-o6 (Jan. 4, 1900).
771 See CLARK, supra note 762, at 433 (noting the board was chosen by lot) ("Only fate
could have defeated the Democrats in this drawing, since they dominated the legislature. One
Republican and one Populist were chosen. The other members were Democrats."); LOWELL
H. HARRISON & JAMES C. KLOT'rER, A NEW HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 271 (1997) ("An investigating
committee was formed, and in what was likely a prearranged drawing, ten of the eleven names
picked were Democrats. Republicans expected the committee to recommend removal of
enough ballots so Goebel would have a majority ...."); see also Harrison, supra note 762, at
I 1i; WILSON, supra note 762, at 550 ("[Tlhe outlook for the republicans ... before the contest
board ... was gloomy and discouraging."). On January 15, Senator N. T. Howard introduced a
resolution in the Senate to discharge the three senators from the board, producing an affidavit
from Taylor to the effect that the drawing of names for the board had been fraudulent, that
several of the board's members were partial to Goebel, and that the board was improperly
preventing him from making his case. See Ky. SEN. JOUR. 189-92 (Jan. 15, 19oo). After Howard
spoke, Senator Carter proposed to refer Howard's motion, along with Taylor's affidavit, to
the Committee on the Judiciary. Howard acceded to this substitute with some changes, and
the Senate adopted the substitute, as amended, with only one dissenting vote. See id. at 192.
On January 16, the matter came back to the floor but then returned to committee. See id. at
200-01.
772 See CLARK, supra note 762, at 434 (noting that Goebel was "shot through the abdomen
by a rifleman concealed somewhere in the capitol office building"); Harrison, supra note 762, at
115; WILSON, supra note 762, at 55 1-52 ("As soon as the wounded man could receive attention,
it was discovered that his injuries were serious and little hope of his recovery was entertained
by the physicians in attendance.").
773 See Ky. SEN. JOUR. 295 (Jan. 31, 19OO) ("At IO:3O o'clock the senators proceeded to
the senate chamber but were refused admission thereto by D. R. Collier, Adjutant-General of
Kentucky, accompanied by armed men. The senators then proceeded to the Capitol Hotel
in Frankfort, Kentucky"); see also Harrison, supra note 762, at 115; WILSON, supra note 762, at
552-
774 See WILSON, supra note 762, at 553.
775 See CLARK, supra note 762, at 434; WILSON, supra note 762, at 554.
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agreement among the rival political parties or among historians of the pe-
riod." "But in their practical effect," he observed, "the meetings so held
were as effectual as if they had been called and held in the regular way
under the roof of the Capitol building itself. ' 776 Writing more recently,
James C. Klotter has concluded unequivocally that the proceedings were in• 1777
fact clandestine. The Journals themselves suggest no irregularity, how-.... 778
ever, noting that the speaker called a joint session on January 3 1, that the779 . 780
members came to order, that the report was received, and that it was• 781
adopted without dissent.• 782
Goebel quickly took office, but died just a few days later, Beckham
taking his place•.7 " Taking issue with alleged irregularities in the resolution
of the contest, Taylor took his case to court but was unsuccessful. Despite
claims that the legislature had failed to conduct the contest according to
784
established principles of law, the Court refused to reach the merits, not-
776 WILSON, supra note 762, at 554.
777 See HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 771, at 272 (chapter written by Klotter)
("Gathering secretly in the hotel [where Goebel had been taken], with no Republicans
present, they accepted the contest committee's report regarding the disputed election, threw
out enough votes to reverse the results, and on January 31, 19oo, declared Goebel governor.");
Harrison, supra note 762, at 1 15 (entry written by Klotter); JAMES C. KLOTTER, WILLIAM GOEBEL:
THE POLITICS OF WRATH 104 (1977) ("[Wlord came privately to each Democratic member to
meet in the Capitol Hotel that evening. The instructions asked them to assemble separately,
not in groups, and then to come one by one to a second floor room."); id. ("A quorum of
nineteen senate Democrats and fifty-three from the house was announced as present, though
those attending were not certain of the numbers.").
778 See Ky. HousE JOUR. 296-97 (Jan. 31, 19oo); Ky. SEN. JOUR. 296 (Jan. 31, 1900).
779 See Ky. HousE JoUR. 297 (Jan. 31, 19oo); Ky. SEN. JOUR. 296 (Jan. 31, 1900).
780 See Ky. HOUSE JoUR. 297 (Jan. 31, 1900) ("[W]e have heard all the evidence offered by
both parties, and we now respectfully report ... that in our opinion William Goebel was legally
elected Governor...."); Ky. SEN. JOUR. 296-97 (Jan. 31, 1900).
781 See Ky. HOUSE JouR. 298-99 (Jan. 3 1, 1 900); id. at 299 (House vote) ("In the negative
-none."); Ky. SEN. JOUR. 297-98 (Jan. 31, 19oo); id. at 298 (Senate vote) ("In the negative
-none."). Although the Journals appear regular on their faces, they do contain much by
way of belt and suspenders, suggesting at least some anxiety on members' parts. See, e.g., Ky.
HOUSE JOUR. 307 (Feb. 2, i9oo) (House adopts report and recognizes Goebel as Governor); id.
at 311 (House concurs with Senate in adopting report and recognizing Goebel as Governor);
id. at 313 (House adopts report); id. at 377 (Feb. 20, 19oo) (House ratifies the actions of January
31); id. at 386 (House and Senate ratify the actions of January 31 in joint session). All these
votes in the House were unanimous or nearly so, except the vote of February 20 to ratify the
actions of January 31. This passed by a margin of 55-40. See id. at 377-78.
782 See WILSON, supra note 762, at 554.
783 See Harrison, supra note 762, at 115; JAMES C. KLOTTER, KENTUCKY: PORTRAIT IN
PARADOX, 1900-1950, at 203 (1996) (noting that Beckham "found himself at Goebel's death
the governor of the state, barely old enough to serve at the age of thirty").
784 See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 56 S.W. 177, 183 (Ky.), appeal dismissed, 178 U.S. 548
(19oo). ("It is also argued that the contest board was not fairly drawn by lot; that certain of the
board were liable to objection on the score of partiality, and that, therefore, this board was not
properly constituted.").
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ing that "these were matters to be determined by the legislature, which
the constitution has made the sole tribunal to determine such a contest.
Whether their decision in these matters was right or wrong we have no
power to inquire.""" Indeed, the Court justified its refusal to scrutinize the
general assembly's action in terms of the privilege recognized in section
38. "Suppose these suits had been brought-by two members of the general
assembly," it wrote, "alleging, in effect, the same facts as are alleged in this
case." "[W]ould anybody suppose that the judiciary of the state would
have the power to go behind the legislative journals," the Court asked, "or
to supervise the propriety of the legislative action, in determining the elec-
tion of its members?":
Could a member of the general assembly, who had received a certificate
from the canvassing board, and been afterwards ousted from the house to
which he belonged on a contest, allege and show that the house had acted
arbitrarily, depriving him of a pre-existing right, and denying to him the
emoluments of the office for the term?786
787
The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the appeal.
Given the historical record, one could plausibly argue that the only real
heroes in Goebel v. Taylor (the contest) and Taylor v. Beckham (the action in
court) were the members of the Court who kept in mind the limits of their. . . 788
office. The governor had no business adjourning the legislature, or ex-
cluding it from its chambers by force of arms, and the legislature might well
have made a mistake in meeting and resolving the contest as it did. But
although the constitution does not authorize the governor to prevent the
legislature from meeting, it does authorize the legislature to resolve con-
tested gubernatorial elections. The Court's decision to stay its hand was
respectful of both the text and purpose of section 90 of the constitution,
notwithstanding what might have been a natural urge to revisit the entire
affair.789
785 Id. at 182.
786 Id. at 184; see also id. at 181 ("We have no more right to supervise the decision of
the general assembly in determining the result of this election than we have to supervise the
action of the governor in calling a special session of the legislature, or in pardoning a criminal,
or the action of the legislature in contracting debts, or determining upon the election of its
members, or doing any other act authorized by the constitution.")
787 See Taylor, 178 U.S. 548.
788 The Court in fact so held. See Taylor, 56 S.W. at 179.
789 See WILSON, supra note 762, at 557 ("There can be little doubt now that the position
taken by the courts, both state and Federal, throughout all the litigation which arose, with
respect to the question of jurisdiction was correct and, in a legal and constitutional point of
view, unassailable, but there can be no question that to many of those at the time concerned,
the rulings seemed harsh and to amount to a practical denial of justice.")
For other examples of a court refusing to entertain an action in the nature of quo warranto
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E. Conclusion
The privilege we set out to explain in this part of the Article is indeed
broad, arising inexorably with the meeting of the body and operating to
the exclusion of other tribunals within its scope. And this is as it should be.
This is not simply a matter of text, although text matters. Nor is it simply
a matter of overwhelming historical practice, recognized by legislators and
judges alike, although that too matters. It is also a matter of theory.
On this point, we can begin with James Madison, who wrote many of
the Federalist Papers. One of Madison's great insights into political theory
was his recognition that true separation of powers depends acutely on in-
dependence in matters of personnel. As he noted in Federalist No. 51, to
establish a "due foundation" for the "separate and distinct exercise of the
different powers of government, it is evident that each department should
have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the
members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appoint-
ment of the members of the others."' 9 In making this observation, Madi-
son took the simple and quite reasonable position that, in hopes of acquir-
ing a position, people will tend to be solicitous of the appointing authority
-eager to please, and careful not to antagonize. To this Madison might
well have added that, after they obtain their positions, people tend to be
solicitous toward those with authority to remove them. As the Supreme
Court of the United States later noted in Bowsherv. Synar, "[o]nce an of-
ficer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the
authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of
his functions, obey."' '
against a member of the legislature, see State ex rel. Rigby v. Junkin, I So.2d 177, 177 (Fla.
1941) ("This Court is without jurisdiction to determine the rights of one who has been
elected a member of the Legislature to hold such office. That question is one which only
the Legislature may determine."); State ex rel. Turner v. Scott, 269 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa
1978) ("This action in quo warranto must eventually rest on a judicial determination that the
defendant was not qualified for the office to which he was elected. The Iowa Constitution
clearly leaves to the Senate the determination as to whether a member is qualified. We
therefore find the controversy to be nonjusticiable and improper for judicial resolution
c ."); f English v. Bryant, 152 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1963) (denying mandamus where petitioner
challenged the right of an incumbent Senator to serve in the legislature); Raney v. Stovall,
361 S.Wzd 518, 521 (Ky. 1962) (requiring the Treasurer of Kentucky to pay a person whom
the Senate of the state had found qualified to serve as a member, although the Treasurer took
the position that the person was not qualified); State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah 1987)
(denying an extraordinary writ sought by the Attorney General of Utah against two members
of the legislature who were employees of the executive branch and a third who had a contract
with that branch after the House had rejected challenges to the qualifications of two of these
members) ("Constitutional procedures have been followed, and we decline to interfere with
or second-guess the action of the House of Representatives.").
790 T E FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
791 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (quoting Synar v. United States,
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In fact, Madison's insight is especially apt for the legislature, which
serves the additional and perhaps unique function of reconstituting and
speaking for the polity. The legislature is the attorney for the people, com-
petent to give their assent to otherwise unpopular measures, such as the
levying of taxes or the declaration of war. As Conrad Russell wrote, "[i]f a
parliament voted a tax, no one could say 'I never agreed to this': every po-
tential protester was legally bound by the act of his representative." The
cry of "[nlo taxation without representation" fails if there is representation.
For the legislature to perform this role, however, the people must perceive
it as their creature, not that of another branch of government. This was one
of the lessons Commons drew from In re Wilkes, and it was one of the points
Adam Clayton Powell's supporters emphasized in In rePowell. Because the
people control their legislature without an intermediary, they are by posit
bound by its decisions. To the extent they perceive this not to be true,
they are that much less bound.9
Nor is this principle evaded by the easy answer that only a member
made subject to litigation in a court of law will feel threatened by or be-
holden to the courts. If one member's seat can become vulnerable any
member's can, and if one member's seat is made vulnerable every mem-
ber of the chamber, or at least every member of the vulnerable member's
party, will become vulnerable to some extent. After all, the legislature and
the courts do not relate to each other in narrow, discrete ways. They in-
teract along a broad range, in matters pertaining to, among other things,
legislative privilege, pensions, redistricting, rules of evidence, rules of civil
procedure, allocation of jurisdiction, substantive elements of crimes and
626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)).
792 See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 85, at 128.
793 See Hexter, supra note 142, at 31 (discussing the contest of Goodwin v. Fortescue)
(noting that Commons defended its privilege by arguing that "[any other order of things
would make it easy to take from Englishmen a freedom that they valued most highly, freedom
through a free Parliament freely to consent to the laws by which they were ruled").
794 See I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
833, at 585 (5th ed. 1905) ("If [the power to judge elections] is lodged in any other than the
legislative body itself, its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may be
destroyed or put into imminent danger. No other body but [the legislature] can have the
same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be so perpetually
watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from infringement, to purify and vindicate its
own character, and to preserve the rights and sustain the free choice of its constituents."); see
also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 211 (2005) ("[In the] unusual
situations involving an individual's right to serve as an officer or congressman-where routine
interference by Article III courts risked inverting the document's grand democratic pyramid
-the Constitution gave legislators power to "try" and "Judge" sundry issues of law and
fact.").
795 See People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494 (1865) ("If we have the power
to review the decision in one case, we have in all."). Mahaney is discussed at length supra notes
732-36 and accompanying text.
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related defenses, educational finance, standards for liability, judicial appro-
priations, and a wide variety of other phenomena. Allowing the courts to
sit in judgment on the qualifications, elections, and returns of members,
particularly where the Constitution explicitly vests this authority in the
legislature, undermines not only text but also legislative independence and
separation of powers.76
III. STEPHENSON V. WOODWARD
A. Introduction
Given the various authorities and historical principles discussed in Part II
of this Article, the decision in Stephenson v. Woodward has simply nowhere
to stand. 97 It departs not only from text, but also from precedent, including
precedent from within Kentucky, from tradition, and from basic notions of
separation of powers.
As may be recalled, two distinct judicial matters preceded this decision.
The first was Woodward's motion under KRS 118.176 in Jefferson Circuit
Court, which she brought on November 1, 2004, the day before the general
election. In this action, Woodward alleged that Stephenson could not serve
in the senate because she had not "resided in" Kentucky for "six years next791
preceding" the election. On November 22, the court agreed, declaring
Stephenson ineligible and prohibiting the local electoral officials from re-
porting votes in her favor. No party sought review of this decision.79 Not
long thereafter, Stephenson initiated a contest in the senate.
The second matter, and in fact the matter on appeal in Stephenson, was
Woodward's separate action for declaratory and injunctive relief in Frank-
lin Circuit Court. In this action, Woodward sought to obtain a certificate
of election, to terminate the contest, to prevent the senate from admitting
Stephenson, and to compel the senate to admit her. Woodward achieved
substantial but not complete success in the lower court in this action, ob-
taining a certificate and also obtaining both a declaration and an injunction
preventing Stephenson from serving. She did not, however, obtain any
relief that would entitle her to a seat in the senate.
796 See generally Gerald T McLaughlin, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Power to Expel,
to Exclude and to Punish, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 43,43 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(noting that the Houses of Congress need the power to expel, exclude, and punish to "maintain
their own institutional integrity and the proper functioning of the legislative process," and
also to "guarantee Congress' existence as a separate but equal branch of government").
797 See Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3 d 162 (Ky. 2005). See supra notes 19-67 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this decision's factual and procedural background.
798 Ky. CONST. § 32.
799 See infra note 889 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
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The issues before the Supreme Court on appeal were essentially five
in number: (1) whether the Jefferson Circuit Court had jurisdiction to
proceed under the statute after the general election; (2) if so, whether it
had authority under the statute to grant relief in the form of an injunction
suppressing Stephenson's votes; (3) whether such jurisdiction and relief, if
valid under the statute, impaired the senate's authority under the consti-
tution; (4) whether, notwithstanding the decision of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, the senate retained power under the constitution to reach an inde-
pendent judgment regarding Stephenson's qualifications; and (5) whether
Woodward was entitled to a seat in the senate. The Court, with Justice
Johnstone writing for the majority, resolved the first two of these issues in
800
the affirmative and last three in the negative.
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging the judiciary's ordinar-
ily limited role in electoral matters, noting that whatever jurisdiction it has
in this area arises from legislative delegation or from the customary opera-801
tion of quo warranto. It then went on to classify KRS 118.176 as a delega-
tion consistent with this scheme, reasoning that by this statute the general
assembly had conferred "sole authority" on the courts to judge the bona
802
fides of candidates, provided the motion is brought before the election.
This provoked the question of whether such "sole authority" would im-
pair the senate's prerogative under the constitution. The Court addressed
this issue by construing this prerogative not to extend to matters resolved
by a court of law before the legislature comes into session. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court laid great stress on the fact that Stephenson was not
literally a "member" of the senate when the Jefferson Circuit Court ren-
dered its decision:
[T]he delegation of authority in KRS 118.176 in no way infringes upon
the constitutional authority of the General Assembly to judge the qualifica-
tions of its members pursuant to Section 38. Stephenson's and Williams'
arguments are predicated upon the fundamentally flawed belief that Ste-
phenson was actually a member of the Senate .... [But] a Senator-elect
only becomes a member of the Senate when his or her term commences
"upon the first day of January of the year succeeding [the] election." This
proscription exists for an obvious reason: so that the terms of the departing
Senator and the Senator-elect do not overlap.
Here, though, when the Jefferson Circuit Court rendered its order find-
ing that Stephenson was not a bona fide candidate and therefore ineligible
800 See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 163. Justice Johnstone was joined in this opinion by
Chief Justice Lambert and by Justices Graves and Wintersheimer. Justice Cooper wrote
separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. See id. at i75 (Cooper, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
8oi See id. at 167 (quoting Noble v. Meagher, 686 S.W.2d 458,460 (Ky. 1985)).
8o2 Id.
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to appear on the ballot, she lost all rights to that office. This determination
was made on November 22, 2004 ... before the term of office which she
sought commenced on January 1, 2005. There is simply no legal or logical
authority for the proposition that Stephenson was a member of the Senate
when the Jefferson Circuit Court rendered its decision, a point conceded
by all parties. Because she was not a member, the Jefferson Circuit Court's
order in no manner violated Section 38 of the Kentucky Constitution. It is
also for this reason that Appellants', as well as the dissenting opinions', reli-
ance on cases dealing with this Court's refusal to interfere with the General
Assembly's exclusive authority to pass on the qualifications of its members is
clearly misplaced. 3
In other words, because Stephenson was not a "member" of the body
in the full sense of the word when the Jefferson Circuit Court rendered its
decision, that decision did not implicate the senate's authority under the
constitution.
The Court then took up the scope of the statute. Between Stephen-
son and Williams, three basic arguments had been raised in this area, two
pertaining to timing and one to relief. With regard to timing, Stephenson
had argued that a motion under the statute had to be brought long enough
before the election to be resolved prior thereto,s°4 and both Stephenson
and Williams had taken the position that a court could not exercise jurisdic-
tion under the statute once the election had occurred."O' With respect to
relief, Stephenson had argued that a court's options under the statute were
limited, and did not include authority to grant relief after an election.
86
The Court addressed the first of these arguments in strictly textual
terms. Because the statute provided that a motion thereunder could be
brought "at any time prior to the general election, 8 °7 it refused to accede
to any other deadline. "This language is clear and free of any ambiguity or
uncertainty," the Court reasoned. 08
803 Id. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
804 See Brief forAppellant Dana Seum Stephenson at I6 (quoting the record), Stephenson
v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2005) (Nos. 2oo5 -SC-6o3 -TG (2oo5-CA-16oi-MR), 2005-
SC-6o4-TG (zoo5-CA-16o2-MR), & 2oo5-SC-645-TG (zoo5-CA-1643-MR).
805 See id. at 15; Brief for Appellant David L. Williams, in His Official Capacity as
President of the Senate at i I, Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3 d 162 (Ky. 2005) (Nos.
2oo5-SC-603-TG (zoo5-CA-i6oi-MR), 2oo5-SC-604-TG (2005-CA-I6o2-MR), & zoo5-SC-
64 5 -TG (2005-CA-16 4 3 -MR); see also Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 19o (Roach, J., dissenting)
("[Aln action.., under KRS 18.176 'evaporates' once the election begins. The clear intent
of the statute is to prevent voters from casting their votes for non-bona-fide candidates, not to
nullify those votes after the fact of their casting.").
8o6 See Brief for Appellant Dana Seum Stephenson at 2, 20, Stephenson v. Woodward,
182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2005).
807 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § I 18.176(2) (West 2005).
8o8 Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 169-70 (majority opinion).
2006- 2007]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The second argument regarding timing provoked a more elaborate
analysis. Before the general assembly amended KRS 118.176 in 2001, a
motion thereunder could only be brought before a primary election. 8°9 As
a consequence, the idea that a court could proceed under the statute after
the general election was at least somewhat problematic. For two distinct
reasons, however, the Court concluded that the Jefferson Circuit Court was
correct in retaining the case after the general election. First, it reasoned,
jurisdiction ordinarily does not dissipate once it attaches."' Second, a stat-
ute that sets a deadline for the bringing of a motion but not for its ultimate
resolution implicitly rejects any such second deadline."1
The Court's analysis regarding relief was embedded in its discussion of
the statute's general scope. Under KRS 118.176(4), if a court finds that a
candidate is not qualified, it must "certify the fact to the board of elections,
and the candidate's name shall be stricken from the written designation of
election officers filed with the board of elections or the court may refuse
recognition or relief in a mandatory or injunctive way. 8  Although the
Court recognized that "striking a candidate's name from the ballot is a pre-
election remedy," it was not willing to construe the statute to allow only
such forms of relief, emphasizing the phrase "may refuse recognition or relief
in a mandatory or injunctive way. 8 13  "By enjoining the Jefferson County
Board of Elections from counting votes cast for Stephenson," it reasoned,
"the court refused recognition of Stephenson by means of an injunction,
which is expressly authorized by the statute.
814
809 See id. at 172 (citing Noble v. Meagher, 686 S.W.zd 458 (1985)).
81o See id. at 170 (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 72 (2005)).
811 See id. at 171.
812 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.176(4) (West 2oo6).
813 See Stephenson, 18z S.W.3d at 171 (quoting Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § I18.176 (West
2oo6)).
814 Id. The scope of this article does not permit close examination of whether KRS
118.176 authorizes a court to proceed after the general election, or whether it authorizes a
court to grant relief in the form of an injunction suppressing a particular candidate's votes.
It suffices to note, however, that no statute can supersede the Constitution, and in fact the
Court itself saw fit in another context to interpret KRS 118.176 narrowly so as to avoid a
constitutional question. As enacted, KRS 118.176 does not provide for review at any point
by the Supreme Court. It simply authorizes a motion to set aside in the Court of Appeals,
the decision of which is then final. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § i18.176(4) (West 2OO6). In
Thomas v. Lyons, however, the Court held that no statute could prevent it from performing its
constitutional duty to exercise appellate jurisdiction. See Thomas v. Lyons, 586 S.W.2d 711,
716 (1979) (citing Ky. CONST. § I 1O(2)(b)). One wonders why the Court was willing to interpret
the statute narrowly so as to preserve judicial prerogatives in Thomas, but could not take a
comparable step vis-A-vis a legislative prerogative in Stephenson. See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at
211 (Scott, J., dissenting) ("Never before has this Court hesitated in finding the application
of KRS i 18.176 to be unconstitutional when it invades constitutionally protected areas."). In
addition, the Court's construction of the language in the statute bearing on relief is somewhat
curious. This language-"may refuse recognition or relief in a mandatory or injunctive
way"-almost certainly refers only to the movant, which would have been Woodward, not
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This brought the Court to the end of its analysis regarding Stephenson.
Having upheld the Jefferson Circuit Court's decision against both statu-
tory and constitutional challenge, and noting that neither Stephenson nor
Williams had sought review of that decision, it proceeded to deem it "bind-
ing on the parties.""' "Though for substantively different reasons," it then
concluded, "we affirm that portion of the Franklin Circuit Court judgment
declaring that Stephenson is not constitutionally qualified for the office
of State Senator and may not be seated." Although the Court did not
really explain what these "substantively different reasons" were, perhaps
it was referring back to its earlier statement that KRS 118.176 conferred
"sole authority" to resolve certain disputes on the courts. The unanswered
question, however, was how any statute could grant "sole authority" to the
courts in derogation of a constitutional provision.
Finally, the Court took up and rejected Woodward's argument that she
was entitled to a seat in the senate. In various cases the courts of Kentucky
had previously held that the runner-up in an election does not accede to
office if the person who wins the most votes is later found unqualified to817
serve. Woodward's claim, the Court reasoned, ran counter to this prin-
ciple.
s
M
Chief Justice Lambert wrote a brief concurring opinion expressing hope
that the decision would be peacefully heeded by the senate. Justice
Cooper also wrote a separate opinion, concurring on Stephenson's inability
to serve but dissenting on the Court's refusal to grant relief that would
810
entitle Woodward to a seat in the legislature. Justice Cooper's argument
proceeded from the premise that, because Woodward brought her motion
before the election, the Jefferson Circuit Court's finding that Stephenson
was not qualified related back to that point in time, thus converting the
votes cast for Stephenson into non-votes. "Thus," he contended, "the re-
Stephenson. Only a movant seeks "relief," and one would reasonably construe the words
"recognition" and "relief," being joined only by the disjunctive "or," to apply to the same
party. As a consequence, one wonders why the Court adopted a strained construction of this
language to limit the Senate's prerogative under the Constitution, yet simply invalidated clear
language in the same statute to vindicate a judicial prerogative.
815 See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 173 (majority opinion).
816 Id.
817 See id. (citing Woods v. Mills, 503 S.W.zd 706 (Ky. 1974); Bogie v. Hill, 151 S.W.zd 765
(Ky. 1941); McKinney v. Barker, 203 S.W. 303 (Ky. 1918)).
818 Seeid. ("[Tihe effect of the disqualification of a candidate subsequent to the election
is that no election has occurred and the true and legitimate will of the people has not yet been
expressed.").
819 See id. at 175 (Lambert, C.J., concurring) ("Responsible officials will reject any notion
of defiance or retaliation against the judiciary, for such action would be an attack upon the
Constitution itself.").
8zo See id. at 176 (Cooper, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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suit [here] is the same as if Woodward ran unopposed. ' ' " Justices Scott
and Roach wrote lengthy dissents, raising a wide variety of issues, both. . ,822
statutory and constitutional.
B. Discussion
The most salient conclusion of Stephenson v. Woodward-that the Jeffer-
son Circuit Court's decision under KRS 118.176 could somehow supersede
the senate's authority under section 38 of the constitution-simply can-
not withstand scrutiny. Its infirmity takes two specific forms. First, what-
ever the legislature said or meant to say when it enacted and subsequently
amended the statute, it lacked power to delegate the senate's authority
under the constitution irrevocably to the courts. Second, that authority,
unimpaired, could not be superseded by statute.
No legislature may bind another, as courts have recognized for centu-
ries,"' including the highest Court of Kentucky. Even in the United
Kingdom, which in theory has no formal constitution, the rule is recognized
825that no one Parliament is subject to another. Indeed, not long before
821 Id. at 177.
822 See id. at 204 (Scott, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe founders of our Constitution did not give
us (only one of the three branches of the government) the power to interfere with 'the qualifi-
cations, elections and returns' of our sister branch, the General Assembly."); id. at 178 (Roach,
J., dissenting) ("The plain words and historical meaning of Section 38 are clear.
One important issue that Justices Scott and Roach raised was how the majority could rec-
oncile its decision with the Speech or Debate Clause of Kentucky's Constitution, which pro-
vides that "for any speech or debate in either House [the members of the General Assembly]
shall not be questioned in any other place." Ky. CONST. § 43. As Justice Roach noted in his
dissent, however, "[s]urely the act of continuing to hold a legislative seat," which Stephenson
was hoping to do, "is the quintessence of legislative function." See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at
199 (applying language from Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Ky. zoo)). Indeed, Justice
Scott in his dissent wondered what the courts would do, in light of section 43, if Stephenson
refused to accede to its judgment. "[Ihf the Appellant, Ms. Stephenson, disregards the injunc-
tion," he wrote, "then we will again be called upon to decide whether or not the contempt
powers of the Courts to enforce an injunction would themselves, be in violation of Section 43
of the Kentucky Constitution ..... Id. at 212 (Scott, J., dissenting). In fact, the majority did
not affirm the Franklin Circuit Court's injunction against Stephenson, instead affirming only
its declaration that she could not serve. See id. at 173 (majority opinion). Justice Scott was
presumably construing the Court's judgment as the functional equivalent of an injunction.
823 See Fletcher v. Peck, io U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (18io) ("[Olne legislature cannot
abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.").
824 See Swift & Co. v. City of Newport, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 37, 41 (1869) ("One legislature
can not control the conduct or limit the power of its successor except by an act operating
as a binding contract."); of City of Mt. Sterling v. King, 104 S.W. 322, 322 (Ky. 1907) ("In
business so important as state legislation, one Legislature cannot put any limitation in the
matter of ordinary legislation upon its successor, control its conduct, or prescribe its method of
procedure in the enactment of laws.").
825 See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 90 (George
Tucker, ed. 1965) ("Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments
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Stephenson the Supreme Court of Kentucky itself recognized the "ancient
principle that each legislature is a free and independent body and cannot
control the conduct of its successor except by acts in the form of binding
contracts." And as much as this is true in the abstract, it is still more
true in this particular context. "It is not within the constitutional power
of Congress," wrote McCrary, "by legislative enactment or otherwise, to
control either house in the exercise of its exclusive right to be the judge of
the election, returns, and qualifications of its own members."' 8z' As the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts similarly noted in Dinan v. Swi. 8"
General phrases elsewhere in the Constitution, which in the absence of an
explicit imposition of power and duty would permit the enactment of laws
to govern the subject, cannot narrow or impair the positive declaration of
the people's will that this power is vested solely in the Senate and House
respectively. It is a prerogative belonging to each House, which each alone
can exercise. It is not susceptible of being deputed. 8 9
Not only is this an axiom of constitutional law and legislative practice, it
also makes eminent sense. A contrary rule would permit today's majority
to adopt rules that would preclude tomorrow's majority from acting. Such
bind not....").
8z6 Fletcher v. Commonwealth ex rel. Stumbo, 163 S.W.3 d 852, 868 (Ky. zoo5) (citing Bd.
of Trs. v. Attorney Gen., 132 S.W.3d 770, 789 (Ky. 2003)). There is also the general rule that
the legislature may not delegate its basic powers. Although the line between the making of
laws and the exercise of executive or administrative discretion is not always easy to discern,
Kentucky adheres to a fairly strict version of this rule. See Legislative Research Comm'n v.
Brown, 664 S.W.ad 907,914-15 (Ky. 1984).
827 MCCRARY, supra note 345, § 338, at 232; see also MASON, supra note 682, § 560, 'i 5,
at 400 (citing cases) ("The exclusive power to judge of the qualifications and elections of
its members is fixed in each house and cannot by its own consent or by legislative action be
vested in any other tribunal or office."); cf Parsons, supra note 573, at 220 (referring to South
Dakota's version of the privilege) ("[Ilt is clear from the specification that 'each house' shall
be the judge 'of its own members' that neither house of the Legislature may interfere with the
seating of the other's members.").
828 Dinan v. Swig, 1 12 N.E. 91 (Mass. 1916).
829 Id. at 92-93; see also Kansas ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Tomlinson, 2o Kan. 692, 1878 WL
986, at *8 (1878) ("While the constitution has conferred the general judicial power of the state
upon the courts and certain officers specified, there are certain powers of a judicial nature
which, by the same instrument, are expressly conferred upon other bodies or officers, and
among them is the power to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of
the legislature. This power is exclusively vested in each house, and cannot by its own consent,
or by legislative action, be vested in any other tribunal or officer."); 68 CONG. REC. 119 (1926)
(Sen. Dill) ("The present membership of the Senate has no authority to decide whether or not
Mr. VARE is qualified to sit in the new Senate. This Senate can not prevent the presentation of
credentials in the Senate of the next Congress."); BUTLER & WOLFF, supra note 226, at 40 ("In
response to Webster's protest, the chair ruled that, because one Congress could not judge the
qualifications for a future Congress, the matter could not be reviewed until March 4, 1837.");
COOLEY, supra note 73, at 149.
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rules require a formal amendment to the constitution. Thus, the general
assembly that met in 2001 and that amended KRS 118.176 to allow an ac-
tion to proceed "at any time prior to the general election" was not compe-
tent to delegate to the courts the authority of the senate that met in January
2005, even assuming that it meant to accomplish any such thing. 83 In other
words, if KRS 118.176 could be interpreted to effect such delegation, it
would to that extent be unconstitutional.
Equally vulnerable to criticism is the conclusion that the decision of
the Jefferson Circuit Court could somehow supersede the senate's consti-
tutional authority because Stephenson was not a "member" of the chamber
in every sense of the word on November 22, 2004, when the court rendered
its judgment. First, this rationale would appear to classify the vast majority
of exercises of the privilege since the Revolution as patently unconstitu-
tional. As we have noted, almost all such exercises have pertained to in-
dividuals presenting themselves for membership-in other words, people
who were not "members," as per the Court's analysis, at the time that their
alleged infirmity first arose. Indeed, of the legislative precedents we dis-
cuss in Subpart II-C, only In re Raney pertained to a ground for exclusion
that arose after the member's admission.s3'
Second, the very language of the privilege as articulated in section 38,
and as articulated in every other constitution that recognizes it, would be
absurd if the Court's interpretation were accurate. This is because a would-
be member's "election" and "return" would never arise after the legisla-832
ture came into session. Thus the Court's interpretation would appear
to reduce the privilege to a power to adjudicate claims of disqualification
arising after the body meets, but not before. Imagine a department of the
government being told that it may "judge of' its members' "qualifications,
elections and returns," only to learn that this language in fact requires it to
accept as members those that other public officials deem eligible, unless13
someone allegedly becomes ineligible after coming on board. Later in
830 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § i 18.176(2) (West 2006).
831 See supra notes 467-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative
precedent, including In re Raney; see also Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 198 (Ky.
2005) (Roach, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's position as "against the great weight
of authority and reason") ("The Senate's power under Section 38 is not limited to the narrow
circumstances that arose in Raney. The vast majority of the [applicable cases] contemplate
that the power conferred by Section 38, and its federal analog, is plenary and comes into play
whenever a legislator elect presents himself or herself to a legislative body for acceptance as
a member.").
83z Cf. Lexington Fayette County Food & Bev. Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Gov't, 131 S.W.3 d 745, 750 (Ky. 2004) (citing County of Harlan v. Appalachian Reg'l
Healthcare, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 607 (Ky. 2002)) (discussing statutory construction) ("It is a primary
rule of statutory construction that no single word or sentence determines the meaning of a
statute. Rather, the statute as a whole must be considered.").
833 Seegenerally Officemax Inc. v. United States, 428 E3d 583,600 (6th Cir. 2005) (Rogers,
J., dissenting) ("A host separately asked two prospective guests what they liked to drink. One
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its opinion, the Court perhaps recognizes this problem and suggests that
the privilege might apply to questions of election and return arising before
the legislature convenes, without attempting to reconcile this suggestion
with its earlier language, and without attempting to explain how two items
in a series of three can be subject to one temporal regime, but the third can
be subject to another. 34 "Cases dealing with election contests-that is,
disputes involving not the qualifications of a candidate but the validity of
the election itself," the Court states, citing Taylorv. Beckham, "are inappli-
5 35cable to this matter." But the Court never explains why exercise of the
privilege at the threshold of service is limited to contests, where it neverhas beenbefore836. ...
has been before, 8nor why a "contest" cannot pertain to qualifications
even though quite a few have, including Goodwin v. Fortescue (outlawry),
83
1
said, 'I like bourbon and water.' The other said, 'I like beer and wine.'When the second guest
arrived at the event, the host served the guest a glass of beer mixed with wine. 'What's that
awful drink?' said the guest, to which the host answered, 'You said you liked beer and wine.'
Replied the guest: 'Pfui! You know what I meant. Quit playing word games and get me
something I can drink.'); Shamburger v. Duncan, 253 S.W.2d 388,390-91 (Ky. 1952) ("[C]ourts
in construing constitutional provisions will look to the history of the times and the state of
existing things to ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the people
adopting it, and a practical interpretation will be given to the end that the plainly manifested
purpose of those who created the Constitution, or its amendments, may be carried out."
(quoting Keck v. Manning, 231 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Ky. 1950))).
834 See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 197 (Roach, J., dissenting) ("Each of those questions,
which appear in the same constitutional provision, is on equal footing, and the analysis as to
each is identical."); see also Parsons, supra note 573, at 221 ("As is apparent from the language
employed, constitutional provisions of this nature contain at least two distinct elements:
(i) the constitutional duty of each legislative body to judge the "elections," "returns," or
"election returns" of its own members; and (2) the constitutional duty of each legislative body
to judge the "qualifications" of its own members. Because these two separate responsibilities
are contained within a single sentence of the constitution, framed by the same grammatical
structure, and supported by the same constitutional history, one would expect the scope of
those responsibilities to be construed in the same manner by the courts that have been called
upon to do so." (footnote omitted)).
835 See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3d at 168 (citing Taylor v. Beckham, 56 S.W. 177 (Ky. 19oo)).
836 See McCaR"s, supra note 345, § 283, at 189-9o ("[T]here are questions which may
be raised, touching the qualifications of a person elected, which may be investigated and
decided as a part of the primafacie case, and as preliminary to swearing in the claimant ...
It is necessary, however, that such allegation should be made by a responsible party; it is
usually made, or vouched for at least, by some member or member elect of the House.");
id. § 336, at 230 ("The House of Representatives of the United States, may in its discretion
proceed to inquire into the validity of one of its members, without any formal contest having
been instituted. A contestant is not absolutely necessary."). In both In re Gallatin and In re
Ames, which we have discussed, the Senate of the United States exercised the privilege on a
question of qualifications at the threshold of service and in the absence of a contestant. See
supra notes 227-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Gallatin and supra notes
314-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of In reAmes.
837 Seesupra notes 139-61 and accompanying text.
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Stanton v. Lane (dual office), 3s Halfieldv. Holt (age), 939  Humblev. Hoover
(residence),8 the last of which actually took place in Kentucky.84'
Finally, the Court's interpretation of the scope of the privilege was ex-
pressly rejected, and in fact described as lacking "real substance," by the
Supreme Court of the United States some seventy-seven years ago. As
may be recalled, in Barry v. UnitedStates ex rel. Cunningham, the Court was
called upon to decide whether Cunningham could be brought before the
Senate for investigation about his refusal to answer questions about where
he had obtained money that he had later contributed to the campaign of
William S. Vare.84' One of Cunningham's arguments was that the Senate
lacked jurisdiction over In re Vare because it had yet to admit him as a
member. 83 Given the obvious purpose of the privilege, the Court had little
difficulty rejecting this objection:
When a candidate is elected to either House, he of course is elected a mem-
ber of the body; and when that body determines, upon presentation of his
credentials, without first giving him his seat, that the election is void, there
would seem to be no real substance in a claim that the election of a "mem-
ber" has not been adjudged. To hold otherwise would be to interpret the
word "member" with a strictness in no way required by the obvious pur-
pose of the constitutional provision, or necessary to its effective enforce-
ment in accordance with such purpose, which, so far as the present case is
concerned, was to vest the Senate with authority to exclude persons assert-
ing membership, who either had not been elected or, what amounts to the
same thing, had been elected by resort to fraud, bribery, corruption, or other
sinister methods having the effect of vitiating the election.8
It is possible, of course, that the Stephenson Court meant only to observe
that, because Stephenson was not literally a member of the senate when
838 See supra notes 269-313 and accompanying text.
839 See supra notes 430-66 and accompanying text.
840 See supra notes 654-63 and accompanying text.
841 For other contests in Kentucky involving qualifications, see, for example, McKinney
v. Taylor, Ky. HousE Joua. 220-21 (Jan. 23, 1900) (dual office re both parties); Callon v. Rardin,
Ky. HousE JouR. 186-88 (Jan. 14, 1888) (dual office); Oldham v. Daniel, Ky. HousE JOUR. 64
(Nov. i1, 1825) (age); cf. Thomas v. Hurst, Ky. HousE JOUR. 90-92 (Dec. 16, 1869) (claim of
dual office not reached because presented too late). For other contests at the federal level
involving qualifications, see Lawson v. Owen, 72 CONG. REc. 10193 (June 6, 1930); McGraw v.
Scott, 32 CONG. REc. 2691-92 (Mar. 2, 1899); Lowry v. White, 19 CONG. REC. 915 (Feb. 2, 1888);
Ramsay v. Smith, i ANNALS oF CONG. 143 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (Apr. 15, 1789).
842 See Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 614 (1929). See supra
notes 367-429 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative precedents of In re
Vare and Wilson v. Vare.
843 See Barny, 279 U.S. at 614.
844 Id. at 615. Seegenerally Schauer, supra note 13, at 419 ("[Language cannot be divorced
from its context, because meanings become clear if and only if certain understandings are
presupposed.").
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the Jefferson Circuit Court rendered its decision, that decision, standing
alone, did not implicate the senate's authority. If this was the Court's entire
point, it knocked on an open door. Obviously Stephenson was not a "mem-
ber" of the senate in every sense of the word before the chamber admitted
her to membership. That is what section 38 means. But the observation
that Stephenson was not literally a member on November 22 accomplishes
nothing, for the real issue in the case was not whether Stephenson was a
member of the senate on that date but instead whether the senate was
empowered under the constitution to find her qualified after it came into
session on January 4, 2005. On this point the Court provided little if any-
thing by way of analysis, except perhaps the untenable suggestion that the
general assembly could somehow delegate a single house's authority under
section 38 irrevocably to the Courts.
Indeed, a similar set of observations explains why the Court misappre-
hended the issues regarding Woodward as well. As noted, the Court also
held that Woodward was not entitled a seat in the senate because she did
not prevail in the election s46 Although this is true, it is also beside the point.
The reason Woodward had no valid claim to the seat was not because she
received fewer votes in the election but because the senate excluded her
on January 4, 2005. The senate's reason for doing so was Woodward's lack of
election, but the plenary nature of the privilege would have permitted the
senate to make the contrary determination, and judicial review of such a
determination would not have been available. 47
In light of the foregoing, the Court in Stephenson appears to have reached
its holding in error. Evaluating the senate's resolution of the contest is more
complicated, however. Given Stephenson's substantial indicia of having
"resided in" Indiana from 1997 to 2001,848 one could reasonably conclude
that she failed to satisfy the requirements for service, and that the senate's
decision was therefore wrong on the merits. On the other hand, the senate
did assemble a substantial record in support of its conclusion that Stephen-
son "resided in" both Kentucky and Indiana during the disputed period,84
and the constitution does not foreclose construing the phrase to encompass
845 In addition to lacking a persuasive basis for superseding the senate's authority under
section 38 of the constitution, Stephenson also lacks a persuasive basis for overcoming section
43 of that document, which protects a member of the legislature, such as Stephenson, from
judicial process in her official capacity. See Ky. CONST. § 43 ("[Flor any speech or debate in
either House [the members of the General Assembly] shall not be questioned in any other
place."); Wiggins v. Stuart, 671 S.W.zd 262, 264 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). This point falls well
within the scope of this article, but space does not permit its full consideration. Justices Scott
and Roach, dissenting in Stephenson, took up this point. See supra note 8zz.
846 See Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 16z, 173-74 (Ky. 2005).
847 See Brown v. Lamprey, zo6 A.2d 493,495 (N.H. 1965).
848 See supra note 30-34 and accompanying text.
849 Seesupra note 56 and accompanying text.
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dual residence.5 In fact, Black's Law Dictionary recognizes in its second
definition of "residence" that "[a] person ... may have more than one resi-
dence at a time but only one domicile." And beyond these lawyerly argu-
ments lie arguments sounding more in substance than form. For example,
Stephenson was as familiar with the thirty-seventh district as Mae Hoover
had been with hers.8 s5 In addition; the voters clearly chose Stephenson in
the general election, and the tradition of giving as much weight as possible
to the wishes of voters is at least as old as In re Wilkes. 53
C. Grounds Not Adduced
Given the significance of the issues presented in Stephenson v. Woodward,
there may be some interest in ascertaining whether some unstated rationale
could sustain the Court's decision. Such a rationale might arise from sec-
tion 2 of Kentucky's constitution, which provides that "[aibsolute and arbi-
trary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere
in a republic, not even in the largest majority." This section bears a close
analytical resemblance to the federal guarantees of due process and equal
protection. A second alternative might arise from the last clause of section
38, which provides that "a contested election shall be determined in suchS7855
manner as shall be directed by law." A third might sound in "waiver" or
a related concept. Close examination of these potential grounds, however,
suggests that they cannot sustain the Court's decision.
1. Section 2, Due Process, and Equal Protection.-In theory, one could seek
to justify Stephenson in terms of section 2 of Kentucky's constitution, which
850 See Ky. CONST. § 32 ("No person shall be a Senator who, at the time of his election, is
not a citizen of Kentucky, has not attained the age of thirty years, and has not resided in this
State six years next preceding his election, and the last year thereof in the district for which
he may be chosen.").
851 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (8th ed. 2004); see also id. (defining "resident"
secondarily as "[a] person who has a home in a particular place," and noting that, "[iun [this]
sense, a resident is not necessarily either a citizen or a domiciliary"). In this regard, we also note
that, although section 32 of the constitution requries a senator to have "resided in" Kentucky
six years prior to his or her election, it only requires citizenship in the commonwealth "at the
time of" the election. Ky. CONST. § 32. Some of the indicia of Stephenson's "resid[ence] in"
Indiana during the disputed period, such as her casting of votes, pertained more to citizenship
than to "resid[ence]."
852 See supra notes 654-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Humble v. Hoover,
and see supra notes 467-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Raney, which
involved similar considerations.
853 See supra notes 578-618 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Wilkes.
854 Ky. CONST. § 2.
855 Ky. CONST. § 38. This section provides in full that "[ejach House of the General
Assembly shall judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, but a
contested election shall be determined in such manner as shall be directed by law."
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provides that "[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largestS .856...
majority." Although originally adopted with the principal goal of protect-
ing slavery, section 2 was retained in the current constitution and now
operates much like a guarantee of due process or equal protection. 8 The
defense of Stephenson under section 2 would posit that the senate's finding
that Stephenson was qualified to serve was "arbitrary" and therefore an
abuse of its authority under section 38. 859
Although this argument has the virtue of standing on text, it does go
beyond the principal understanding of section 2 as a guarantor of individualS 860 ...
rights. More significantly, however, it would also eliminate the entire
concept of "non-justiciable political questions" as a category of constitu-
tional law. After all, if the resolution of such questions were subject to
judicial review, they would no longer be "non-justiciable."
Take, for example, the question of impeachment. Imagine that a con-
stitutional officer were indicted for a crime, tried, and subsequently exon-
erated on a directed verdict. Imagine further that a member of the house
then introduced articles of impeachment against the officer for precisely
the conduct at issue at trial. If section 2 applied to non-justiciable politi-
cal questions, the officer could seek equitable relief against the pending
impeachment on the ground that a court of law had already rejected its
factual basis, despite the provision of the constitution that gives the house
"the sole power of impeachment." 6 1
This power and others expressly assigned by the constitution to branch-
es of the government other than the courts would be implicated were sec-
tion 2 amenable to judicial enforcement in such matters. Indeed, the list of
non-justiciable political questions arising from a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment"8 61 is quite long. It includes the house's power to impeach, the sen-
856 Ky. CONST. § 2.
857 See John D. Dyche, Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution-Where Did it Come From and
What Does itMean?, i8 N. Ky. L. REV. 503, 503, 505-07 (1990).
858 See Ky. Milk Mktg. & Antimonopoly Comm'n v. Kroger Co., 691 S.W.2d 893,899 (Ky.
1985). See generally Dyche, supra note 857, at 5 17-18.
859 Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution makes the "general powers of government"
subject to the bill of rights, of which section 2 is a part. Of course, section 26 goes on to make
these powers subjet to the entire constitution, so section z6 does not appear to make the bill
of rights uniquely fit for judicial review. See KY. CONST. § 26 ("To guard against transgression
of the high powers which we have delegated, We Declare that every thing in this Bill of Rights
is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and
all laws contrary thereto, or contrary to this Constitution, shall be void.").
86o See Dyche, supra note 857, at 518.
861 Ky. CONST. § 66.
862 Philpot v. Haviland, 88o S.W.zd 550, 553 (Ky. 1994) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)).
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ate's power to try after an impeachment, the executive's power to call or
not call a special session,"' a legislator's power to introduce or not intro-
duce a bill, a legislator's power to vote yea or nay, the executive's power to
approve or veto legislation, the executive's power to fill vacancies, and the
864
executive's power to call out the militia. In theory, all these powers can
be exercised "arbitrarily." We should be loathe to adopt a rule that would
eliminate such a broad category of constitutional practice. Moreover, leav-
ing non-justiciable political questions to the legislature or the executive,
as the case may be, promotes important values associated with majoritar-
ian political theory. In any political system worthy of the name, ultimate
power to resolve particular issues will reside somewhere, and exercise of
that power will potentially give rise to controversy. But the people, through
their written constitution, have chosen to allocate certain forms of authority
to the various branches of government, subject only to the ultimate author-
ity of the citizenry. As Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska noted in In
re Var.
I presume our forefathers ... knew that to whatever tribunal they gave this
authority, there was a possibility of its being abused, and inasmuch as that
possibility would necessarily exist wherever the responsibility was placed,
they thought it best to let the Senate settle its own difficulties and be the
865
judge of the qualifications of its own members.
Indeed, as powerful as the concept of non-justiciable political questions
might be in the abstract, its power rises to its zenith with regard to the
privilege we have been discussing because of its strong textual basis. In
fact, in a famous speech on the general subject of non-justiciable political
questions, the noted constitutional scholar Herbert Wechsler, who on the
863 See Royster v. Brock, 79 S.W.zd 707, 711 (Ky. 1935) ("The Governor... need not
issue the proclamation until, after reasonable deliberation, he has determined it is absolutely
necessary."); Geveden v. Commonwealth ex rel. Fletcher, 142 S.W.3d 170, 172 (Ky. Ct. App.
2004).
864 See Franks v. Smith, 134 S.W. 484,487 (Ky. 1911).
865 69 CONG. REC. 988 (Dec. 22, 1927). For a general discussion of non-justiciable
political questions, see Fletcher v. Commonwealth ex rel. Stumbo, 163 S.W.3 d 852, 860 (Ky.
2005). See also REx E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 196 (1981) ("In a sense, the
political-question doctrine constitutes an exception to Marbury v. Madison. Marbury v. Madison
held that it is the province of the courts to say what the law is, including constitutional law.
From that basic premise, the political-question doctrine carves out a few substantive areas of
constitutional law that are not for judicial decision but are left for ultimate decision by one
of the judiciary's sister branches."); Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction
to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CuI. L. REV. 366, 408 (1984) ("[Allthough the
Constitution is concerned with the policing of governmental processes, it does not make
the judiciary the sole or even the dominant institution to carry out this function."); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1706 (2004) ("[Olur
Structural Constitution confers the priceless values of self-governance upon many different
entities.").
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whole opposed the recognition of such questions, acknowledged the exis-
tence of at least two-the legislative power to impeach (and try thereafter)
and the legislative privilege to adjudicate members' eligibility. "[AJII [this]
doctrine can defensibly imply," he said, "is that the courts are called upon
to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of gov-
ernment the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that
itself requires an interpretation":
Who, for example, would contend that the civil courts may properly review
a judgment of impeachment when article I, section 3 declares that the 'sole
Power to try' is in the Senate? ... What is explicit in the trial of an im-
peachment, or, to take another case, the seating or expulsion of a Senator or
Representative may well be found to be implicit in others.86
For the same reasons, the basic operation of the privilege cannot be
subject to judicial review vis-A-vis the federal guarantees of due process
and equal protection without depriving it of significance. Various courts
have recognized this. As we have noted, the two houses of Congress have
the same authority to judge the "[ellections, [rieturns and [qiualifications"86?
of their members as the two houses of the general assembly, and the
claim has been made and rejected that an allegedly improper determina-
tion pursuant to this power is actionable in a court of law. Although the
court in Morgan v. United States868 acknowledged that some actions tangen-
tially related to the privilege, such as the compelling of witnesses to appear,
might be subject to judicial scrutiny, it went on to conclude that review
cannot be available with respect to the legislature's substantive determina-
866 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 7-8 (1959) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1O89, 1102 (1997) ("The text of
the Constitution thus gives the representatives of all the people the final say in judging the
qualifications of the representatives of any one State ...."); Van Alstyne, supra note 573, at
9--.io ("Of course, it is a nice question how many clauses of this kind, if any, the Constitution
contains. Very few come labeled as justiciable or nonjusticiable as such-actually none do.
Still, it may not be difficult to propose an example or two of a sort that [Chief Justice] Marshall
himself might have approved. So, as one such plausible example, consider a provision in
Section 5 of Article I. The pertinent section provides that: "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members ...." (emphasis added)); Wechsler,
supra, at 9 (footnote omitted) ("If I may put my point again, I submit that in cases of the kind
that I have mentioned ... the only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from
decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another
agency of government than the courts."). See generally Allan Ides, Judicial Supremacy and the
Law of the Constitution, 47 UCLA L. REV. 491, 506 (1999) (discussing the privilege at the federal
level) ("This placement of the judging function in the legislative branch, however, does not
alter the fact that the subject rules are enforceable. It merely defines the location for that
enforcement.").
867 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. i.
868 Morgan v. United States, 8oi E2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
2006- 2007]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
tion.169 As the court put the matter, an alleged deprivation of due process
or denial of equal protection arising from the privilege "must rest on viola-
tion of some individual interest beyond the failure to seat an individual
or to recognize that person as the winner of an election. That substantive
determination, which is the issue in the present case, resides entirely with
the House. ' 870 This approach is correct, for any other application of these
two clauses would render the privilege meaningless.
Another serious deficiency to the argument under section 2 is that it
fails to engage the history and precedent of the privilege. As we have noted
elsewhere in this Article, legislatures resolving contests, protests, and peti-
tions under the privilege have often come to a conclusion that a court of law
almost certainly could not reach, exalting substance over form or march-
ing to the beat of a different drummer. The problem with subjecting
the privilege to judicial review for "abuse" is therefore both fundamental
and definitional. If abuse were defined as deviation from settled law, then
the legislatures have arguably abused their privilege on numerous and per-
haps innumerable occasions since the Revolution, including in such mat-
ters as Stanton v. Lane, In re Vare, In re Raney, Durkin v. Wyman, and Humble
v. Hoover. Defining these precedents as somehow invalid would not only
undermine the text of the privilege and disserve the concept of legisla-
tive independence, it would also effect a dramatic departure from historical
practice.
Indeed, if actionable "abuse" of the privilege constituted coming to a
conclusion that a court would avoid, then the privilege means almost noth-
ing, converting the legislature into the equivalent of a lower court. This
is because virtually any resolution of a contest will sustain an argument
in good faith that the chamber has reached a conclusion contrary to law.
This judicial device would be resorted to in almost every instance, and
legislative contests would become merely the first step in the process."'
If, by contrast, "abuse" of the privilege were somehow defined as "gross
869 See id. at 45 1.
870 Id. Indeed, the highest Court of Kentucky made the same observation in Taylor v.
Beckham:
The congress of the United States has, by the constitution, the power
to judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns of its members. In
not a few cases it has been supposed to have acted arbitrarily in such
matters, but it was never maintained that one who was ousted of his
seat in congress on a contest could take the matter into the courts to
supervise the action of congress on such grounds as are alleged in this
case.
Taylor v. Beckham, 56 SW. 177, 184 (Ky. 19oo), appeal dismissed, 178 U.S. 548 (19oo).
871 See supra notes 664-7o and accompanying text.
872 See Morgan, 8oi E2d at 450 ("Adding a layer of judicial review.., would undoubtedly
be resorted to on a regular basis .... ").
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deviation" from settled principles of law, the perplexing and unanswerable
question would arise of exactly what constitutes such deviation. At the
end of the day, judicial resolution of a process that has historically lain at
the intersection of law and politics is a contradiction in terms. From the
point of view of any one judge at any one time, the "law" is an objectively
cognizable concept, and a rule either conforms to it or does not. Though
judges may disagree, and although a judge's opinion on an issue may vary
over time, the concept of law does not presuppose alternative rules for one
judge at one time. There being no undistributed middle, neither a judge
nor a collegial court operating by majority could meaningfully distinguish
"acceptable" from "unacceptable" quasi-political resolutions of a contest.
In addition, the presupposition that the privilege will be used primar-
ily for ill is not well supported by the facts. As Senator Walter F. George
noted long ago in defense of Rush Holt, the House of Representatives had
allowed John Young Brown of Kentucky to take his seat, although he had
lacked the requisite age at the beginning of the session for which he had
been elected, "and yet immature men under 25 years of age [were not]
elected in sufficient number to prevent the orderly functioning of govern-
ment."' 873 For whatever reason, legislatures have tended to be modest in
their exercise of the privilege.
Finally, although this point is most important within Kentucky, the
highest court of the commonwealth long ago held that legislative resolu-
tion of a contested gubernatorial election, closely analogous to exercise of
the privilege, is not actionable under section 2. Over a century ago, in Tay-
lor v. Beckham, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to the
legislature's determination that the voters had chosen Goebel instead of
Taylor to serve as governor. Much of the Court's analysis proceeded from
the provision of the constitution that authorizes the legislature to resolve
such contests, which as noted earlier is functionally identical to Kentucky's
articulation of the privilege. But portions of the Court's analysis also
touched on section 2, and the Court held that legislative resolutions of con-
tested gubernatorial elections are not subject to judicial review under that
provision.
First, counsel for appellants in Taylor clearly raised the section in their
arguments. For example, Bradley, representing Taylor, presented a hybrid
argument predicated on both section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment
to the federal Constitution: "The Legislature," he said, "having violated
873 74 CONG. REC. 9754 (June 20, 1935) (Sen. George);seesupra note 451 and accompanying
text.
874 Compare Ky. CONST. § 38 ("Each House of the General Assembly shall judge of
the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, but a contested election shall be
determined in such manner as shall be directed by law."), with id. § 90 ("Contested elections
for Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall be determined by both Houses of the General
Assembly, according to such regulations as may be established by law.").
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every rule of procedure governing the trial, has attempted to exercise ar-
bitrary and absolute power and has in this way deprived the appellants of
their privileges and immunities under the Constitution ... ." Similarly,
the firm of Helm, Bruce and Helm, representing appellants, argued that
"[airbitrary power exists nowhere in a republic." And Phelps, represent-
ing appellees, responded in kind, noting that "'[a]bsolute and arbitrary
power' must lie somewhere in determining these matters, and it is within
the domain of the Legislature to so place it.""' The references to section
2 are unmistakable.
And in its opinion the Court took up and rejected appellants' argu-
ments: "It is averred," the Court noted, " that the general assembly acted
without evidence, and arbitrarily." ' The Court further added that:
It is also argued that the contest board was not fairly drawn by lot; that
certain of the board were liable to objection on the score of partiality, and
that, therefore, this board was not properly constituted. If any of these ob-
jections were well founded, the general assembly had full power to take
such action as was proper in the premises. It does not appear that any of
the objections urged were presented to the general assembly, but, if they
were, and it refused to make a correction, if must be presumed that it had
sufficient reasons for its action. 79
Given this language, one cannot say that the courts of Kentucky have left
open the question of whether section 2 applies to a non-justiciable political
question such as the exercise of legislative authority under section 38.
2. The Last Clause of Section 38.-Because section 38 includes a second,
conjunctive clause, Kentucky's articulation of the privilege is slightly more
complicated than that of many other states. Although the section recogniz-
es, in customary fashion, that "[elach House of the General Assembly shall
judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members," it goes
on to say "but a contested election shall be determined in such manner as• ,,880 ..
shall be directed by law." In the abstract, this language might permit ju-
dicial review of the "manner" in which a contest is resolved, but such an
875 Taylor v. Beckham, 56 S.W. 177, IO8 Ky. 278, 281 (0oo) (Bradley, for appellant).
876 Id. at 282 (Helm, Bruce and Helm, for appellants).
877 Id. at 283 (Phelps, for appellees).
878 Taylor, 56 S.W. at 179.
879 Id. at 183.
88o Ky. CONST. § 38.
881 Given the plenary nature of the privilege, however, a strong argument can be made
that even the "manner" of resolving a contested election is to be interpreted and enforced
solely by the legislature. In somewhat analogous circumstances, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the manner by which the Senate undertakes to "try" impeachments
itself presents a non-justiciable political question. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
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action, in fact, would have been unfounded in Stephenson's contest against
Woodward because, in resolving the contest, the senate adhered to the pro-
cedures laid down in the applicable statutes.
These procedures are codified at KRS 120.215 and 120.205. KRS
120.215, for example, provides that:
When the election of a member of the General Assembly is contested,
the branch to which he belongs shall, within three (3) days after its organiza-
tion, and in the manner provided in KRS 120.205, select a board of not more
than nine (9) nor less than five (5) of its members to determine the contest.
Such board shall be governed by the same rules, have the same power, and
be subject to the same penalties as a board to determine the contested elec-
tion of Governor. It shall report its decision to the branch of the General
Assembly by which it was appointed, for its further action.
8
81
Review of the senate's procedure in resolving the contest will show that it
observed this and other applicable statutes, and that therefore an action
under the last clause of section 38 would not have been tenable.
Although Woodward presented the argument in Stephenson that KRS884
118.176 sets forth the "manner" of resolving a contested election, the
Court properly did not take this position, emphasizing instead the statute's
role as a regulation of elections. 85  "[Tihis Court has specifically deter-
mined," it noted, "that pre-election challenges pursuant to KRS 118.176
are not election contests." Indeed, it defies credulity to argue that a statute,
such as KRS 120.215, that begins with the words "[w]hen the election of
236 (1993) ("[Olpening the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in
trying impeachments would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps
years, of chaos."').
882 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.215 (West 2OO6).
883 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
884 See Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Virginia L. Woodward in Response to Briefs
Filed by Appellants Dana Seum Stephenson and David L. Williams at 37, Stephenson v.
Woodward, 182 S.W.3 d 16z (Ky. 2005) (Nos. 2oo5-SC-6o3-TG (zoo5-CA-i6oi-MR), 2oo5-SC-
6o4-TG (2005-CA-it6oz-MR), & 2oo5-SC-645-TG (200 5 -CA-16 4 3 -MR) ("In accordance with
Section 38, the General Assembly has created a statutory scheme found in KRS Chapters 116
through IM1A to regulate the outcome of elections.").
885 Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, j68 (Ky. 2oo6); see also id. at 202 (Scott,
J., dissenting) ("'Pre-election proceedings' are regulated by KRS Chapter 1 18 and are not an
approved means of determining the 'qualifications, elections, and returns' of the members of
the General Assembly under Ky. Const. Sec. 38."); Noble v. Meagher, 686 S.W.2d 458,461 (Ky.
1985) (noting that an action under KRS 118.176 "is technically not an election contest"); id. at
460 ("It is important to distinguish between an election contest and a pre-election lawsuit.");
Fletcher v. Wilson, 495 S.W.ad 787, 791 (Ky. 1973) ("An election contest obviously is a post-
election procedure, involving an election that has been held, as distinguished from a pre-
election suit to determine whether a person may be voted on as a candidate.") (emphasis
added).
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a member of the General Assembly is contested" does not set forth the
"manner" in which such contests should proceed.
Even though legislators on at least one occasion have construed the
last clause of section 38 to make substantive provisions of law apply to886
contests, the validity of such a construction is subject to serious doubt.
To be sure, legislators are on solid ground when they resolve contests in
accordance with such provisions, but the clause does not mandate such
accordance. In fact several principles suggest strongly to the contrary.
First of all, ascribing a substantive meaning to the word "manner" would
be quite unorthodox, particularly where the tradition and theory underly-
ing the privilege cut decidedly in the opposite direction. Second, such a
construction is far from universal, as Humble v. Hoover attests. Section 32
of the constitution requires members of the house to have "resided in this
State two years next preceding [their] election, and the last year thereof
in the county, town or city for which [they] may be chosen."887 Although
Hoover had "resided in" her district less than a month before her election,
the house nevertheless found her qualified, choosing to emphasize her fa-
miliarity with the district, the unusual circumstances presented in the con-
test (the district's lines had recently changed), and the voters' expressed
desire that Hoover represent them instead of the substantive requirements
of section 32. 8 ' If a chamber of the general assembly could exalt the sub-
stance of section 32, a constitutional provision, over its form, afortiori it
could exalt the substance of a statute over its form.
Third, interpreting the clause to require adherence to the entire elec-
toral code and supporting precedent would allow judicial review of virtu-
ally every exercise of the privilege (assuming such review was available
under the last clause of section 38 at all), because an argument can almost
always be made in good faith that resolution of a contest has departed from
an established principle of substantive law. In addition to seriously un-
dermining separation of powers, this would also eliminate exercise of the
privilege as a distinct aspect of our legal and political culture, preventing
the legislature from overlooking technical defects in pursuit of a broader
goal, such as vindication of the expressed interests of the voters.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the proper construction of the
last clause of section 38 is that, at most, it subjects the procedures by which
the legislature exercises the privilege to judicial review.
3. "Waiver".-A third possible justification for Stephenson, apart from the
rationale adopted by the Court, lies in the idea of "waiver" or a related
concept. According to this justification, the holding in the case was ap-
886 See Gilliam v. Follis, Ky. HOUSE JOUR. 95-97 (Jan. I 2, 1894) (majority report).
887 Ky. CONST. § 32.
888 See supra notes 654-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of this contest.
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propriate because the Jefferson Circuit Court found Stephenson ineligible
to serve, and neither Stephenson nor Williams sought review of that find-
ing. Although the Court noted this choice on Stephenson and Williams's
part at various points in its opinion, it never indicated that this was itself a
ground for its disposition of the case. This was appropriate, for a contrary
indication would have mistaken politeness for separation of powers. If the
judiciary as a whole lacked authority to supersede the senate's determina-
tion, then afortiori the Jefferson Circuit Court lacked such authority. In
this regard, one should also note that Stephenson never asked to be a party
to the action in Jefferson Circuit Court, and Williams made no arguments to
889
that court respecting Stephenson's putative qualifications.
D. Glitches
In addition to trivializing a privilege central to legislative independence,
the decision in Stephenson will also quite likely engender uncertainty in
the area of elections. For example, the Court quite clearly takes the posi-
tion early in the case that the senate's authority under section 38-and
presumably therefore also the House's authority under the same provision
-does not operate with respect to individuals who present themselves to
the chamber for membership. As noted above, this is not a sensible inter-
pretation of the language, and it departs radically from precedent, history,
and theory. Nevertheless, any person made subject to a contest, protest, or
petition at the threshold of service will undoubtedly rely on this language
to suggest that the chamber in question is acting beyond its authority, and
the court to which this person takes his or her case will be confronted with
Stephenson as precedent. The court may, of course, rely on the Court's later
observation in Stephenson that the authority of the two houses under section891
38 in fact does extend to questions pertaining to election and return, but
even then the would-be member will argue that the latter observation does
not control the earlier, broader one. Quite certainly, then, a protracted legal
action will proceed, even though under a proper interpretation of the law
an outright dismissal would have been the proper resolution of the mat-
ter. Moreover, the foregoing supposition assumes a question of election
or return is presented. If, on the other hand, a question of qualifications
were presented at the threshold of service, as with Stanton v. Lane, Hatfield
v. Holt, or Humble v. Hoover, the Court's later quasi-reversal of itself would
have no application, and the courts would find themselves in something of
a quandary.
889 See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Woodward v. Stephenson, No.
04-CI-09261 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Ky. Nov. 8, 2004).
890 See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3 d at 167-68.
891 See id. at 167.
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Stephenson also casts doubt upon the constitutionality of the statutes
that set forth the procedures for legislative contests. These were the pro-
cedures according to which the senate conducted the contest of Stephenson
v. Woodward. These procedures contemplate contests at the threshold of
membership, and indeed make elaborate provision for the taking of evi-
dence before the chamber comes into session.89 Presumably these pro-
cedures are now unconstitutional to the extent they purport to pertain to
qualifications, elections, and returns at the threshold of membership. In
addition, even if the Court's second observation on the scope of section 38
is correct, and not its inconsistent first one, then these provisions are still
unconstitutional to the extent they contemplate a contest regarding uali-
fications at the onset of service, as was the case in Humble v. Hoover.
9
Finally, Stephenson also leaves us in a quandary regarding grounds for
disqualification that arise after the general election but before the general
assembly comes into session. This can happen, for example if a member-
elect simply moves to another country, yet Stephenson appears to eliminate
the exclusive historical means of adjudicating a challenge to such a mem-
ber-elect's qualifications upon the convention of the legislature. In this
regard, one must bear in mind that the Court purported to justify its deci-
sion on the scope of KRS 118.176, but that statute clearly will not permit
an action to be initiated after the general election, nor will the improbable
analysis of Stephenson permit a house of the general assembly to adjudicate
such an issue, given that the issue regarding qualification arose before the
body came into session.
There are quite likely other anomalies that the decision in Stephenson
will create, given its deviation from well-settled and coherent principles
of separation of powers and legislative practice, but these should suffice to
demonstrate the need for attention to the potential problems created by
this decision.
CONCLUSION
The practices and privileges of legislatures have long histories, often
grounded in constitutional text, and it is unfortunate when legal academics,
attorneys, and judges overlook or trivialize such history. "People will not
look forward to posterity," wrote Edmund Burke, "who never look back-
ward to their ancestors." "By a constitutional policy," he went on to ob-
892 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.195(2) (West 2oo6) ("In the case of a member of the
General Assembly, the notice shall be given within fifteen (15) days after the final action of the
county board of elections or the State Board of Elections, whichever canvasses the returns.");
id. § 120.195(3) ("The taking of depositions to be used before a board or branch of the General
Assembly shall close ten (io) days before the next meeting of the General Assembly, or, if in
session when notice is given, when the taking is ordered to close.").
893 See supra notes 654-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of this contest.
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serve, "working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit
our government and our privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy• . ,894
and transmit our property and our lives." Repairing the apparent damage
from Stephenson v. Woodward would be part of this salutary process.
Stephenson v. Woodward reflects a profound lack of appreciation for the
history and theory underlying the legislative privilege to "judge of" the
"qualifications, elections and returns" of its members. s9' It also departs
dramatically from text and from the overwhelming weight of applicable
precedent, both legislative and judicial. For these reasons, we earnestly
hope that the Supreme Court of Kentucky will have occasion to revisit this
decision and unwind its questionable reasoning.
894 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND ON THE
PROCEEDINGS IN CERTAIN SOCIETIES IN LONDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT I 19 (Conor Cruise
O'Brien ed., 1968) (1790); see also Fouad Ajami, A Sage in Christendom, WALL ST. J., May I, 2oo6,
at A14 ("In the normal course of things, America is not a country given to excessive deference
to historians and to the claims of history, for the past is truly a foreign country here.").
895 KY. CONST. § 38.
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